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A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTI ON 
The training, working conditions, and careers of restricted and unrestricted line 
officers differ significantly in the U.S. Navy.  In addition, many differences also exist 
within each group.  Some occupations are riskier and more arduous than others, and some 
occupations require long-term deployments.  Officers assigned to duties in foreign 
countries must live in those countries for extended periods, and vast cultural differences 
often influence the officers’ lifestyles.  In addition, according to the Navy’s assignment 
policy, duty stations for officers change every two or three years.  When compared with a 
civilian who has a “regular” job, it is obvious that the duties of Navy officers can be far 
more demanding and far more intrusive in one’s personal life.  
In public service, serving one’s country with loyalty and devotion is a 
requirement, and the “oath of ser vice” is the symbolic contract of this devotion.  Officers 
begin their service cognizant of the difficulties of their profession and obey the orders 
that sometimes affect not only themselves, but also their families throughout their 
service.  On the one hand, being an officer -on-duty regularly in the earlier career period, 
going on long-term deployments, and serving consecutive assignments to different 
locations, including foreign countries, limit the time available to single Navy officers for 
their personal lives.  This may reduce the possibility of finding a suitable spouse.  On the 
other hand, these difficulties can threaten the stability of an existing marriage.  
The degree to which officers are affected differs greatly according to their duties.  
For instance, one of the eligibility requirements of the U.S. Naval Academy is to be 
single with no dependents.  Midshipmen must leave their hometowns and their friends, 
including their potential spouses, for four years during their enrollment at the Naval 
Academy, and they only have limited free time during the holidays.  Also, the stress that 
submariners and Navy SEALS are exposed to in their duties is typically much greater 
than that of most other Navy officers, and this stress may affect their private lives in a 
more profound manner.  
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The Navy recognizes differences in the working conditions of officers and tries to 
compensate for these difficulties through many policies.  Some of these policies exist in 
the form of monetary incentives, and some are in the form of family support services.  
The main purpose of these policies is to improve the quality of the lives of the officers 
and their dependents to the same level as that of the officers who have relatively less 
difficult duties.  These policies have always been important to the Department of 
Defense, both in terms of their financial and social dimensions.  One of the indications of 
the effectiveness of these policies is the degree to which they may prevent divorces.  This 
is important, because a recent study discovered that married male U.S. Navy officers 
have better on-the-job performance and higher probability of promotion to O-4 than do 
their unmarried counterparts.1  For this reason, healthy marriages of Navy officers are not 
only beneficial for society, but can also contribute to the readiness of the Navy. 
Healthy marriages have always been an issue of concern in the U.S.  The trends 
for marriage and divorce rates of both the U.S. population as a whole and the Armed 
Forces have changed a great deal over time.  Generally, the U.S. has always had one of 
the highest divorce rates in the world.  Many studies have been conducted comparing the 
marital status trends in the Armed Forces and the U.S. population.  However, these 
studies only covered the total Navy, so the effects of different occupational or working 
conditions in the Navy on the marital status of officers could not be examined.     
This thesis utilizes data on U.S. Navy officers to analyze the effects of military 
assignments and duties on the marital status of Navy officers.  The thesis seeks to 
determine whether specific duties in the Navy significantly affect marital status.  The 
results are used to make recommendations about policies that may affect the officers’ 
quality of life and family well-being. Conducting a detailed study on specific duties and 
occupations provides better information to policy makers on the precise working 
conditions that affect the well-being of officers.  The results also promote more informed 
discussion concerning current problems related to the marital status of Navy officers and 
actions to remedy these problems.  
                                          
1 Ryu, Seung-min and Kol, Mustafa, An Analysis of the Relationship between Marital Status and 
Family Structure and On-the-Job Productivity, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, March 2002. 
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B. THESIS PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is, first, to ascertain if some types of duties and 
assignments significantly affect the decisions of Navy officers to marry and divorce.  The 
second goal is to detect the effectiveness of the policies of the Department of Defense 
that provide monetary and non-monetary incentives to officers in these occupations and 
duties.  
C. THESIS SCOPE  
This research encompasses four parts: (1) a review of previous studies about the 
marriage and divorce trends in the United States; (2) estimation of different models and 
testing of hypotheses about the effects of duties on the marital status of Navy officers; (3) 
summary of major findings and recommendations; and (4) discussion of the limitations of 
the study and possible extensions. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions addressed by this thesis are: 
· Do U.S. citizens, in general, and military officers have the same mar riage 
and divorce rates? 
· Which military duties affect the marital status of Navy officers? 
· Do long deployments contribute to divorce? 
· Do foreign duties or long deployments reduce marriage rates? 
The secondary research questions addressed by this thesis are: 
· Does the number of dependents have an impact on divorce?  
· Does the commissioning source affect marriage rates? 
· Do early marriages have a significant effect on divorce? 
E.  THESIS ORGANIZATI ON 
This thesis consists of the following chapters: 
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION.  Introduces the problem, purpose, and scope of the 
thesis, and presents the research questions and organization of the thesis.  
Chapter II: DUTY TYPES AND ASSIGNMENT POLICIES IN THE NAVY.  
Presents detailed information about the duty types and assignment policies in the Navy.  
Chapter III: LITERATURE REVIEW.  Discusses marriage and divorce trends, 
reviews the causes and effects of marriage and divorce decisions of individuals through a 
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review of previous studies and summarizes the major hypotheses about the effects of 
military duties on the marital status of Navy officers based on the literature review.  
Chapter IV: DATA AND METHODOLOGY.  Describes the variables used in the 
models and the basic data, and presents descriptive statistics information on the marital 
status of Navy officers.  Also discusses the methodologies used to estimate the 
multivariate models. 
Chapter V: RESULTS.  Lists and interprets the results of each multivariate model, 
and compares the results obtained from the models.  
Chapter VI: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.  
Summarizes the major findings of the study, identifies the limitations of the research, and 
provides recommendations for policy and future research.  
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II. DUTY TYPES AND ASSIGNMENT POLICIES IN THE NAVY 
A. INTRODUC TION 
There are many different duties in the Navy.  One of the main reasons for limiting 
this thesis only to Navy officers is the necessity of controlling these various kinds of 
duties to some extent.  In the Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) Codes list, 
hundreds of different officer billets are listed.2  The NOBC identifies a group of officer 
billets, which are similar but not necessarily identical in scope, and the nature of duties.3 
Although it is not the exact billet list for the officers, NOBC is a good indicator of how 
the duties in the Navy do differ.  The Navy’s assignment policy concerning sea -shore 
rotations, duties in foreign countries, and the duty changes caused by the increase in the 
officer’s seniority over time, do not allow officers to stay at the same duty station for a 
long period of time.  One of the reasons for the rotation approach in assignments is to 
reduce the negative effects of harder and riskier duties.  For example, during the shore 
cycles, by providing more personal time and relatively easier duties to the officers, the 
officers are expected to eliminate the negative issues they encountered during their sea - 
duty cycles.  Since it is difficult to provide degrees for the hardship of each duty in the 
Navy, and since is also not possible to include every single duty in the studies about the 
negative effects of duties, one must generalize and draw hypotheses.  
This chapter contains detailed information about duty types and assignment 
policies in the Navy to establish a background  for the literature review and to derive 
hypotheses to test the effects of various duties and assignments on the marital status of 
Navy officers.  
B. OFFICER DUTIES IN THE NAVY 
1. Coding of Duties  
Officer duties in the Navy are coded differently for the three occupation codes of 
“primary, secondary, and duty.”  Grouping the officers according to their occupations is 
possible by checking these codes.   
                                          
2 http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD/BUPERS/OFFCLASS/Vol. 1/PART C - 
Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) Codes.PDF, No vember 2002.  
3 http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD/BUPERS/OFFCLASS/Vol 1/PART C - 
Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) Codes.PDF. p. C-3, November 2002.  
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a. Primary Occupation 
Primary occupation codes are composed of a four-digit Designator and the 
most current three-digit Additional Qualification Designator (AQD-1).  The first three 
digits of the officer designator codes are used to group officers by categories for 
personnel accounting and administrative purposes.  The fourth digit is used to determine 
the status of the officers in the various categories.  AQD codes enhance Designator codes 
by identifying more specifically the qualifications of officers and the qualifications 
required by a billet or awarded to the incumbent of a billet.4  Billet and officer designator 
codes are grouped in general categories as follows:5 
(1) Unrestricted Line (URL).  Officers of the line of the 
Regular Navy and Naval Reserve who are not restricted in the performance of their duty.  
(2) Restricted Line (RL).  Officers of the line of the Regular 
Navy and Naval Reserve, who are restricted in the performance of their duty by having 
been designated for aviation duty, engineering duty, aerospace engineering duty, or 
special duty. 
(3) Unrestricted Line – Prospective Staff Corps.  Unrestric ted 
Line officers under instruction as prospective officers of a specific staff corps.  
(4) Staff Corps.  Officers of all staff corps of the Regular Navy 
and Naval Reserve.  The eight staff corps are: (1) Medical Corps; (2) Dental Corps; (3) 
Medical Servic e Corps; (4) Judge Advocate General’s Corps; (5) Nurse Corps; (6) 
Supply Corps; (7) Chaplain Corps; and (8) Civil Engineer Corps.  
(5) Limited Duty-Line.  Officers of the line of the Regular 
Navy and Naval Reserve appointed for the performance of duty in the broad occupational 
fields indicated by their former warrant designators or enlisted rating groups.  
(6) Limited Duty-Staff.  Officers of the staff of the Regular 
Navy and Naval Reserve appointed for the performance of duty in the broad occupational 
fields indicated by their former warrant designators or enlisted rating groups.  
                                          
4 DoD Occupational Conversion Index, DoD 1312.1-I, March 2001, p. 259. 
5 http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD/BUPERS/OFFCLASS/Vol1/PARTA - Billet 
and Officer Designator Codes, p. A-2, November 2002. 
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(7) Chief Warrant-Line.  Officers of the line of the Regular 
Navy and Naval Reserve appointed to chief warrant officer for the performance of duty in 
the technical fields indicated by their former enlisted rating groups.  
(8) Chief Warrant-Staff.  Officers of the staff of the Regular 
Navy and Naval Reserve appointed to chief warrant officer for the performance of duty in 
the technical fields indicated by their former enlisted rating groups. 
Table II.1 shows the billet and officer designator codes in the Navy by 
category and description. 
 
Table II.1. Billet and Officer Designator Codes by Category and Description  
 
BILLET CODE GENERAL CATEGORY BILLET DESCRIPTION 
1100 Unrestricted Line General Unrestricted Line 
1110 Unrestricted Line Surface Warfare 
1120 Unrestricted Line Submarine Warfare 
1130 Unrestricted Line Special Warfare 
1140 Unrestricted Line Special Operations EOD/DIV/SAL 
1160 Unrestricted Line Surface Warfare, Trainee 
1170 Unrestricted Line Submarine Warfare, Trainee 
1180 Unrestricted Line Special Warfare, Trainee 
1190 Unrestricted Line Special Operations, Trainee 
1200 Unrestricted Line Material Professional Designated 
1300 Unrestricted Line Aviation, Terminated 
1310 Unrestricted Line Pilot 
1320 Unrestricted Line Naval Flight Officer  
1370 Unrestricted Line Naval Flight Officer, Trainee 
1390 Unrestricted Line Pilot, Trainee 
1440 Restricted Line Engineering Duty Officer  
1460 Restricted Line ‘Various” Engineering Duty,  Trainee 
1500 Restricted Line Aerospace Engineering 
1510 Restricted Line Aerospace Engineering ENGR 
1520 Restricted Line Aerospace Engineering AMD 
1540 Restricted Line Aviation Duty Officer  
1610 Special Duty Cryptology 
1620 Special Duty Merchant Marine, Deck 
1630 Special Duty Intelligence 
1640 Restricted Line Cryptology, Trainee 
1650 Special Duty Public Affairs 
1660 Special Duty Merchant Marine, Deck - Engineering 
1670 Special Duty Merchant Marine, Engineering 
1690 Special Duty Merchant Marine, Communications  
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BILLET CODE GENERAL CATEGORY BILLET DESCRIPTION 
1700 Special Duty Fleet Support 
1800 Special Duty Oceanography 
1900 Unrestricted Line Prospective Nurse Corps Officer  
1910 Unrestricted Line Prospective Medical Corps Officer  
1920 Unrestricted Line Prospective Dental Corps Officer  
1930 Unrestricted Line Prospective Medical Service Corps Off.  
1940 Unrestricted Line Prospective Chaplain Corps Officer  
1950 Unrestricted Line Prospective Judge Advocate General’s  
1960 Unrestricted Line Prospective Medical Corps Trainee  
1970 Unrestricted Line Scholarship (Medical/Osteopathic) 
1980 Unrestricted Line Scholarship (Dental) Trainee 
1990 Unrestricted Line Scholarship (Medical Service) Trainee 
2100 Staff Corps Medical Corps 
2200 Staff Corps Dental Corps  
2300 Staff Corps Medical Service Corps 
2500 Staff Corps Judge Advocate General Corps  
2700 Staff Corps Active Duty Nurse Corps  
2900 Staff Corps Nurse Corps-General 
3100 Staff Corps Supply Corps-General 
3160 Staff Corps Direct Com. Supply Corps Trainee  
4100 Staff Corps Chaplain Corps  
5100 Staff Corps Civil Engineer Corps  
6110 Limited Duty  Deck, Surface 
6120 Limited Duty Operations, Surface 
6130 Limited Duty Engineering/Repair, Surface 
6150 Limited Duty Special Warfare, technician 
6160 Limited Duty Ordnance, Surface 
6180 Limited Duty Electronics, Surface 
6190 Limited Duty Communications, Surface 
6210 Limited Duty Deck, Submarine 
6230 Limited Duty Engineering/Repair Submarine 
6260 Limited Duty Ordnance, Submarine 
6280 Limited Duty Electronics, Submarine 
6290 Limited Duty Communications, Submarine 
6300 Limited Duty Naval Aviator 
6310 Limited Duty Deck, Aviation 
6320 Limited Duty Operations, Aviation 
6330 Limited Duty Maintenance, Aviation 
6360 Limited Duty Ordnance, Aviation 
6380 Limited Duty  Avionics 
6390 Limited Duty Air Traffic Control 
6400 Limited Duty Nuclear Power 
6410 Limited Duty Administration 
6420 Limited Duty Data Processing 
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BILLET CODE GENERAL CATEGORY BILLET DESCRIPTION 
6430 Limited Duty Bandmaster 
6440 Limited Duty Cryptology 
6450 Limited Duty Intelligence 
6460 Limited Duty Meteorology/Oceanography 
6470 Limited Duty Photography 
6480 Limited Duty Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
6490 Limited Duty Security 
6510 Limited Duty Supply Corps – General 
6530 Limited Duty Civil Engineer Corps  
6550 Limited Duty Judge Advocate General Corps  
7110 Chief Warrant Boatswain, Surface 
7120 Chief Warrant Operations Technician, Surface 
7130 Chief Warrant Engineering Technician, Surface 
7140 Chief Warrant Repair Technician, Surface 
7150 Chief Warrant Special Warfare Technician 
7160 Chief Warrant Ordnance Technician, Surface 
7180 Chief Warrant Electronics Technician, Surface 
7190 Chief Warrant Communications Technician, Surface 
7200 Chief Warrant Diving Officer 
7210 Chief Warrant Boatswain, Submarine 
7230 Chief Warrant Engineering Technician, Submarine 
7240 Chief Warrant Repair Technician, Submarine 
7260 Chief Warrant Ordnance, Submarine 
7280 Chief Warrant Electronics, Submarine 
7310 Chief Warrant Boatswain, Aviation 
7320 Chief Warrant Operations, Aviation 
7340 Chief Warrant Aviation Maintenance Technician 
7360 Chief Warrant Ordnance, Aviation 
7380 Chief Warrant Aviation Electronics 
7400 Chief Warrant Nuclear Power 
7410 Chief Warrant Ship’s Clerk 
7420 Chief Warrant Data Processing 
7440 Chief Warrant Cryptology 
7450 Chief Warrant Intelligence 
7470 Chief Warrant Photographer 
7480 Chief Warrant Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
7490 Chief Warrant Security 
7510 Chief Warrant Supply Corps – General 
7520 Chief Warrant Food Service 
7530 Chief Warrant Civil Engineer Corps  
7560 Chief Warrant Technical Nurse 
From: http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD/BUPERS/OFFCLASS/  PART A - 
Billet and Officer Designator Codes  
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b. Secondary Occupation 
This is composed of the fir st four digits of the most current five-digit 
Subspecialty Code.  The fifth digit states the level of the education/training/experience 
pertaining to the field and is not used in creating Secondary DoD Occupation Codes.  
Subspecialty codes define the field  of application and additional education, experience 
and training qualifications needed to satisfy special requirements within an occupational 
field.  Subspecialties are not applicable to Flag Officer billets and Warrant Officer and 
Limited Duty Officer personnel.6  In addition, Master’s level and higher education 
requirements normally are not applied to Unrestricted Line shore duty billets below the 
grade of LCDR.7  Table II.2 shows the subspecialty (SSP) codes in the Navy by 
education, training or experience and subspecialty area.  
 
Table II.2. Subspecialty (SSP) Codes by Education, Training, or Experience and 
Subspecialty Area 
 
CODE EDUCATION/TRAINING/EXPERIENCE SUBSPECIALTY FOR 
0000 Any Discipline URL/RL Staff Corps 
1101-1103 Civil Engineering Unique Staff Corps  
1201-1207 Legal Unique Staff Corps  
1300-1308 Supply Unique Staff Corps  
1410-1470 Religion Unique Staff Corps  
15xx-16xx Medical Corps Unique Staff Corps  
1700-1795 Dental Corps  Unique Staff Corps  
1800-1893 Medical Service Corps  Unique Staff Corps 
1900-1981 Nurse Corps Unique Staff Corps  
2000-2500 National Security Studies  URL/RL Staff Corps 
3000-3212 Resource Management and Analysis  URL/RL Staff Corps 
4000-4500 Applied Disciplines URL/RL Staff Corps 
5000-5710 Engineering and Technology URL/RL Staff Corps 
6000-6500 Operations URL/RL Staff Corps 
From: http://navprodev.bupers.navy.mil/nss/information/subspeciality_Codes.asp. Part B, 
Subspecialty (SSP) Codes, paragraph 4. 
 
c. Duty Occupation 
A four-digit Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) code identifies a 
group of officer billets that are similar, but not necessarily identical in scope and in 
                                          
6 DoD Occupational Conversion Index, DoD 1312.1-I, March 2001. 
7 http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/508/OfficerClassification/i/I14_PT_B.htm . Part B, 
Subspecialty (SSP) Codes, p. B 1-9, November 2002. 
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nature, in their duties.  When NOBC is us ed to identify a billet, it is a general indicator of 
duties performed to accomplish some part of an activity’s mission.  When used in an 
officer classification, the NOBC reflects qualifications required as a result of 
performance in a billet or, in some instances, a combination of experience and education 
related to the billet’s requirements.8  Currently, there are 678 different officer billet 
classification codes in the Navy. The NOBCs and their corresponding fields are shown in 
Table II.3. 
 
Table II.3. Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) Codes and Corresponding 
Fields 
 
CODES BILLET CLASSIFICATION FIELD 
0000-0099 Health Services Management Group  Health Care Services  
0100-0199 Medical Specialties (Medicine) Group Health Care Services  
0200-0299 Medical Specialties (Surgery) Group  Health Care Services  
0300-0399 General Dentistry Group Health Care Services  
0500-0599 Dental Specialties Group Health Care Services  
0800-0899 Health Care Services Group Health Care Services  
0900-0999 Nursing Group Health Care Services  
1000-1099 Fiscal Group Supply and Fiscal Field 
1100-1199 Subsistence, Open Mess, BQ Management Supply and Fiscal Field 
1200-1299 Transportation Group Supply and Fiscal Field 
1300-1399 Material Distribution Group Supply and Fiscal Field 
1400-1499 Procurement Group Supply and Fiscal Field 
1500-1599 Inventory Control Group Supply and Fiscal Field 
1900-1999 General Group Supply and Fiscal Field 
2000-2099 Physical and Natural Sciences Group  Sciences and Services Field  
2100-2199 Naval Sciences Group Sciences and Services Field  
2200-2299 Social Sciences Group Sciences and Services Field  
2300-2399 Meteorology and Oceanography Group Sciences and Services Field  
2400-2499 Public Affairs Group Sciences and Services Field  
2500-2599 Legal Group Sciences and Services Field  
2600-2699 Management and Administrative Services  Sciences and Services Field  
2700-2799 Security and Police Group Sciences and Services Field  
3000-3099 Recruitment and Selection Group Personnel Field 
3100-3199 Classification and Distribution Group Personnel Field 
3200-3299 General Training Group Personnel Field 
3300-3399 Human Resource Management Group Personnel Field 
3400-3499 Performance Group Personnel Field 
3500-3599 Welfare Group Personnel Field 
                                          
8 DoD Occupational Conversion Index, DoD 1312.1-I, March 2001. 
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CODES BILLET CLASSIFICATION FIELD 
3700-3799 Chaplain Group Personnel Field 
3900-3999 General Group Personnel Field 
4200-4299 Shore Facilities Engineering Group Facilities Engineering Field  
4300-4399 Naval Construction Forces Group Facilities Engineering Field  
5700-5799 Training Devices Group Electronics Engineering 
5900-5999 General Group Electronics Engineering 
6000-6099 Ammunition and Explosives Group Weapons Engineering Field  
6200-6299 Guided Missiles Group Weapons Engineering Field  
6300-6399 Weapons Equipment Group Weapons Engineering Field  
6400-6499 Weapons Control Group Weapons Engineering Field  
6500-6599 Undersea Weapons Group Weapons Engineering Field  
6700-6799 Weapons Material and Programs Group Weapons Engineering Field  
6900-6999 General Group Weapons Engineering Field  
7100-7199 Hull Group Naval Engineering Field 
7200-7299 Machinery Group Naval Engineering Field 
7300-7399 Material Group Naval Engineering Field 
7400-7499 Production Engineering Group  Naval Engineering Field 
7900-7999 General Group Naval Engineering Field 
8000-8099 Aviation Engineering (Design-Acceptance) Aviation Field 
8100-8199 Aviation Engineering-Maintenance-Rework Aviation Field 
8500-8599 Flight Group Aviation Field 
8600-8699 Ground Operations Group Aviation Field 
8800-8899 Photography Group Aviation Field 
8900-8999 General Group Aviation Field 
9000-9099 Staff and Fleet Command Group Naval Operations Field 
9200-9299 Shipboard Operations and Weapons Group Naval Operations Field 
9300-9399 Engineering Operations Group  Naval Operations Field 
9400-9499 Shore Operations Group Naval Operations Field 
9500-9599 Communications Group Naval Operations Field 
9600-9699 Intelligence Group Naval Operations Field 
9700-9799 Automatic Data Processing Group Naval Operations Field 
9800-9899 Cryptology Group Naval Operations Field 
9900-9999 General Group Naval Operations Field 
From: http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD /BUPERS/OFFCLASS/  
Vol%201/PART%20C%20-%20NAVY%20OFFICER%20BILLET%20 CLASSIFICATION 
20(NOBC). PDF, Part C, Navy Officer Billet Classification Codes.  
 
The primary, secondary, and the duty occupation codes in Tables II.1, II.2 
and II.3 show that the officer duties in the Navy differ a lot.  When conducting studies  
about the Navy, considering that all Navy personnel are the same, one may probably 
disregard the differences in working conditions among Navy officers.  Since it is 
impossible to use every single duty in this study, a sufficient number of sample duties 
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representing a different and relatively harder group of duties will be selected.  The 
unselected duties will form the base duty condition and will represent the majority of 
Navy officers who have relatively less arduous working conditions.   
2. Navy’s Assignment Policy for Officers  
a. General 
According to the Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) 9, the 
mission of officer -related divisions of the Distribution Department (PERS -4) is threefold: 
· To assign the best qualified officers to meet the needs of the Navy as 
defined by the approved officer billet file  
· To assign officers to billets which develop their professional expertise so 
that the officer corps as a whole embodies the leadership, technical and 
managerial skills necessary to achieve the mission of the Navy 
· To assign officers sensitively and fairly, ensuring their continued 
professional motivation and dedication to the Navy  
These three missions address three different and important areas.  The 
primary mission is the fulfillment of the Navy’s needs.  These needs are met by filling a 
valid billet requirement with the best officer available.  A valid billet requirement begins 
with the officer allowance for each activity, as modified by the Navy Manning Plan for 
officers (NMPO).  Billet requirements are further defined by augmenting information, 
such as Naval Officer Billet classification (NOBC) codes, Additional Qualification 
Designators (AQDs) and so on.10  
The second mission is the fulfillment of the qualifications and career 
needs of the individual.  Each officer community has a basic career path that develops its 
officers to assume positions of increasing responsibility.  Depending on the community, 
each officer must obtain certain qualifications during his or her career.  Career 
development information for all officer communities is contained in the annual career 
issue of “Perspective” (NAVPERS 15892).  “Perspective” is the professional 
development bulletin of the Navy officer community, and is published by the Navy 
Personnel Command (PERS-05).11  
                                          
9 Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter I, p. 1 -1. 
10 Ibid., p. 1-2. 
11 Ibid., p. 1-3. 
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The third mission is the fulfillment of the desires of the officers.  The 
officers can have contact with their detailers to inform them about their duty preferences 
in different ways, such as by phone or e-mail, by sending Officer Preference and Personal 
information cards (NAVPERS 1301/1), by Super JASS (Job Advertising and Selection 
System), and by face-to-face talks during detailer visits.  Although officer duty 
preferences are important, there is no guarantee given to the officer about his/her 
preference.  
Being directly related with my thesis, the working spouse factor is 
specifically considered in the assignment process.  However, the employment status of 
the spouse does not take priority over the needs of the Navy or the career needs of the 
individual.  The decision by a spouse to accept the paid employment, to attend school, to 
participate voluntarily in activities related to Naval Service, or to do none of these, will 
not be influenced by the preferences or requirements of the Navy.  In addition, neither 
this decision nor the individual’s marital status will have an effect on assignments or 
selection boards.12 
b. Sea/Shore Rotations and Tour Lengths 
Sea/shore rotations and tour lengths differ greatly among the duties in the 
Navy.  Some occupations have several sea tours, and some have none.  In addition to the 
nature of the occupation, other factors affecting rotation policy are the needs of the 
service, professional career development needs of the officers, officers’ preferences 
(where feasible), personnel inventory, number of ships/commands available or projected, 
future requirements and fiscal constraints.  In terms of fiscal constraints, Permanent 
Change of Station (PCS) cost is the major issue taken into account by the detailers.  
Reduction of personnel turbulence and PCS cost initiatives focus high- 
level attention on adherence to tour length.  Shore tour lengths for career personnel will 
normally be a minimum of three years.  There are authorized exemptions, which can be 
seen in the tables of Prescribed Sea Tour (PST) and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths 
in Tables II.5 to II.19.  Career development criteria necessitate that some Unrestricted 
Line (URL) officer warfare specialists will not be assigned ashore for excessive periods 
between sea tours.  As a general policy, shore tours in excess of 36 months for pay grade 
                                          
12 Ibid. 
15 
O-4 (lieutenant commander) and below, and 48 months for O-5 (commander) and above 
are the exception rather than the rule. 13  
Rotation of duty, sea duty and shore duty are defined and computed as 
spec ified in MILPERSMAN 1300-03014.  When required, tour extensions may be granted 
for a maximum of 12 months.15  In general, three requirements affect the rotation policy.  
These are Time on Station (TOS), retainability, and the prescribed tour lengths.  
TOS applies primarily to consecutive CONUS (Continental United States) 
shore tours.  TOS is established to stabilize the lives of members and dependents and to 
reduce PCS costs.  DoD requires that members serve 36 months or more at a geographic 
location before receiving a PCS move that incurs a cost.  One or more activity tours in the 
same geographic location are used to satisfy the 36-month area tour.  A PCS move one 
month early requires a TOS waiver approved by PERS-4.  Exemptions may be granted 
for any of the following reassignments on reasons:16  
· To DoD overseas tour–a two-year minimum Navy activity tour at CONUS 
sea/shore is required prior to transfer overseas  
· From sea duty activity–sea duty tour lengths are set by the Secretary of the 
Navy (SECNAV) 
· To sea duty activity–a two-year minimum Navy activity tour at sea/shore 
is required prior to transfer to sea duty 
· From Duty Under Instruction (DUINS-instruction 20 weeks or greater) – 
tour length dependent upon length of instruction 
· To DUINS–24 months required for shore activity; a full sea tour is 
required coming from sea duty  
· Disqualification–security, professional, special weapons, medical 
· Humanitarian reasons  
· From unit undergoing major weapon system change or unit conversion  
· From unit designated new construction or undergoing homeport change 
                                          
13 Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3 -2. 
14 https://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD/BUPERS/MILPERS/Articles/1300 -
030.pdf. 
15 Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3 -4. 
16 Ibid. 
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· Spouse collocation–for CONUS, requires one year at losing command for 
collocating spouse; the other spouse, if also transferring, must complete 
TOS requirement or SECNAV recommended prescribed sea tour  
· First-Termers–defined as O-1 and O-2 personnel: 
· First-term personnel reassigned (shore to shore) with less than 
three years TOS require NPC division director waiver approval 
· CONUS-Officers transferring to DUINS require 24 months prior to 
a PCS move from a shore activity and a full sea tour prior to 
transfer from a sea activity 
· OVERSEAS-Overseas first-termers must comply with DoD 
overseas tour lengths  
· Office of the Secretary of defense (OSD), Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (OJCS) or Defense Agency activity tour lengths are limited by 
statute 
· SECNAV - designated tours to validate specialized professional 
credentials for doctors and lawyers before independent duty  
· Separation 
· Nuclear billets under NAVSEA 08 cognizance (24-month minimum tour 
regardless of prior assignment or locatio n) 
· Skill conversion (designator change)  
The second requirement affecting the rotation policy is retainability.  
Retainability is the minimum obligated service an officer must have to qualify for the 
issuance of PCS orders that incur a cost.  Retainability covers the period from the date of 
reporting for duty at the new duty station, as seen in Table II.4.  
 
Table II.4. Retainability Periods by Assignment 
 
ASSIGNMENTS FROM/TO  PERIOD 
CONUS to CONUS Shore  Two Years 
CONUS to CONUS Sea One Year 
To Overseas Shore Full DoD Area Tour (according to accompanied status)  
To Overseas Sea Min. 24 Months (except where DoD area tour is shorter)  
Overseas to CONUS One Year 
CONUS No/Low Cost Move  One Year 
Overseas No/Low Cost Move One Year or the Balance of the DoD Area Tour 
Note:  CONUS: Continental United States, OUTUS: Outside Continental United States. 
From: Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3-6. 
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The third requirement affecting the rotation policy is the Prescribed Tour 
Length (PTL).  PTLs are set by SECNAV for sea duty assignment and by DoD for all 
others.  Retainability and PTL are not interchangeable terms.  Both must be satisfied prior 
to writing the assignment order.  The retainability requirement is met in relation to the 
next PCS assignment, while the PTL requirement is satisfied for the existing tour 
assignment.  Tables II.5 to Table II.19 show the Prescribed Sea Tour (PST) and 
recommended (by the Officer Transfer Manual NAVPERS 15559B) Shore Tour Lengths 
of different officer occupations.  
 
Table II.5. Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Prescribed Sea Tour (PST) Lengths and 
Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA  SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS/LTJG Initial Sea Junior Officer 24  
LTJG/LT  Second Sea Division Officer 18  
LT First Shore TRACOM, NPS, Staff etc.   24 
LT Third Sea Initial Department Head Tour 18  
LT/LCDR Fourth Sea Second Department Head Tour  18  
LT/LCDR  Single Department Head Tour  24-36  
LCDR Second Shore Subspecialty, NPS, JPME, Joint  24-36 
LCDR Fifth Sea Complex 18-24  
  XO (Afloat) 18  
  XO (Other) 18-24  
  LCDR Command 20  
LCDR Third Shore Subspecialty  24-36 
CDR  Washington, TRACOM, JPME, 
Joint 
 24-36 
CDR Sixth Sea CDR Complex Sea, Staff  24-36  
CDR  CDR Command 20  
CDR Fourth Shore Subspecialty  24-36 
CAPT  Washington DC, JPME, Joint  24-36 
CAPT Seventh Sea Major Command 18-24  
  Sequential Command, Staff  18-24  
 Fifth Shore TRACOM, Staff, Subspecialty, 
Joint 
 24-36 
Note: TRACOM: Naval Training Command 
JPME: Joint Professional Military Education 
NPS: Naval Postgraduate School 




Table II.6. Nuclear Surface Warfare Officer Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and 
Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS/LTJG Initial Sea Junior Officer, Nuclear 
Training* 
36-42 18* 
LT First Shore NPTU, NPS, Staff  24 
  SWOS Department Head School  6 
 Second Sea Department Head, CVN  18-24  
LCDR Second Shore Washington DC, Joint  18-24 
 Third Sea XO 18  
 Third Shore Joint, Washington DC  24 
CDR Fourth Sea CO 20  
CAPT Fifth Sea CVN Reactor Officer  24-30  
 Fourth Shore Shore Staff (NUC) Sequential  24-36 
 Sea Major Command 24  
Note: NPTU: Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit  
From: Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3-12. 
 
Table II.7. Submarine Officer Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended Shore 
Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS/LT Training Junior Officer  15 
 Initial Sea  36  
 Initial Shore   24-36 
 Shore SOAC  6 
 Sea Department Head 36  
LCDR Shore Post Department Head  24-36 
 Sea XO 24  
 Shore PCO  6 
CDR Sea CO 36  
 Shore Post CO  24-36 
CAPT Sea  36  
 Sea Major Command 24  
 Shore   24-36 
Note: SOAC: US Navy Submarine Officers Advanced Course  
PCO: Prospective Commanding Officer Training  











Table II.8. Special Warfare Officer Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended 
Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS Input Core Training  9 
ENS  
/LTJG 
Initial Sea Assistant Platoon Commander/Division 
Officer  
36  
LT Second Sea Sea Platoon Commander/Dept. Head 24  
 First Shore Staff, Tang Command, NPS  24-36 
LCDR Third Sea XO Seal Team, SBU, SDV or 
NSWU/XO 
15  
  Other Afloat Staff  24  
 2nd Shore Joint Duty, Fleet or SOC Staff, SVC 
College 
 24-36 
CDR Fourth Sea CO-Seal Team, SBU, SDV or NSWU 24  
 3rd Shore CO Ashore, Shore Staff, SVC College, 
Joint Duty 
 24-36 




 4th Shore COMNAVSPECWARCEN, NSWC 
Staff, Joint Duty 
 24-36 
Note: SBU: Special Boat Unit  
SDV: Seal Delivery Vehicle  
NSWU: Navy Special Warfare Unit  
SOC: Special Operations Craft  
SVC: Service 
COMSPECBOATRON: U.S. Navy Specia l Boat Squadron 
COMNAVSPECWARGRU: U.S. Navy Special Warfare Group 
COMNAVSPECWARDEVGRU: Commander Naval Special Warfare Development Group  
COMNAVSPECWARCEN: Naval Special Warfare Center 
NSWC: Navy Special Warfare Center 














Table II.9. Special Operations Officer Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and 
Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS Input Core Training  12 
ENS/LTJG Initial Sea Division Officer, AOE, ARS, MHC, 
MCS 
30  
LT  EOD School  12 
 Second Sea EODMU, MDSU, ARS, 24-30  
  Ops MCM, MHC, XO Afloat MCM  18  
  MHC XO Afloat, ARS 24  
LT First Shore Staff, Training Command, OIC, EOD 
Shore Set, EOM Duty 
 36 
LCDR Sea CO Afloat ARS, MCM, MHC, XO 
Afloat EODMU, MDSU Dept Head 
MCS 
24-30  
  CO Afloat MCM, MHC 22  
 Shore CO/XO Ashore, Staff Service College, 
RDT&E, NPS, Dept Head, EOM Duty 
 36 
CDR Sea CO EODMU, MDSU, CSO, 
EODGRU, MCMR on XO Afloat MCS  
24  
 Shore CO Ashore EOD, EOM, XO 
WPNSTA,  
Training Command, Shore Staff, 
RDT&E, Svc College, Joint Duty 
 36 
CAPT Sea COMEODGRU, COMCMRON Var.  
 Shore CO EOM, EOD, HQ Staff, Joint Duty   Var. 
Note: AOE: Fast Combat Support Ship  
ARS: Auxiliary Rescue and Salvage  
MHC: Coastal Mine Hunter 
MCS: Mine Countermeasures Support Ship  
EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
EODMU: Explosive Ordnance Mobile Unit  
MDSU: Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit  
MCM: Mine Countermeasures Ships  
RDT&E: Research Development Test and Evaluation  
EOM: Explosive Ordnance Management 
WPNSTA: Naval Weapons Station  
COMEODGRU: Commander Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group  
COMCMRON: Commander Mine Countermeasures Squadron  












Table II.10. Aviation Officer Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended Shore 
Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS Input Pilot/NFO Training  Variable 
LTJG-LT Initial Sea Fleet Squadron Tour  36-42  
LT First Shore TRACOM, FRS, NPS, CRUITCOM, 
Staff, Washington DC 
 24-36 
 Second Sea Squadron, Ship’s Company, Embarked 
Staff 
24  
LCDR Third Sea Squadron Department Head  24-30  
CDR Second 
Shore 
Staff, Joint, Washington DC, 
Subspecialty 
 24-36 
 Sea Command XO/CO 24-36  
 Shore Post-command  36 
 Sea Ship’s Company 24  
CAPT Sea Major Sea Command, CV/LHA 
Command 
18  
  Ship’s Company, VP Wing Command, 
CVW Command 
24  
  CVN Command 36  
 Shore Major/Minor Shore Command  24 
  Other Shore  36 
Note: NFO: Navy Flight Officer 
TRACOM: Naval Training Command 
FRS: Fleet Replacement Squadron 
CRUITCOM: Naval Recruiting Command 
VP: U.S. Navy Patrol Squadron  
CV: Aircraft Carrier 
LHA: Amphibious Assault Ships  
CVW: Carrier Air Wings  
CVN: Aircraft Carrier 








Table II.11. Aviation Engineering Duty Officer Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and 
Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
CDR and below Sea Engineering Duty 30  
 Shore Engineering Duty  36-48 
CAPT  Engineering Duty  36-48 
From: Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3-16. 
 
Table II.12. RL/Staff Officer (Aerospace Engineering-Designator Code 151X) 
Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS Input Pilot/NFO Training  Variable 
LTJG-
LT 
Initial Sea Fleet Squadron Tour in Warfare 
Specialty 
36-42  
LT First Shore TRACOM,FRS,NPS, Test Pilot School   24-36 
 Second Sea Squadron, Ship’s Company, Embarked 
Staff 
24  
LCDR Shore Initial Acquisition Project Officer 
NAVAIR, SPAWAR, DPRO, NADEP 
RDT&E, Warfare CTRS  
 36 
 Shore T&E/FLE Supp, Acquisition Project 
Officer NAVAIR, SPAWAR, DPRO, 
NADEP RDT&E, Warfare Centers  
 36 
CDR Shore Course DAU Program Manager   4 
 Shore Senior Level Acquisition, DEP Program 
Manager, Assistant Program Manager  
 36 
CAPT Shore Senior Level Acquisition. NAVAIR, 
SPAWAR PEO, DPRO CO, TYCOM 
ACOS as Program Manager, Division 
Director 
 36 
Note: NAVAIR: Naval Air Systems Command  
SPAWAR: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command  
DPRO: Defense Contract Administration Services Plant Representative Office  
NADEP: Navy Air Depot  
DEP: Navy’s Distributed Engineering Plant  
TYCOM: Type Commander 
ACOS: Assistant Chief of Staff 
PEO: Program Executive Officer 






Table II.13. RL/Staff Officer (Aviation Maintenance Officer -Designator Code 152X) 
Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
CDR and below Sea Aviation Maintenance Officer  36  
 Shore Aviation Maintenance Officer   36 
 Sea Aviation Maintenance Officer  24  
 Shore Aviation Maintenance Officer   36 
CAPT Shore Aviation Maintenance Officer   36 
From: Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3-17. 
 
Table II.14. RL/Staff Officer (Special Duty-Intelligence-Designator Code 163X) 
Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS-LTJG Sea Intelligence Officer  24-36  
 Shore   36 
LT-CDR Sea Intelligence Officer  24  
 Shore   36-48 
CAPT Sea Intelligence Officer  24  
 Shore   36-48 
From: Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3-18. 
 
Table II.15. RL/Staff Officer (Special Duty-Public Affairs-Designator Code 165X) 
Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
LCDR and below  Sea Public Affairs Officer  24  
 Shore Public Affairs Officer   36 
CDR-CAPT Sea Public Affairs Officer  24  
 Shore Public Affairs Officer   36 













Table II.16. Medical, Medical Service, Dental, Nurse Corps Prescribed Sea Tour 
Lengths and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
All Sea Medical, Medical Service, Dental Corps  24  
 Sea Nurse Corps 12  
 Shore   36 
From: Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3-18. 
 
Table II.17. RL/Staff Officer (Special Duty-Oceanography-Designator Code 180X) 
Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS-CDR Sea METOC 24  
 Shore   36 
CAPT Sea METOC N/A  
 Shore   36 
CDR Shore Command  24-36 
CAPT Shore Command  24-36 
Note: METOC: Meteorology and Oceanography Center 
From: Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3-18. 
 
Table II.18. RL/Staff Officer (Chaplain-Designator Code 410X) Prescribed Sea Tour 
Lengths and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR DESCRIPTION 
(IN MONTHS) 
LT and below Sea Chaplain 24-30  
 Shore Chaplain  24-36 
LCDR Sea Chaplain 24-30  
 Shore Chaplain  36 
CDR/CAPT Sea Chaplain 24-30  
 Shore Chaplain  36-48 












Table II.19. RL/Staff Officer (Civil Engineer Corps-Designator Code 510X) 
Prescribed Sea Tour Lengths and Recommended Shore Tour Lengths  
 
SEA SHORE RANK TOUR 
(IN MONTHS) 
ENS Sea 24-30  
 Shore  24-36 
LTJG/LT  Sea 24-30  
 Shore  36 
LCDR Sea 24-30  
 Shore  36 
CDR/CAPT Sea 24  
 Shore  36-48 
 Sea Command 24  
 Shore Command  24-36 
From: Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 3, p. 3-20. 
 
As can be seen from Tables II.5 to II.19, the occupations to which the 
sea/shore rotation policy is applied require officers to face consecutively changing 
working conditions throughout their careers.  The increase in age and rank of the officers 
does not change the rotation policy unless the officers change their occupation.  
c. Overseas Duties 
Overseas service is defined as military duty performed while assigned to a 
military installation or activity permanently based outside the 48 contiguous United 
States.  Duty in Hawaii or Alaska is counted as overseas duty, but temporary duty in a 
foreign country is not, no matter how long the duty lasts.  To be assigned to overseas 
duty, an officer must fulfill the following criteria:17 
· Suitability as a representative of the United States  
· Professional competence of the individual 
· Number and suitability of accompanying family members as 
representatives of the United States 
· Acceptable physical condition of his/her family members  
The responsibility for determining suitability for overseas service rests 
with the CO of the transferring command.  The CO of the transferring command conducts 
the screening and reports the results by NAVPERS 1300/16 (Report of Suitability for 
Overseas Assignment).  The suitability decision factors are the medical fitness of the 
                                          
17 Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 4, p. 4 -1. 
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officer and his or her family members, the dental fitness of the officers and his or her 
family members*, alcohol-related problems, drug-related problems, physical fitness, 
disciplinary history, psychiatric disorders, performance, pregnancy (for overseas shore 
assignments, transfer must be executed such that the member arrives overseas prior to the 
seventh month; for overseas shipboard assignments, assignments will be deferred until 
four months after childbirth), financial stability, single parents/military couples with 
family members (this itself does not disqualify officers for overseas duty, but it must be 
pointed out to the assignment officer), and individual and family characteristics (all 
family members have to be screened for overseas assignment unless the officer is in 
receipt of unaccompanied orders for tour lengths of less than 24 months).18     
Since family characteristics form the basis of this thesis, family -related 
issues about the overseas assignments receive greater attention.  One of the major 
determinants of the location and the length of the overseas assignments is whether the 
officer will be accompanied or unaccompanied by his or her family members.  For 
assignment in some countries, family members are not allowed to accompany the 
officers, and for most of the countries, the issue of the accompanying family members 
determines, and changes, the length of the overseas tour.  
One of the other issues related to the family is the situation in which the 
officer has a dependent who is in the Exceptional Family Member (EFM) program.  The 
overseas assignment is required to be made to the locations wher e the EFM will have 
educational and/or medical support available. 19 
Another issue about the effects of family characteristics on the overseas 
assignment is the Family Advocacy Program (FAP).  Service members enrolled in FAP 
may be disqualified from overseas  assignment.  Assignment officers have to call the 
PERS-6 FAP branch prior to transmitting any overseas orders.  Waivers to the FAP 
                                          
*  Note: If family members are disqualified for medical or dental fitness factors, the officer may serve 
an unaccompanied overseas tour due to the urgency of the duty requirement. 
18 Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B) Chapter 4, pp. 4 -2, 4-4. 
19 Ibid. 
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policy are not normally granted and require the approval of the Commander, Navy 
Personnel Command (CNPC).20    
Divorce decrees concerning custody and control of family members are 
also important in overseas assignments, especially for the determination of the moving 
expenses paid by the government and overseas station allowances. 21  
For a married officer whose spouse is also a member of a military service, 
the tour of duty overseas is determined as follows:22 
· Married service members accompanied or joined by command-sponsored 
family members serve the accompanied-by-family members tour 
· Married service members assigned to or living in  the same overseas 
location or locale serve the accompanied-by-family member tour when 
such a tour length is authorized for the duty station.  The lack of 
concurrent travel, whether a result of personal reasons or operational 
requirements, may not have an impact on the stipulation that each service 
member of a military couple must, at a minimum, serve the accompanied -
by-family member’s tour.  Curtailment of the last arriving service 
member’s minimum tour to coincide with the tour completion date of the 
first arriving service member, in order to effect a joint spouse assignment 
from the military couple’s overseas duty station, cannot be authorized 
without a waiver from PERS-4.   
· Married service members assigned to different locations shall serve the 
“all others” tour (not accompanied by family members tour).  However, 
when said service members establish a joint residence that is, reside 
together in government-approved family quarters, they serve the 
accompanied-by-family members tour, when such tour is authorized for 
the location or locale where they are residing. 
· When a service member marries another service member while both are 
assigned overseas, their original tours are maintained, unless both service 
members voluntarily agree to serve the longer (accompanied-by-family 
members) tour at that location 
Table II.20 shows the available overseas duty locations and the duty 
periods both for the officers who are accompanied by family members and those who are 
not.  The regional differences in some of the countries are omitted in the list, since they 
have less importance than the country as a whole, but the period differences caused by 
                                          
20 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., pp. 4-15, 4-16. 
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the different regions are added to the table in order to show how these differences change 
the tour lengths.   
 
Table II.20. Overseas Duty Tour Lengths (Other Than the Defense Attaché System) by 
Country or Area 
 
 TOUR LENGTH IN MONTHS 
COUNTRY OR AREA ACCOMPANIED BY 
FAMILY MEMBERS 
OTHERS 
Alaska 36 36 
Antarctic Region NA TBD 
Argentina 36 24 
Australia 24/36 15/24 
Austria 36 24 
Bahamas 24 24 
Bahrain 24 12 
Belgium 36 24 
Belize 24 12 
Bermuda 36 24 
Bolivia 24 18 
Brazil 36 24 
British Indian Ocean Territory NA 12 
Canada 24/36 12/18/24 
Chile 36 24 
Colombia 24 18 
Cuba 30 18 
Denmark 36 24 
Egypt 24 18 
El Salvador NA 12 
France 36 24 
Germany 36 24 
Gibraltar 36 24 
Greece NA/24/36 12/15/18/24 
Guam 24/30 24/30 
Hawaii 30/36 18/36 
Hong Kong 36 24 
Iceland 30 18 
India 24 12 
Indonesia 24 12 
Israel 24 12 
Italy 24/36 12/15/18/24 
Jamaica 24 12 
Japan NA/24/36 12/15/18/24 
Johnston Atoll NA 12 
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 TOUR LENGTH IN MONTHS 
COUNTRY OR AREA ACCOMPANIED BY 
FAMILY MEMBERS 
OTHERS 
Kenya 24 12/18 
Korea NA/24 12 
Kuwait 24 12 
Laos NA 12 
Malaysia 36 24 
Mexico 24 18 
Midway Island NA 12 
Morocco 24 15 
Netherlands 36 24 
New Zealand 36 24 
Niger 24 12 
Norway 36 24 
Panama NA/24 12 
Paraguay 24 18 
Peru 30 18 
Philippine Island NA/24 12/18 
Portugal 24/36 15/24 
Puerto Rico NA/36 12/18/24 
Qatar 24 12 
Saudi Arabia NA 12 
Senegal 24 12 
Singapore 36 24 
Somalia 24 12 
Spain 24/36 15/24 
Thailand 24 18 
Tunisia 24 18 
Turkey NA/24 12/15 
United Arab Emirates 24 12 
United Kingdom 24/36 18/24 
West Indies 36 24 
Note:  More than one figure means that tour lengths differ at different regions in this country.  
From: Derived from Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559B), Figure 4-1. 
 
d. Military Couples 
Some of the regulations for the assignments of military couple are 
mentioned in the previous sections.  Remaining issues related to the assignment policy 
for military couples are as follows: 
· MILPERSMAN 1320-190 determines the military couple assignment 
policy.  It states that PERS-451 is the responsible office for the 
assignments of military couples.  The general policy is that the Chief of 
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Naval Personnel supports the collocation of Navy members married to 
other military members and every reasonable effort will be made to allow 
military couples to move together and/or serve together whenever 
possible.  
· The collocation requests must be submitted by each member separately 
and a copy of their spouse’s request must be enclosed with his/her own 
request.  Members who are not collocated can request reassignment to a 
valid requirement in their spouse’s area, providing the following criteria 
are met: 
· Member requesting to be transferred has completed one year on 
board current duty station at time of transfer and, if required, a 
contact relief is available.  Every effort will be made to achieve 
collocation within one year of request.  
· Neither member is currently in or under orders to a training status.  
If one or both members are entering a training status, their requests 
will be kept on file to help facilitate spouse collocation upon 
completion of training. 
· Military couples cannot be permanently assigned to the same ship 
or same shipboard deployable command (e.g., tender with multiple 
unit identification codes or carrier and its associated air wing).  
· Military couples cannot normally be assigned involuntarily to 
simultaneous sea duty.  However, military couples involving first 
term personnel, initial accessions, and/or personnel completing a 
training assignment, may require assignment to simultaneous sea 
duty consistent with the needs of Navy and the member’s 
training.23 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, officer duties in the Navy, the Navy’s assignment policy, 
sea/shore rotations, overseas duty, and the assignments of the military couples are 
discussed.  Since officer occupations in the Navy and the assignments of officers form 
two main fields in the thesis, various tables are used to emphasize differences within the 
Navy.   
 
                                          
23 https://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD/BUPERS/MILPERS/Articles/1320 -
190.pdf  MILPERSMAN 1320-190, p. 2, November 2002. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has one of the highest divorce rates of any nation in the world.  
The US military is drawn mainly from the population of adults between the ages of 18 
and 45 years, so it will tend to reflect many of the same social, economic, and political 
trends of this age group in the larger society.  It is not surprising, then, to find certain 
national trends in marriage and divorce present in the military.  It is also not surprising to 
find that the marital status of military members can affect their on -the-job performance, 
as well as their tendencies to leave or stay in the military, their chances for promotion, 
their general health and well being, and their likelihood of having disciplinary problems.  
Simply put, personal relationships and the stability of one’s marriage or famil y life can 
have a far-reaching effect on many aspects of behavior, occupational performance and 
certain career choices.  At the same time, it is logical to assume that the demands of one’s 
job and any related stress can affect personal relationships or even the stability of a 
marriage. Just as marital discord or harmony can have an impact on how a military 
member performs his or her work, so, too, can the stresses or nature of work affect one’s 
marriage. 
  This literature reviews focuses first on various th eories relating to marriage and 
divorce.  Historical trends in marriage and divorce are then explored for the United States 
and the Navy.  The literature review then shifts focus to the previous studies regarding 
the effects of marital status on military personnel.  Finally, the results of the review are 
used to formulate hypotheses on the possible effects of occupational conditions on a 
military member’s marriage.  
B. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE THEORIES  
1. Marriage Theory 
As Johnson mentions in her thesis, citin g Sheehy (1976):  
Adult life proceeds by developmental stages, each often marked by a crisis 
or turning point that guides individual decision making. …  Marital 
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understanding and satisfaction are curvilinear over the life cycle of a 
family.24 
This statement emphasizes two different points.  First, marriage has a sudden and 
great impact on individuals, and, second, the effects of marriage continue and change 
throughout the life cycle of a family.  To better explain marriage, the theories about the 
reasons and the effects of marriage, therefore, should not only include marriage 
decisions, but also the changes within families, such as the birth of a child, as well.  
The decision to marry is one of the most important decisions of an individual’s 
entire life, and all marriage decisions are affected by many different conditions, such as 
social, cultural, economical, psychological, and health factors.  Thus, analyzing the 
reasons behind the decision to marry is very complicated.  Due to the complexity of not 
doing so, researchers generally prefer to analyze marriage in terms of only one factor.  
Although his theories about marriage focus mostly on economic factors, in this 
thesis, Gary S. Becker’s work is used to explain marriage.25  Becker’s theories about 
marriage are still accepted as an important resource by researchers because of their 
simplicity and their capability to relate the decisions about marriage to economic factors.  
Becker, using utility functions and mathematical formulas, explains the basic 
characteristics of marriage, such as why single women and men work more than those 
who are married, and why the effect of an increase in wage rates alone on the incentive to 
marry is less straightforward.  However, to focus solely on the major determinants of 
marriage decisions, all of his theories, most of which concern economic well -being, are 
not mentioned in this thesis.  
Becker offers two basic assumptions: (1) each person tries to find a mate who 
maximizes his or her well-being, with well-being measured by the consumption of 
household-produced commodities; and (2) the marriage market is assumed to be in 
equilibrium, in the sense that no person could change mates and become better off.  
According to Becker, marriage means that men and women share the same household , 
                                          
24 Johnson, Roni S., Civilian Husbands in the Military Family: Current Issues and Future Concerns, 
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cal ifornia, March 1998, p. 24. 
25 Becker, S. Gary, A Theory of Marriage I-II, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 81, Number 4, 
July/August 1973, pp. 813-846 and Volume 82, Number 2, March/April 1974, pp. S11 -S26. 
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and marriage occurs if, and only if, both are better-off, that is, their utility increases.  The 
utility gained from the marriage covers a broad range of human activities and goals, such 
as the quality and quantity of children, prestige, and the quality of meal, recreation, 
companionship, love, and health status.  
The Vital and Health Statistics Report 2002 also mentions the benefits of 
marriage.  According to this report, the differences between married and unmarried 
people can be summarized as follows: “Compared with unmarried people, married men 
and women tend to have lower mortality, less risky behavior, more monitoring of health, 
more compliance with medical regimens, higher sexual frequency, more satisfaction with 
their sexual lives, more savings, and  higher wages.”26 
The utilities mentioned by Becker and the Vital and Health Statistics Report are 
valid for everybody.  In addition, marriage also provides many different advantages for 
specific groups, such as military personnel.  Elizabeth A. Wallace and  Kenneth C. Rose 
analyze the advantages of marriage for military personnel in their joint thesis.  Wallace 
and Rose first mention the benefits of marriage in general by citing Tullock and 
McKenzie: 
From an economic perspective, the benefits of marriage and family are 
two-fold: spouses have the opportunity to produce things not readily 
duplicated in non-marriage situations, and the family operating as a single 
household can produce many goods and services more efficiently than can 
several single person households.  The list of “things” produced within a 
marriage situation includes …children, prestige and status that can affect 
employment and the realm of friends, companionship that is solid and 
always there, a family style sex life…and family life in general. 27.  
Wallace and Rose then describe the advantages of marriage for a military service 
member as follows:  
A military member’s marital status is a unique factor in that it reflects both 
an economic and a demographic influence.  This combination of 
influences exists because of the economic benefits, both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary, gained by the military member when dependents are 
                                          
26 Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarr iage in The United States, Vital and Health Statistics, 
Series 23, Number 22, July 2002, p. 3.  
27 Wallace, Elizabeth A., Rose, Kenneth C., Divorce and Family Support Services: Problems and 
Prospects for the U.S. Navy, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate Sch ool, Monterey, California, March 
1991, p. 17. 
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acquired.  Dependents can be a spouse, a child, or a financially dependent 
relative.  The benefits of having dependents include in creased income, 
separation allowances, Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) computed at 
the “with dependents” rate, Variable Housing Allowance (VHA), and non -
pecuniary benefits such as eligibility for government housing, low-cost or 
free medical care and commissary and exchange shopping privileges.28 
Since Becker analyzes marriage decisions within the total marriage market, 
besides the personal decisions, he also emphasizes the importance of sex ratios on the 
total number of marriages.  Becker gives the example of a war, mentioning,  
An aftermath of a destructive war is many unmarried young women 
pursuing relatively few men available, and men usually either marry late 
and not at all in rural areas that have lost many young women to cities.  
Statistical studies indicate that the fraction of women currently married at 
different ages is positively related to the appropriate sex ratio.29  
Based on this theory, it can be thought that the number of marriages for military 
personnel will be affected by the sex ratios both within the military and within the 
civilian population, and especially at the location of the duties.  
Although there are some exceptions, most marriages are based on love, caring, 
and the desire to have children.  For this reason, Becker emphasizes the importance of 
love, caring, and children on marriages in his study.  Becker believes that almost all of 
the utilities related with marriage can be gained through purchasing by a single person, 
except the desire to raise one’s own children and “the physical and emotional 
involvement called love”.  Although there are substitutes for other utilities of marriages, 
such as recreation, the quality of meals and even sex, there is no substitute for one’s own 
child.  Based on this assumption, because of the importanc e of the identification of the 
father in some communities, one male can marry more than one woman, but no woman 
can marry more than one man.30   
                                          
28 Wallace, Elizabeth A., Rose, Kenneth C., Divorce and Family Support Services: Problems and 
Prospects for the U.S. Navy, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 
1991, p. 2. 
29 Becker, S. Gary, A Theory of Marriage Part I, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 81, Number 4, 
July/August 1973, p. 838. 
30 Ibid. 
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Muchinsky, citing Silberstein (1992), mentions the effects of the birth of children 
on marriages and states: 
Most dual-career couples have a work-oriented lifestyle prior to the birth 
of children.  However, once there are children, the dual-career system 
undergoes a profound shift.  The pragmatic demands of home life increase 
dramatically and cannot be postponed, rescheduled, or ignored.  Both men 
and women attest that the arrival of children creates the greater conflict 
between work and family.31 
As mentioned in Chapter II, since military duties are less flexible, civilian spouses 
mostly “sacrifice” their careers to take care of their children and the situation, of course, 
is more problematic for dual-military couples.   
Love and caring, and other emotional attachments, are the other important factors 
in marriage decisions, and also for the survival of healthy marriages.  According to 
Becker, if a man cares about a woman, or vice versa,  
male’s utility would depend on the commodity consumption of female as 
well as his own...Household commodities are transferable within (without 
any loss) but not between households.  Thus if each of the spouses fully 
cares for the other, the total amount of household production is shared by 
the couple equally, which is consistent with the popular belief that persons 
in love “share.”32 
Since love raises the commodity output, and caring increases total income by 
increasing the importance of family commodities, the families that have love and caring 
have more income and total output than others.  
Becker also explains the effects of beauty, intelligence, and education on 
marriages.  According to Becker: 
The gain from marriage also depends on traits, such as beauty, 
intelligence, and education, that affect nonmarket productivity as well, 
perhaps, as market opportunities.  An increase in the value of traits that 
have a positive effect on nonmarket productivity, market productivity held 
constant, would generally increase the gain from marriage.  Presumably 
this helps explain why, for example, less attractive or less intelligent 
                                          
31 Muchinsky, Paul M., Psychology Applied to Work, 2000, p. 321.  
32 Becker, S. Gary, A Theory of Marriage Part II, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 82, Number 
2, March/April 1974, p. S14. 
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persons are less likely to marry than are more attractive or more intell igent 
persons.33 
Besides beauty, intelligence and education, there are other characteristic issues 
related to marriage.  As stated in the Vital and Health Statistics Report 2002:  
For first marriages are less likely to break up, and more likely to succeed, 
if the wife grew up in a two parent home, is Asian was 20 years of age or 
over at marriage, did not have any children when she got married, is 
college-educated, has more income, or has any religious affiliation…The 
probability of first marriage is lower for non-Hispanic black women than 
for other woman…First marriage is less likely for woman who report that 
their religion is not important.34 
Early marriage is one of the topics analyzed in this study, and Becker has many 
theories concerning the reasons for early marriages.  As Becker writes:  
The age of entry (to the marriage market) would be earlier the larger the 
number of children desired, the higher the expected lifetime income, and 
lower the level of education…(In order to marry,) he searches until the 
value to him of any expected improvement in the mate he can find is no 
greater than the cost of his time and other inputs into additional search…  
People marry relatively early when they are lucky in their search.  They 
also marry early, however, when they are unduly pessimistic about their 
prospects of attracting someone better (or unduly optimistic about persons 
they have already met).  Therefore early marriages contain both lucky and 
pessimistic persons, while later marriages contain unlucky and optimistic  
ones.35 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the important issue for the military is whether or not 
some military assignments and duties, such as overseas duties, cause officers to be 
pessimistic, mostly in terms of finding sufficient personal time to search for a better 
spouse, and cause them to marry early and have a less stable marriage.  
Another dimension concerning the decision to marry is the existing financial 
situation of an individual before marriage.  Becker, citing the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(1971) and Keeley (1972), finds a direct relationship between income and marriage, 
                                          
33 Becker, S. Gary, A Theory of Marriage Part I, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 81, Number 4, 
July/August 1973, p. 822. 
34 Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in The United Stat es, Vital and Health Statistics, 
Series 23, Number 22, July 2002, p. 2.  
35 Becker, S. Gary, A Theory of Marriage Part II, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 82, Number 
2, March/April 1974, pp. S21-22. 
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where “when years of schooling and a few other variables are held constant, higher -wage 
persons appear to marry earlier than others.”36  Although this is true for men, an increase 
in wages has the reverse effect on women, because since the working hours of females 
are reduced after they marry, an increase in their income affects their decision to marry 
negatively.  Generally, officers have regular and relatively higher income than an av erage 
citizen, excluding other factors.  Thus, officers should have higher marriage rates than 
civilians, based on the income/marriage relationship theory.  
2. Divorce Theory 
No newlywed couple expects to see their marriage end in divorce. However, 
divorces are caused by selecting the wrong spouse in the beginning and by thinking that 
any mismatched characteristics may disappear in the future. Divorces are also caused by 
internal effects, such as the loss of love and caring, and by external effects, such as  
pressures from relatives and friends that take place afterwards.  The consequences of a 
divorce are not only the loss of the benefits gained by the marriage, but additional 
problems that mostly affect the individuals.  For this reason, many military and c ivilian 
support services are established to help divorced individuals.  Furthermore, the decision 
to divorce is not easy due to a variety of factors, such as the restrictions of a religion, the 
concern about earning sufficient income to live on one’s own, the presence of children, 
and the optimistic thought that everything might be fine one day.  Many other family 
support services are, therefore, established to help families that have such problems.   
Becker discusses the causes and the effects of divorce in his study.  Instead of 
directly mentioning divorce, he prefers to focus on separation first.  According to Becker:  
The incentive to separate is smaller the more important are investments 
that are specific to a particular marriage.  The most obvious and dominant 
example of marriage-specific investment is children, although knowledge 
of the habits and the attitudes of one’s mate are also significant.  Since 
specific investments would grow, at least for quite a while, with the 
duration of marriage, the incentive to separate would tend to decline with 
duration.  The incentive to separate is greater, on the other hand, the more 
convinced a person becomes that the marriage was a mistake.  This 
conviction could result from additional information about one’s mate  or 
other potential mates.  (Some search goes on, perhaps subconsciously, 
                                          
36 Becker, S. Gary, A Theory of Marriage Part I, Journa l of Political Economy, Volume 81, Number 4, 
July/August 1973, p. 822. 
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even while one is married).  If the mistake is considered large enough to 
outweigh the loss in marriage-specific capital, separation and perhaps 
divorce will follow…Couples with rela tively large differences in 
education, intelligence, race, or religion, because they were unlucky 
searchers, should be more likely separate and should have smaller 
differences when they remarry.37 
The negative effects of divorce are very high.  For example,  according to the Vital 
and Health Statistics Report 2002, the disadvantages of divorce include the following: 
Compared to married individuals, divorced persons exhibit lower levels of 
psychological well-being, more health problems, greater risk of mortali ty, 
more social isolation, less satisfying sex lives, more negative life events, 
greater levels of depression and alcohol use, and lower levels of happiness 
and self-expectance.38 
Focusing on the Navy, Wallace and Rose write:  
The divorce of a military member, while a highly personal and 
emotionally changed event for the individual, implies three significant 
problems for the Navy in the areas of decreased productivity, unit 
readiness, and retention.39 
The consequences of divorce may be even worse for children .  According to the 
Vital and Health Statistics Report 2002:  
Adverse outcomes accrue to children of divorce and children raised in 
single-parent families.  Although not all single parent families are the 
result of divorce and not all divorced mothers remain single, virtually all 
children of divorce spend some time in a single -parent household until the 
mother remarries.  Even when the mother does remarry, studies suggest 
that children in step-families have similar risks of adverse outcomes as 
children in single parents: both groups of children do worse than children 
living with two biological parents in terms of academic achievement, 
depression, and behavioral problems such as drug and alcohol abuse, 
premarital sexual intercourse and being arrested.40 
 
                                          
37 Becker, S. Gary, A., Theory of Marriage Part II, Volume 82, Number 2, March/April 1974, p. S23.  
38 Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in The United States, Vital and Healt h Statistics, 
Series 23, Number 22, July 2002, p. 3.  
39 Wallace, Elizabeth A., Rose, Kenneth C., Divorce and Family Support Services: Problems and 
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The external environment, such as laws and religion, can exercise a great impact 
on encouraging or discouraging individuals both to marry and to divorce.  According to 
Becker, when divorce becomes easier, the fraction of persons legally married may 
actually increase because of the effect on age when marrying.  Citing Kogut (1972) and 
Freiden (1972), Becker mentions that, in Latin America, where divorce is usually 
impossible, a relatively small fraction of the adult population is legally married because 
consensual unions are so important; and in the United States, a smaller fraction of women 
have been married in states having more difficult divorce laws.41  
As mentioned in Chapter II, family and job-related problems can affect men and 
women differently.  This is another reason that makes decisions about divorce harder.  
The same negative circumstances may be perceived by one individual as a sufficient 
reason to divorce, while his/her spouse may not think so.  An example of this difference 
in the perception of a spouse is cited by Muchinsky: 
(there is) a stronger correlation between work/family conflict and job 
satisfaction for women (-.35) than for men (-.29).  Likewise, the 
correlation between work/family conflict and life satisfaction was stronger 
for women (-.42) than for men (-.32).  Then there is a greater association 
for woman than men in resolving issues of work/family conflict and 
feeling satisfaction.42  
Due to this difference between men and women, in times of trouble, women may 
not get the help and understanding expected from their husbands, which will add even 
more stress to their relationship. 
Remarrying becomes an issue for divorced people mostly after a period of 
healing.  Their experiences from their former marriage may eventually lead them to 
remarry.  Although it is more likely that they will not make the same mistakes again that 
caused them to divorce in the first place, having enough courage to start a new marriage 
is again not easy.  For this reason, there is a significant difference in the remarriag e ratios 
                                          
41 Becker, S. Gary, A., Theory of Marriage Part II, Volume 82, Number 2, March/April 1974.  
42 Muchinsky, Paul M., Psychology Applied to Work, 2000, p. 318.  
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of different groups of people.  For example, the probability of remarriage is highest 
among divorced white women and lowest among divorced black women. 43  
The marriage and divorce theories presented in this chapter seek to explain the 
main reasons why individuals marry and divorce.  However, the main factor is always the 
personal assessments of the individual making these decisions.  
C. MARITAL STATUS TR ENDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE 
U.S. NAVY   
1. Marital Status Trends in the United States  
Marital status trends in the United States are presented in three different tables.  
Table III.1 displays the numbers and the rates of marriage and divorce in the United 
States between 1870 and 1998.  Table III.2 displays the population totals for each marit al 
status, sorted by gender and race, and covers the period between 1980 and 1998.  Table 
III.3 displays the distribution of men and women in each marital status in 1998.  By using 
these three tables, the trends for marriage and divorce in the United States since 1870 and 
marital status differences by gender, race/ethnicity and age are analyzed.    
 















































































































































































































1870 39,905  352 11 3.1 8.8 30.3 0.3 - 
1880 50,262  453 20 4.3 9.0 29.8 0.4 - 
1890 63,056  570 33 5.9 9.0 29.2 0.5 3.0 
1900 76,094  709 56 7.9 9.3 29.2 0.7 4.0 
1910 92,407  948 83 8.8 10.3 31.4 0.9 4.7 
1920 106,461 1,274 171 13.4 12.0 36.0 1.6 8.0 
1925 115,829 1,188 175 14.8 10.3 30.3 1.5 7.2 
1930 123,077 1,127 196 17.4 9.2 26.3 1.6 7.5 
1935 127,250 1,327 218 16.4 10.4 29.0 1.7 7.8 
1945 139,928 1,613 485 30.1 12.2 30.5 3.5 14.4 
1950 152,271 1,667 385 23.1 11.1 29.6 2.6 10.3 
1955 165,931 1,531 377 24.6 9.3 25.7 2.3 9.3 
                                          
43 Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in The United States, Vital and Health Statistics, 















































































































































































































1960 180,671 1,523 393 25.8 8.5 23.9 2.2 9.2 
1965 194,303 1,800 479 26.6 9.3 25.9 2.5 10.6 
1970 205,052 2,159 708 32.8 10.6 28.3 3.5 14.9 
1975 215,973 2,153 1,036 48.1 10.0 25.6 4.8 20.3 
1980 227,225 2,390 1,189 49.7 10.6 26.1 5.2 22.6 
1985 237,924 2,413 1,190 49.3 10.1 24.9 5.0 21.7 
1990 249,439 2,443 1,178 48.2 9.8 24.1 4.7 20.4 
1995 262,765 2,336 1,169 50.0 8.9 22.0 4.4 19.6 
1998p  270,299 2,244 1,135 50.6 8.3 20.5 4.2 18.9 
From: http://beverlylahayinstitute.org/events/1999-10_marriage/20_table-1.gif. 
 
As seen in Table III.1, the divorce rate per 100 marriages has increased 
continuously, except for 1935 and 1990, since 1870; currently, the divorce rate is 
approximately 50 percent or half of all marriages in the United States.  On the other hand, 
the marriage rate has remained almost the same since 1870.  In terms of divorces for 
women, except in 1940 and 1945, the divorce rate has continuously increased until 1980 
and has slightly decreased afterwards. 
 
Table III.2. Marital Status of Population, by Gender and Racial/Ethnic Group:  
1980-1998 
 
TOTAL MALE FEMALE 
 
1980 1990 1995 1998 1980 1990 1995 1998 1980 1990 1995 1998 
Total (x) 159.5 181.8 191.6 197.4 75.7 86.9 92.0 95.0 83.8 95.0 99.6 102.4 
Never 
Married 
32.3 40.4 43.9 46.6 18.0 22.4 24.6 25.5 14.3 17.9 19.3 21.0 
Married 104.6 112.6 116.7 117.9 51.8 55.8 57.7 58.6 52.8 56.7 58.9 59.3 
Widowed 12.7 13.8 13.4 13.6 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.6 10.8 11.5 11.1 11.0 
Divorced 9.9 15.1 17.6 19.4 3.9 6.3 7.4 8.3 6.0 8.8 10.3 11.1 
Percent of 
Total 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Never 
Married 
20.3 22.2 22.9 23.6 23.8 25.8 26.8 26.9 17.1 18.9 19.4 20.5 
Married 65.5 61.9 60.9 59.7 68.4 64.3 62.7 61.7 63.0 59.7 59.2 57.9 
Widowed 8.0 7.6 7.0 6.9 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.7 12.8 12.1 11.1 10.8 
Divorced 6.2 8.3 9.2 9.8 5.2 7.2 8.0 8.8 7.1 9.3 10.3 10.8 
42 
TOTAL MALE FEMALE 
 
1980 1990 1995 1998 1980 1990 1995 1998 1980 1990 1995 1998 
White,Total 139.5 155.5 161.3 165.3 66.7 74.8 78.1 80.4 72.8 80.6 83.2 85.0 
Never 
Married 
26.4 31.6 33.2 35.1 15.0 18.0 19.2 20.0 11.4 13.6 14.0 15.2 
Married 93.8 99.5 102.0 102.6 46.7 49.5 50.6 51.3 47.1 49.9 51.3 51.3 
Widowed 10.9 11.7 11.3 11.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.1 9.3 9.8 9.4 9.3 
Divorced 8.3 12.6 14.8 16.1 3.4 5.4 6.3 7.0 5.0 7.3 8.4 9.1 
Percent of 
Total 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Never 
Married 
18.9 20.3 20.6 21.2 22.5 24.1 24.6 24.8 15.7 16.9 16.9 17.8 
Married 67.2 64.0 63.2 62.1 70.0 66.2 64.9 63.8 64.7 61.9 61.7 60.4 
Widowed 7.8 7.5 7.0 6.9 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 12.8 12.2 11.3 11.0 
Divorced 6.0 8.1 9.1 9.8 5.0 7.2 8.1 8.7 6.8 9.0 10.1 10.7 
Black, 
Total 
16.6 20.3 22.1 23.1 7.4 9.1 9.9 10.3 9.2 11.2 12.2 12.8 
Never 
Married 
5.1 7.1 8.5 9.0 2.5 3.5 4.1 4.2 2.5 3.6 4.4 4.8 
Married 8.5 9.3 9.6 9.6 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.8 4.9 5.0 
Widowed 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Divorced 1.4 2.1 2.4 2.7 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.7 
Percent of 
Total 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Never 
Married 
30.5 35.1 38.4 38.9 34.3 38.4 41.7 40.9 27.4 32.5 35.8 37.3 
Married 51.4 45.8 43.2 41.8 54.6 49.2 46.7 45.3 48.7 43.0 40.4 38.9 
Widowed 9.8 8.5 7.6 7.6 4.2 3.7 3.1 3.7 14.3 12.4 11.3 10.7 
Divorced 8.4 10.6 10.7 11.7 7.0 8.8 8.5 10.1 9.5 12.0 12.5 13.1 
Hispanic, 
Total 
7.9 13.6 17.6 19.8 3.8 6.7 8.8 10.1 4.1 6.8 8.8 9.8 
Never 
Married 
1.9 3.7 5.0 5.9 1.0 2.2 3.0 3.5 0.9 1.5 2.1 2.4 
Married 5.2 8.4 10.4 11.7 2.5 4.1 5.1 5.8 2.6 4.3 5.3 5.9 
Widowed 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 
Divorced 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Percent of 
Total 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Never 
Married 
24.1 27.2 28.6 29.7 27.3 32.1 33.8 34.8 21.1 22.5 23.5 24.3 
Married 65.6 61.7 59.3 58.9 67.1 60.9 57.9 57.5 64.3 62.4 60.7 60.3 
Widowed 4.4 4.0 4.2 3.8 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.3 7.1 6.5 6.6 6.3 
Divorced 5.8 7.0 7.9 7.7 4.0 5.5 6.6 6.4 7.6 8.5 9.2 9.1 
Note (x): Persons 18 years old and over (in millions) 
From: http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p20-514u.pdf, November 2002 
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As seen in Table III.2, the ratios for both men and women, who never married and 
who divorced, have increased continuously between 1980 and 1998.  On the other hand, 
the ratios for married and widowed men and women have decreased con tinuously.  In 
terms of race/ethnicity, whites have the same trends as the entire population, except the 
widowed white male rate, which was relatively constant.  Blacks have the same trends, 
except the never married and divorced male rates for the year 1998, where these rates 
show opposite trends for this particular year.  For Hispanics, never married and married 
rates are consistent with the U.S. population.  However, the rates for widowed are 
different from those of other races, and although the divorced rates increased for both 
male and female Hispanics until 1995, as with other races, in 1998, the rate decreased 
slightly. 
 
Table III.3. Marital Status of the Population, by Gender and Age: 1998 
 






































MALE 95,009  25,518  58,601  2,567 8,322 100.0 26.9 61.7 2.7 8.8 
18-19 3,807 3,706 91 - 10 100.0 97.3 2.4 - 0.3 
20-24 8,826 7,360 1,332 - 133 100.0 83.4 15.1 - 1.5 
25-29 9,450 4,822 4,219 10 398 100.0 51.0 44.6 0.1 4.2 
30-34 10,076  2,939 6,345 20 773 100.0 29.2 63.0 0.2 7.7 
35-39 11,299  2,444 7,598 44 1,213 100.0 21.6 67.2 0.4 10.7 
40-44 10,756  1,676 7,633 50 1,397 100.0 15.6 71.0 0.5 13.0 
45-54 16,598  1,481 12,665  150 2,303 100.0 8.9 76.3 0.9 13.9 
55-64 10,673  572 8,559 275 1,266 100.0 5.4 80.2 2.6 11.9 
65-74 7,992 328 6,331 707 626 100.0 4.1 79.2 8.8 7.8 
75 - over 5,533 190 3,829 1,311 202 100.0 3.4 69.2 23.7 3.7 
FEMALE 102,403 21,043  59,255  11,027  11,078 100.0 20.5 57.9 10.8 10.8 
18-19 3,780 3,565 211 - 5 100.0 94.3 5.6 - 0.1 
20-24 8,788 6,178 2,372 17 222 100.0 70.3 27.0 0.2 2.5 
25-29 9,546 3,689 5,298 35 525 100.0 38.6 55.5 0.4 5.5 
30-34 10,282  2,219 7,044 55 964 100.0 21.6 68.6 0.5 9.4 
35-39 11,392 1,626 8,145 138 1,484 100.0 14.3 71.5 1.2 13.0 
40-44 11,015  1,095 8,016 166 1,738 100.0 9.9 72.8 1.5 15.8 
45-54 17,459  1,263 12,345  697 3,154 100.0 7.2 70.8 4.0 18.1 
55-64 11,582  538 7,847 1,526 1,671 100.0 4.6 67.8 13.2 14.4 
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65-74 9,882 425 5,420 3,155 882 100.0 4.3 54.8 31.9 8.9 
75- over 8,677 446 2,558 5,239 433 100.0 5.1 29.5 60.4 5.0 
From: http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p20-514u.pdf, November 2002 
 
Table III.3 shows the effects of age on the marital status of both men and women.  
Some of the findings from Table III.3 are: (1) men marry later than women; (2) women 
live longer than men; (3) except for the 18-19 age group, there are more divorced women 
than divorced men in each age group; and (4) the 45-54 age group has the highest 
percentages of divorce for both men and women. 
2. Marital Status Trends in the U.S. Navy 
Before showing the marital status tables, it is useful to summarize some of the 
changes in demographic character istics of U.S. Navy officers.  Table III.4 lists 
race/ethnicity, gender, mean age, and mean service time for the officers between the 
years 1973 and 2000.  According to Table III.4, between 1973 and 2000: (1) the 
percentage of black officers has increased 6.2 times; (2) the percentage of Hispanic 
officers has increased 6.7 times; (3) the percentage of female officers has increased 2.9 
times; (4) the mean age of officers increased 7 percent; and (5) the mean service period 
increased 14 percent.  Therefore, when comparing the marital status of officers at 
















Table III.4. End Strength Composition of Active Component Navy Officers, 1973-
2000 
 
NAVY ACTIVE COMPONENT OFFICERS 
END STRENGTH 










1973 66,337 687 1.0 537 0.8 3,445 5.2 32.1 116.3 
1974 63,380 758 1.2 566 0.9 3,639 5.7 32.4 117.2 
1975 60,422 810 1.3 260 0.4 3,486 5.8 32.5 118.1 
1976 59,992 925 1.5 294 0.5 3,567 5.9 32.7 120.4 
1977 60,274 1,104 1.8 340 0.6 3,779 6.3 32.9 121.8 
1978 59,672 1,271 2.1 347 0.6 3,967 6.6 33.0 122.1 
1979 59,189 1,317 2.2 363 0.6 4,292 7.3 32.9 120.1 
1980 60,237 1,446 2.4 412 0.7 4,859 8.1 32.8 118.4 
1981 62,678 1,649 2.6 485 0.8 5,329 8.5 32.9 118.2 
1982 64,571 1,790 2.8 562 0.9 5,724 8.9 33.0 118.1 
1983 66,874 1,925 2.9 673 1.0 6,303 9.4 33.0 118.2 
1984 65,796 1,964 3.0 818 1.2 6,532 9.9 32.9 117.9 
1985 67,521 2,144 3.2 925 1.4 6,888 10.2 33.0 118.3 
1986 68,922 2,261 3.3 1,184 1.7 7,213 10.5 33.1 119.6 
1987 69,071 2,304 3.3 1,243 1.8 7,195 10.4 33.2 121.5 
1988 69,576 2,433 3.5 1,360 2.0 7,324 10.5 33.4 123.3 
1989 69,475 2,536 3.7 1,528 2.2 7,449 10.7 33.4 123.1 
1990 69,426 2,721 3.9 1,643 2.4 7,779 11.2 33.6 124.3 
1991 67,980 2,784 4.1 1,697 2.5 7,888 11.6 33.9 126.2 
1992 66,253 2,860 4.3 1,745 2.6 8,150 12.3 34.0 126.9 
1993 63,608 2,881 4.5 1,786 2.8 8,113 12.8 34.1 127.7 
1994 59,265 2,908 4.9 1,783 3.0 7,847 13.2 33.9 127.4 
1995 56,408 2,989 5.3 1,864 3.3 7,775 13.8 34.0 127.8 
1996 55,602 3,063 5.5 1,941 3.5 7,748 13.9 34.1 129.0 
1997 54,382 3,144 5.8 2,046 3.8 7,704 14.2 34.2 129.8 
1998 53,206 3,226 6.1 2,133 4.0 7,694 14.5 34.2 130.3 
1999 52,136 3,267 6.3 2,706 5.2 7,669 14.7 34.3 131.0 
2000 51,540 3,354 6.5 2,811 5.5 7,736 15.0 34.3 132.1 
From: U.S. Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal 




Table III.5 through III.14 show marital status trends in the Navy.  Although the 
main purpose is to present the most recent and detailed information, some relatively older 
information is also used, to cover a wider range of variables.  First, recent marital status 
information of military personnel from different branches of service are provided to allow 
comparisons between the separate armed forces.  Then, some time-based information is 
given. Finally, statistics showing trends in the marital status of female Navy officers are 
presented. 
Table III.5 summarizes the married officer information in Fiscal Year 2000.  The 
percentage of married male officers in the Navy is lower than in all the other forces, and 
the percentage of married female officers in the Navy is only higher than that of female 
officers in the Marine Corps.  In addition, the percentages of dual marriages in the Navy 
are far below those in the other services.  This table suggests that getting married, and 
remaining married, may be relatively more difficult for Navy officers than for officers in 
the other services.  
 
Table III.5. Fiscal Year 2000 Active Component Officers Who were Married, and in 
Dual-Service Marriages by Gender and Service (Number and Percent)  
 
MARRIED 







NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT 
NAVY 
MALE 43,804  29,373  67.1 473 1.6 
FEMALE 7,736 3,538 45.7 619 17.5 
TOTAL 51,540  32,911  63.9 1,092 3.3 
ARMY 
MALE 55,355  40,592  73.3 2,541 6.3 
FEMALE 9,997 5,391 53.9 2,600 48.2 
TOTAL 65,352  45,983  70.4 5,141 11.2 
MARINE CORPS 
MALE 15,196 10,534  69.3 361 3.4 
FEMALE 812 336 41.4 220 65.5 
TOTAL 16,008  10,870  67.9 581 5.3 
AIR FORCE 
MALE 57,203  43,919  76.8 2,365 5.4 
FEMALE 11,819  6,673 56.5 2,488 37.3 
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MARRIED 







NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT 
TOTAL 69,022  50,592  73.3 4,853 9.6 
DoD 
MALE 171,558 124,418 72.5 5,740 4.6 
FEMALE 30,364 15,938  52.5 5,927 37.2 
TOTAL 201,922 140,356 69.5 11,667  8.3 
From: Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 
2000, February 2002. 
Tables III.6 through III.10 are based on the responses of military person nel in the 
1999 Active Duty Survey of Members.  Table III.6 shows that personnel in the Navy 
have lower marriage and divorce rates than personnel in the Army, Air Force and Coast 
Guard, but more than higher than the rates for personnel in the Marine Corps.   On the 
other hand, the proportion of Navy personnel in the “separated” group is the highest of all 
services. 
 













5,615 5,534 1,852 1,670 762 1,251 81 
RESPONDED 1,298,134 1,267,027 451,414 335,446 149,997 330,170 31,108 
MARRIED 
(%) 
59.8 59.8 62.2 57.5 47.9 64.2 61.3 
SEPARATED 
(%) 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 
DIVORCED 
(%) 
6.6 6.7 6.7 5.9 4.2 8.4 5.8 
WIDOWED 
(%) 
0.1 0.1 NR NR NR NR NR 
NR: Not reported; cell size less than 30 
From: 1999 Active Duty Survey of Members, Defense Manpower Data Center, February 2001.  
 
Table III.7 shows the differences in the marital status of military perso nnel as a 
whole by paygrade.  Naturally, the percentage of married personnel increases over time, 
as well as for paygrade for both enlisted personnel and officers.  The separation rates are 
higher in the enlisted group than in the officer group.  For the d ivorce rates, using another 
48 
ratio such as divorced/married may be more useful to eliminate the fact that, since the 
number of marriages in junior ranks will be lower, then naturally the number of divorced 
personnel will also be lower.  Although at first glance, the divorce rates seem to increase 
by paygrade, both for enlisted personnel and officers, when the new ratio is applied, the 
divorce rate for junior officers becomes higher than for the senior officers, where it does 
not change the initial condition for enlisted personnel.  
 
Table III.7. Marital Status of Active-Duty Military Members by Paygrade 
 
ENLISTED WARRANT OFFICERS  
POPULATION E1-E3 E4 E5-E6 E7-E9 W1-W5 O 1-O 3 O 4-O 6 
NOT 
RESPONDED 1,749 1,039 1,907 587 28 174 133 
RESPONDED 239,017 279,518 412,634 152,003 17,058 112,485 85,340 
MARRIED 
(%) 26.8 45.8 72.1 83.1 85.3 63.7 87.1 
SEPARATED 
(%) 
1.3 2.8 3.8 3.0 1.4 1.2 1.2 
DIVORCED 
(%) 1.9 4.9 9.8 10.5 8.2 4.8 5.6 
WIDOWED 
(%) 
NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 
NR: Not reported; cell size less than 30 
From: 1999 Active Duty Survey of Members, Defense Manpower Data Center, February 2001.  
 
Table III.8 details the divorce information by each branch of service.  Consistent 
with the information in Table III.6, military personnel in the Navy have lower divorce 
rates than in the Army, Air Force and Coast Guard, but higher than in the Marine Corps.  
 














400,221 390,633 126,914 112,568 68,492 82,658 9,588 
NOT 
RESPONDED 
9,082 8,771 3,129 2,353 932 2,358 311 
RESPONDED 894,447 873,157 323,223 222,195 81,334 246,405 21,289 
NONE (%) 72.7 72.7 71.0 74.3 78.7 71.5 74.0 











2 (%) 4.0 4.1 4.6 3.7 2.2 4.3 3.0 
3 OR MORE 
(%) 
0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 NR 0.7 NR 
NR: Not reported; cell size less than 30 
From: 1999 Active Duty Survey of Members, Defense Manpower Data Center, February 2001.  
Table III.9 details the divorce information for different paygrades.  The 
percentages for divorced enlisted personnel are much higher than for officers.  The 
percentages for divorced personnel also increase as paygrade increases.  
 
Table III.9. Number of Times Divorced of Active Duty Military Members by 
Paygrade 
 
ENLISTED WARRANT OFFICERS POPULATION 
E1-E3 E4 E5-E6 E7-E9 W1-W5 O1-O3 O4-O6 
NOT 
APPLICABLE 
167,103 129,830 58,447 5,051 812 34,014 4,962 
NOT 
RESPONDED 
3,267 1,641 2,485 742 113 394 439 
RESPONDED 70,396 149,085 353,608 146,796 16,160 78,250 80,071 
NONE (%) 90.0 82.2 67.8 58.7 63.9 84.3 78.1 
1 (%) 9.4 16.1 26.8 31.5 28.4 13.7 18.3 
2 (%) NR NR 4.7 8.1 5.5 1.8 3.2 
3 OR MORE 
(%) 
NR NR 0.7 1.8 2.3 NR 0.5 
NR: Not reported; cell size less than 30 
From: 1999 Active Duty Survey of Members, Defense Manpower Data Center, February 2001. 
 
Table III.10 shows the number of divorces for all military personnel by gender 
and duty location.  It can be easily seen that female military personnel divorce more often 
than male personnel.  However, as for the effect of duty location on divorces, it seems 
that overseas duties do not make any difference, which is contrary to a hypothesis in the 
study.  In fact, the information in Table III.10 only indicates that the marital status of 
divorce does not make any differenc e in assigning personnel to overseas duty.  Since 
information on whether the divorces occurred during the overseas duty is not available, it 
is not possible to assess whether the overseas duty may have played a role in the divorce.  
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POPULATION MALE FEMALE 50 STATES & DC 
Overseas, American Samoa, 




330,519 69,702 326,002 72,810 
NOT 
RESPONDED 
7,661 1,421 7,856 1,216 
RESPONDED 776,495 117,952 754,380 137,535 
NONE (%) 74.8 59.1 72.7 73.4 
1 (%) 21.2 31.7 22.5 22.6 
2 (%) 3.5 7.6 4.1 3.4 
3 OR MORE (%)  0.6 1.5 0.7 0.6 
From: 1999 Active Duty Survey of Members, Defense Manpower Data Center, February  2001. 
 
Table III.11 compares the divorce rates of Navy enlisted personnel and officers 
with all personnel in DoD between the years 1977 and 1988.  Navy enlisted personnel 
had consistently higher divorce rates during this period than enlisted personnel in DoD as 
a whole.  However, the divorce rates for Navy officers are not significantly different from 
those of officers in DoD during the same period.  In addition, a significant change in all 
rates does not occur from 1977 to 1988. 
 




ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER 
1977 2.5 1.4 3.1 1.1 
1978 2.5 1.4 2.8 1.2 
1979 2.5 1.5 2.7 1.4 
1980 2.6 1.5 3.0 1.3 
1981 2.8 1.6 3.5 1.6 
1982 2.9 1.6 3.2 1.4 
1983 2.8 1.5 3.3 1.6 
1984 2.7 1.5 3.4 1.6 
1985 2.8 1.5 3.6 1.6 




ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER 
1987 2.6 1.4 2.9 1.3 
1988 2.6 1.4 2.8 1.3 
From: Wallace, Elizabeth A., Rose, Kenneth C., Divorce and Family Support Services: Problems 
and Prospects for the U.S. Navy, Master’s  Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, March 1991, p. 125. 
 
Table III.12 shows the marital status of female Navy officers between 1990 and 
1997.  Although not indicated, it is assumed that divorced officers are included in the 
single category.  One point gleaned from the table is that over 85 percent of the female 
Navy officers marry civilians.  Another point is that the percentage of married female 
officers increased from 1990 to 1997.   
 
Table III.12. Percentage of Female Officers in the Navy Who are Married, by Military 
or Civilian Spouse, 1990-1997 
 








1990 4.3 40.1 44.4 54.5 98.9 
1992 3.8 42.5 46.3 52.9 99.2 
1995 6.6 44.9 51.5 48.5 100.0 
1997 7.6 45.4 53.0 47.0 100.0 
From: Johnson, Roni S., Civilian Husbands in the Military Family: Current Issues and Future 
Concerns, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1998.  
 
Table III.13 focuses on the year 1997 and includes rank information from Table 
III.12.  For each rank, at least 82 percent of the female Navy officers prefer to marry 











Table III.13. Number and Percent of Female Officers in the Navy by Marital Status, 
Type of Spouse (Civilian or Military) and P ay Grade, 1997 
 




NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT 
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
O-1, O-2 67 3.5 635 32.8 1,234 63.7 1,936 
O-3 225 7.8 1,324 45.8 1,343 46.4 2,892 
O-4 178 11.1 847 52.6 585 36.3 1,610 
O-5 104 10.4 545 54.6 349 35.0 998 
O-6 16 6.2 131 50.4 113 43.5 260 
From: Johnson, Roni S., Civilian Husbands in the Military Family: Current Issues and Future 
Concerns, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1998.  
 
Table III.14 shows that the percentage of female Navy officers who married 
civilians did not change for O-3 to O-5 between 1990 and 1997.  However, within the 
same period, there is an increase in the preference of female Navy officers at O-1, O-2, 
and O-6 to marry civilians.   
 




GRADE 1990 1992 1995 1997 
PERCENT 
INCREASE (*) 
O-1, O-2 23.9 29.8 35.1 32.8 8.9 
O-3 44.0 43.6 44.3 45.8 1.8 
O-4 51.1 53.6 52.3 52.6 1.5 
O-5 53.0 53.9 53.2 54.6 1.6 
O-6 33.9 43.4 54.7 50.4 16.5 
(*) These numbers reflect the percentage increase from 1990 to 1997  
From: Johnson, Roni S., Civilian Husbands in the Military Family: Current Issues and Future 
Concerns, Master’s Thes is, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1998.  
 
D. STUDIES ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF MARITAL STATUS ON 
MILITARY PERSONNEL 
Many studies have been conducted regarding the marital status of military 
personnel, with the researchers using information about marital status as the independent 
variable to explain the effects of marital status on different military variables such as 
retention, promotion, reenlistment and performance.  However, in this study, for the first 
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time, marital status information is the dependent variable, and an attempt is made to find 
different variables that significantly affect the marital status of officers.  No study could 
be found that completely covers this issue.  For this reason, the focus is on previous 
research either directly related to the study’s hypotheses, or that can help to better discern 
the decisions of military personnel concerning their marital status, or emphasize the 
importance of marital status on service members for the military.      
1. Mehay and Bowman (2002) 
Stephen L. Mehay and William R. Bowman analyzed the effects of marital status 
on both performance and promotion of Navy officers in their study.  Mehay and Bowman 
emphasized the importance of their study by explaining why marital status is a policy 
issue for the military and stated:  
Marital status is a policy issue for the military because married men cost 
considerably more than single men.  Pay for married personnel exceeds 
that of otherwise similar personnel due to differences in housing and 
subsistence allowances, and due to numerous programs (e.g., child care, 
housing and family support centers) that benefit primarily married 
households.44  
The data used by Mehay and Bowman in their study were provided by the Navy 
Bureau of Personnel and the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, which 
consisted of officers who began their careers in the Navy between 1977 and 1985.  In the 
data, there were 4,283 staff and 26,385 line officers, and their marital status was recorded 
at three different career  points: at entry, at year 3, and at year 10.  The models they used 
were specified due to these marital status recordings.  Their early career stage 
performance model covering years 1-3 was specified as a function of marital status at 
entry; the performanc e model for the later career stage covering years 4-10 was 
conditioned on marital status at year 3; and promotion at year 10 was conditioned on 
marital status at year 10.  
Mehay and Bowman’s findings in their study are: (1) male line specialists who 
are married at entry, have superior ratings during their first three years and are 24 percent 
higher than for non-married male officers; (2) prior enlisted personnel have higher 
                                          
44 Mehay, Stephen L., Bowman, William R., Marital Status and Productivity: Evidence from 
Personnel Data, Research, 21 December 2002, p. 2.  
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supervisor ratings but are not valid for the staff officers; (3) college graduates ha ve higher 
supervisor ratings; (4) married staff officers receive an early -career rating premium of 14 
percent; (5) African-Americans receive substantially lower performance reviews and the 
gap between African-Americans and whites is much larger for the staff group; (6) men in 
the line group who are married at year 3 receive a 6 percent advantage in ratings written 
during the service years 4-10, while married men in the staff group receive a 5 percent 
advantage; (7) divorced men in the line group receive slightly higher later career ratings, 
whereas the effects of divorce on the staff group was insignificant; (8) the rating 
advantage is twice as high for line officers who are continuously married compared to 
those who marry sometime between years 1 and 3, and compared to those who divorce 
during this period; (9) the performance advantage accruing for married men grows with 
marriage tenure; (10) male surface personnel who are married at entry have on -time 
qualification rates about 25 percent higher than single officers, and have eventual 
qualification rates about 20 percent higher than single men; (11) the promotion premium 
for married men is 13 percent higher for line officers and 8 percent higher for staff 
officers, and the premium rises for those who have been married longer; (12) the 
promotion differential is twice as great for continuously -married line officers compared 
to those who first marry between years 3 and 10 and more than twice as great for 
continuously married officers compared to those who divorce during this period; and (13) 
staff personnel are more likely to be promoted to O-4 than unmarried males. 
Mehay and Bowman then added two-stage Heckman models or used different 
personnel groups in the data, in order to prevent the possible selection bias and to achieve 
more detailed findings.  In these models, they found that for both early and later career 
periods, and for both skill groups (line and staff) mean supervisor scores are much higher 
(25-50 percent) for those who eventually choose to stay than those who leave.  Another 
important finding is that for staff officers, the impact of marriage on promotion becomes 
insignificant in the selection-adjusted model.  Finally, line officers who are single at entry 
but who will marry in the future receive higher scores in the early career period than 
single officers who do not marry in the future.  The coefficient is insignificant for staff 
officers.     
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2. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (1993) 
In 1993, the Secretary of Defense directed that a study be conducted on issues 
associated with the first term of enlistment.  The work was divided among different 
panels:  
One was directed to compare single with married enlistees along such 
factors as finances, health problems, substance abuse, pregnancy, 
promotion rates, and indiscipline.  A second panel was directed to study 
existing social service programs and to assess their effectiveness in 
helping families adjust to the demands of military life.  A third panel was 
directed to focus on training and deployability issues-key indicator of 
readiness.  A fourth panel was created to focus on compensation and 
finance matters.  
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided data, analysis, 
and support to each panel…DMDC created two new data bases especially 
for this study, one to facilitate review of demographic data and one 
especially to examine issues of deployment and operating tempo.  DMDC 
also acquired a Census Bureau database to permit comparisons with 
analogous civilian populations.  In addition, for this  study DMDC 
accelerated and redirected its planned analyses of returns from the large -
scale survey conducted in 1992 of attitudes and experiences of almost 
60,000 service members and more than 24,000 spouses.  Of the 
respondents, 8,581 were in their first term of service.45 
The most important findings of the study were: (1) the study group did not find 
any clear, statistically valid quantitative relationship, positive or negative, between 
marital status and readiness; (2) deployability is a key indicator of individual readiness 
and reflecting their diverse missions, the several services have markedly different 
patterns of assignment, location, and deployment; (3) the vast majority of members, 
regardless of marital status or dependents, deploy when ordered, bu t service members 
with dependents report more problems getting ready to deploy than do members without 
dependents; (4) married members tend to have slightly fewer performance and behavior 
problems, but problems of married members tend to be more complex an d much more 
time-consuming for commanders, distracting those commanders from mission -oriented 
activities and leading to a perception that marital status has a significant impact on 
readiness; (5) while marriage in the first -term may pose challenges to the service 
                                          
45 Family Status and Initial term of Service, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel 
and Readiness), Volume I, December 1993, pp. 1 -2. 
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member, many members consider a strong marriage key to a successful long -term career 
in the military; and (6) many married junior enlisted members have financial problems, 
especially in localities with high off-base housing costs.  This study group also found that 
finances and housing problems are at the root of many other problems which service 
members experience in the first term.  Further, service members and families frequently 
lack key information about compensation, financial management, and h ousing. Most 
members and spouses who took advantage of family support programs were satisfied 
with the services they received.  However, not all members took advantage of the 
programs.   
3. Wallace and Rose (1991)46 
Elizabeth A. Wallace and Kenneth C. Rose,  in their joint thesis, first examined 
marriage and divorce rates for Navy personnel and then compared these rates with the 
civilian U.S. population and the military personnel from other forces.  Wallace and Rose 
also briefly examined the counseling suppor t services available to Navy personnel going 
through a divorce.  Wallace and Rose used multivariate regression methods to explore the 
relationship between reenlistment and divorce.  The data they used were taken from the 
1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel.  The survey was conducted by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) with the participation of 19,000 active -duty 
officers and 70,000 active-duty enlisted personnel.  
Wallace and Rose’s methodology used four logit models, where the dependen t 
variable (INTENT) was the degree of the possibility of enlisted personnel to reenlist.  
The responses to the survey in grades between “probable” to “certain” were valued as 1, 
and responses in grades between “good possibility” to “no chance” were valued as 0.  As 
their explanatory variables, they used personnel demographics, job factors, tenure, 
economic factors, personnel influences, and alternatives.  
Wallace and Rose obtained important results from their models.  Their 
reenlistment models indicate that, as a whole, 29.3 percent of the single, 53.4 percent of 
the married, 56.4 percent of the divorced, and 67.9 percent of the remarried personnel 
                                          
46 Wallace, Elizabeth A., Rose, Kenneth C., Divorce and Family Support Services: Problems and 
Prospects for the U.S. Navy, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 
1991. 
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intend to stay, which indicates that divorced individuals have a higher propensity to 
reenlist than single and married but never divorced personnel.  On the other hand, as 
expected, the reenlistment rate for married personnel is almost twice that of single 
personnel.  Another finding concerned being assigned to a ship.  Approximately 66 
percent of the personnel assigned to a ship intended to leave, and 34.5 percent intended to 
stay, and the population assigned to ships had a smaller percentage (11.7 percent) of 
divorces than the population assigned ashore (18.7 percent).  These divorce rates 
definitely do not indicate that being assigned to ships reduces the rate of divorce, because 
in order to reach this conclusion, additional information is required, such as marriage 
rates, age, years of service onboard, at which duty (sea or shore) the divorce has taken 
place and so forth.  On the other hand, the intention of two-thirds of the enlisted 
personnel that have sea duty to leave is evidence of personal problems caused by sea 
duty.  Wallace and Rose also found that members with civilian spouses had higher 
reenlistment propensity than did those married to other service members.  
According to their other findings, both Navy and military marriage rates as a 
whole are generally lower than the overall civilian marriage rates, but two to three times 
higher among 17-20 year olds.  In addition, divorce rates are lower for military men, but 
much higher for military women.  Finally, according to Wallace and Rose, Family 
Service Center services can be improved.  
4. Kol and Ryu (2002)47 
Mustafa Kol and Seung-min Ryu analyzed the effect of marital status on the job 
performance of U.S. Navy officers in their joint thesis.  The data they used include 
information about U.S. Navy officers who entered the Navy between 1976 and 1985.  
Assuming that (1) unrestricted line officers are more likely to  be separated from their 
family for longer periods of time due to deployments at sea, and (2) family separation 
will affect both the employment opportunities of officer’s spouses and the couple’s 
ability to specialize within the household, Kol and Ryu separated officers into two groups 
as unrestricted line officers (N=28,983), and staff and restricted line officers (N=5,357). 
The proxy they used to measure on-the-job productivity was the “recommendation for 
                                          
47 Ryu, Seung-min and Kol, Mustafa, An Analysis of the Relationship Between Marital Status and 
Family Structure and On-the-job Productivity, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, March 2002. 
58 
accelerated promotion” in the fitness reports of officers, and of course, promotion itself.  
These two items are the dependent variables.  When they analyzed the performance 
models (recommendation for accelerated promotion), they used Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) models, and when they analyzed the promotion to O-4, they used maximum 
likelihood probit models. 
Kol and Ryu analyzed the effects of basically five different issues on the officers’ 
on-the-job performance.  These are: (1) marriage premium based on “married” and 
“single”; (2) the effects of years of marriage on performance; (3) the effect of differences 
in two single officers, where the first group remains single and the second group marries 
in the future; (4) the number of dependents; and (5) measuring the relationship between 
marital status and graduate school completion.  
Kol and Ryu discovered in their research that (1) married male officers receive 
higher supervisor evaluations (4-24 percent) and are promoted at higher rates (4-8 
percent) than single male officers; (2) the more years unrestricted line male officers have 
been married, the higher supervisor evaluations they receive and the higher their 
promotion rates, on the other hand, staff and restricted line male officers receive higher 
supervisor evaluations when they have fewer years of marr iage; (3) for both unrestricted 
line and staff/restricted line male officers, performance indicators increase with the 
number of dependents, and having more dependents increases the performance of 
unrestricted male officers more than that of staff/restricted line male officers; (4) for both 
unrestricted line and staff/restricted line male officers, single officers who will marry in 
the future receive more supervisor evaluations than single officers who will remain single 
in the future; (5) both unrestricted  line and staff/restricted line male officers who are 
married have attained more graduate education than single officers; (6) married officers 
stay in the Navy in higher proportions; and (7) for unrestricted line female officers, 
officers who were married at entry received 15 percent more supervisor evaluations 
during grades O-1 and O-2 fitness reports.  However, the effects of marriage on the 
fitness reports at grade O-3, and the promotion rate to O-4, were not significant for 
unrestricted female officers.  
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As Roni S. Johnson indicated, there is a possible relation between the marital 
status and performance grades of the military members, which supports the findings of 
Kol and Ryu.  Johnson mentions in her thesis that, “Despite policy - DoD Directive 
1400.33 - that specifically forbids consideration of a spouse’s employment, educational, 
or volunteer activities in the evaluation of a service member’s performance, many 
individuals in the military and their spouses still believe that volunteer activities are 
required.”48 
5. Hosek and Totten (2002)49 
Hosek and Totten’s recent study on how deployments influence reenlistment uses 
a PERSTEMPO data file created by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  The 
file contains longitudinal data on active-duty personnel by month from January 1993 
through September 1999 and for the last month in each quarter going back to FY1988.  
Although their study was not conducted specifically for Navy deployments, it definitely 
provides a good indication of the effects of deployments, in general, on the retention 
decisions of active-military personnel.  
To track the deployments, Hosek and Totten used the information of whether or 
not active-duty members receive FSA (Family Separation Allowance) or HFP (Hostile 
Fire Pay) payments.  FSA is  payable to members with dependents (spouses and children 
only) who are away on duty for a period of at least 30 consecutive days.  HFP is payable 
to members on duty in areas or circumstances deemed hostile and is payable regardless of 
whether a member has  dependents.  By using FSA and HFB, the authors created variables 
for deployments, months of deployment, and whether or not a deployment involved 
hostile duty. 
Hosek and Totten found that (1) for the first-term members, reenlistment rose 
with the number of non-hostile deployments and typically was little affected by the 
number of hostile deployments; (2) for second-term members, reenlistment rose with 
non-hostile and hostile deployments; (3) rather than decreasing reenlistment, deployment 
generally served to increase it or it was left unchanged; (4) members who were married 
                                          
48 Johnson, Roni S., Civilian Husbands in the Military Family: Current Issues and Future Concerns, 
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1998.  
49 Hosek, James, and Totten, Mark, Serving Away From Home: How Deployments Influence 
Reenlistment, RAND Report, MR-1594-OSD, 2002, pp. 1 -81. 
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by the time the reenlistment decision was made were more likely to reenlist and had a 
greater, positive effect of deployment on reenlistment than did members who were not 
married for both the first and second terms of reenlistment.  The authors concluded that 
the type of member to marry also tended to like the military, deployment and would 
likely reenlist. 
6. Hosek, Asch, Fair, Martin and Mattock (2002)50 
In their report, James Hosek, Beth Asch, Christine C. Fair, Craig Martin and 
Michael Mattock analyzed the employment and earnings of the wives of the military 
personnel and compared it to civilian wives.  In their study, they used Current Population 
Survey (CPS) data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
The findings of the authors are as follows: (1) military family earnings averaged 
about $10,500 (in FY1999) less than the earnings of civilian families, where $5,400 of 
this difference comes from the difference in the wife’s  earnings.  When comparing 
earnings, the age, race and education of the husband were taken into account by the 
authors.  (2) 74 percent of military wives worked during the year compared with 82 
percent of civilian wives; (3) 48% of the working military wiv es worked full-time versus 
59 percent of civilian wives; (4) military wives worked 37.6 weeks versus 40.9 weeks for 
civilian wives; (5) the weekly wage of military wives who worked full -time was $268, 
$40 less than the weekly wage of $308 for civilian wives; (6) the difference in the 
frequency and length of moves accounted for a 2.7 week difference in weeks of work 
(less weeks for military wives); (7) the likelihood of full -time work rose more rapidly 
with age for military wives than for civilian wives; (8) the wage of the military wife is 
lower at every age than the wage of civilian wives, although the increase in wage with 
age is similar for military and civilian wives; (9) the presence of children is associated 
with the reduced labor supply for both milit ary and civilian wives, however, the reduction 
is greater for military wives when the children are aged 0 to 5; and (10) the negative 
effect of moving on the labor supply is actually less for military wives than for civilian 
wives moving a similar distance, and because military wives are more likely to move 
longer distances. (On the last point, it should be noted that the moves by wives are more 
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likely to involve a job change and a larger reduction in the labor supply.  As a result, the 
overall effect of moving negatively affects military wives more.) 
The authors associated the wage difference between military and civilian wives 
with the frequent movement of military families.  According to authors, frequent moves 
might induce the wife to spend less time looking for a job and to seek jobs with short 
training times.  In addition, employers may recognize that military wives are willing to 
accept jobs at lower wages rather than continue searching for a higher -paying job. 
7. Ruger et al. (2002)51 
Recent research by William Ruger et al. (2002) uses an approach that is closest to 
that employed in the present study.  The central feature of their analysis is a statistical 
examination of the relationship between the military service and the duration of men’s 
first marriages.  They focused on military service during World War II (WWII), the 
Korean War, and the Vietnam War periods.  Based on their literature review, they 
generated four hypotheses about the marriage duration of military members, and using 
survey data, they tested these hypotheses.  
They used data from the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), 
which included 3,800 veterans who were interviewed first in the late 1980s and then 
again in the early 1990s.  In this survey, among other things, veterans were asked tell 
about their marital history and their military service.  In the second survey, ex-spouses 
and surviving widows were also included in the interview.  
The four hypotheses that the researchers generated were: (1) military combat 
creates long-term psychological and emotional problems that increase the risk of marital 
dissolution (combat stress hypothesis); (2) time away from a spouse will weaken 
marriage bonds and increase the probability of dissolution (separation hypothesis); (3) 
marriage that occurs before the start of the husband’s time of service should be associated 
with a higher probability of marital dissolution than marriages occurring after service 
commences (hasty marriage hypothesis); and (4) a returning (married) soldier comes 
home to a social milieu that may affect the durability of his marriage (social interaction 
hypothesis).  
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The dependent variable in the model was the duration of the first marriage.  They 
used duration analysis methods (also called survival analysis or hazard mode ls) to test 
their hypotheses.  In this method, researchers determined a baseline “hazard function” 
and they converted the estimated coefficients into hazard ratios, which give the 
percentage difference between the baseline function and the change in the covariates.  
The results they obtained are: (1) marital dissolution increased rapidly starting in 
the middle part of the century; (2) WWII veterans face no adverse effects from service 
and those who were married following the war had a significantly lower rate of 
dissolution than those who didn’t serve; (3) veterans who married in the periods 
following the Korean and Vietnam wars had significantly higher dissolution rates than 
their nonveteran counterparts; (4) a dramatic shift occurred between WWII and Korea  in 
the impact of service on marital dissolution: Korean war veterans have more than twice 
the dissolution rate of the WWII veterans; (5) combat veterans have higher hazard rates 
than noncombat veterans for each war; (6) marrying before or during military service 
increases the probability of marital dissolution; (7) education slightly lowers the hazard; 
and (8) relative to whites, blacks and other races have a higher hazard of dissolution, 
while Hispanics have a lower risk.  
As previously noted, this study is the closest one to this thesis, since duration of 
the marriage of military members is used as the dependent variable.  In addition, two of 
their hypotheses are directly related with the concerns of this thesis.  The “separation 
hypothesis” and the “hasty marriage hypothesis” are similar to those in this thesis.  
However, there are also some major differences: (1) the study focuses only on divorces; 
(2) the study deals with marriages that occurred up to 60 years ago; (3) the study analyzes 
the effects of war, which has dramatically higher negative effects than the regular peace-
time duties analyzed in the thesis; and (4) the methodology in the present study is 
different.  Since the dependent variable in this thesis is binary outcomes —married or 
divorced—this thesis uses multivariate logit models to assess the effects of duties and 




E.  HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS  OF MILITARY 
DUTIES AND ASSIGNMENTS ON THE MARITAL STATUS OF NAVY 
OFFICERS 
The following hypotheses are developed about the negative effects of military 
duties and assignments on the marital status of Navy officers, based on the literature 
review and personal experiences: (1) married officers who are on sea duty are more likely 
to divorce; (2) officers who marry in the early years of military service are more likely to 
divorce; (3) sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage among 
single officers; (4) riskier and more arduous duty has a negative effect on officer s and 
causes a higher rate of divorces than do other types of duty; (5) duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those 
who are married. These hypotheses are discussed below.  
1. Married Officers Who Are on Sea Duty Are More Likely to Divorce  
There are two potential negative effects of “sea duty” on divorce.  The first effect 
arises from the relatively harder working conditions and additional stress caused by 
duties on war ships compared to office work. The second arises from deployments, which 
cause separations from family members for long periods of time, such as generally five to  
six months.  The negative effects of the stress caused by sea duty are explained in 
hypothesis four below.  This section focuses on the negative effects of deployments.  
The negative effects of deployments influence officers and their families 
differently.  In addition, the gender of the officer, and the presence of children are other 
factors that cause differences  in the severity of the effect of sea duty on the officers and 
their families. 
According to a report published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense in 1993, two-thirds of service members with dependents who had deployments 
reported major problems related with the deployments, while only one-third of single 
service members likewise reported problems.52  This supports the hypothesis that the 
combination of difficult working conditions and having dependents may increase a 
member’s problems dramatically.   
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For officers  who deploy, the main problem caused by sea duty is being away from 
family and home.  Another source of stress is the monotony of a long deployment.  The 
feeling of accomplishment of doing their job onboard, being with their colleague s all the 
time, having port visits, and recreational and morale activities organized onboard reduce 
the stress to some extent.  However, these activities cannot overcome the feeling of 
worrying about their family.  Deployments create uncertainty for both t he military service 
member and the spouse about each other’s safety, which induces stress and anxiety.  The 
level at which a spouse and children can communicate with the service member 
determines the intensity of this anxiety.  Nevertheless, in spite of technological 
developments, tactical or environmental constraints, such as the deep- diving cruise of 
submarines, family members are not allowed to communicate with a service member 
whenever they want.  Michelle L. Kelley, citing Glisson (1980) and Beckman (1979), 
states in her study, “Among submariners’ wives, the highest level of depressive effect 
was reported when ships were submerged and all communication ceased,” and “clinical 
levels of depressive behavior have been found in wives of nuclear submariners. ”53 
Deployed male officers who have children are apparently not affected negatively 
from being away from their families as much as their female counterparts, since they tend 
to think that their children are under good care.  Kelley mentions in her study tha t one- 
half of children of enlisted U.S. Navy mothers live with someone other than their father 
during their mother’s deployment.54  For female officers, being anxious about a 
dependent can reduce their ability to concentrate on the job, which is another ne gative 
issue for the Navy.      
The negative effects of a deployment on female military members are analyzed in 
detail in Kelley’s study.  In her study, she surveyed 154 enlisted Navy mothers forming 
one deployment group (N=71) and one non-deploying group (N=83).  According to her 
results, 87 percent of women who experienced deployment reported that they felt guilty 
about leaving a child to go on deployment.55  Thirty-eight percent stated that deployment 
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was stressful for family members, 25 percent stated that their children had difficulty 
emotionally, 24 percent reported that they had mother-child attachment difficulties, and 
22 percent stated that their children exhibited negative behavior.  On the other hand, 16 
percent stated that deployment had a positiv e effect on their children, 16 percent stated 
that deployment had a positive effect on the family, and 15 percent reported that 
deployment had no effect.  
The negative effects of deployments on the dependents of deployed military 
members are relatively greater than on the members themselves.  Kelley summarizes the 
negative effects of the deployments on families, as seen in Table III.15.  
 
Table III.15. The Negative Effects (Sources of Stress) of Deployments on Dependents 




COMMON SOURCES OF SPOUSE STRESS AND AFFECTIVE 
DIFFICULTIES  
Predeployment Marital stress/conflict, distancing from spouse, anger, resentment, 
sadness/depression, negative child behavior 
Deployment Marital problems, isolation, loneliness, anger, resent ment, 
sadness/depression, reduced communication, stress, less social 
support, assuming the role of single parent, child care difficulties, 
sleep disturbances, physical symptoms, home and car repairs, 
difficulty assessing military services, negative child behavior 
Postdeployment/Reunion Redefining responsibilities, marital stress, communication problems, 
anxiety, anger, resentment, parent-child attachment issues  
From: Kelley, L. Michelle, “The Effects of Deployment on Traditional and Nontraditional 
Military Families: Navy Mothers and Their Children”, p. 5.  
 
Kelley, citing Armfield (1993) and Holland (1997), states: 
Families have different abilities to cope with deployment stress.  Military 
wives with deployed husbands who exhibited secure attachment reporte d 
fewer separation concerns and emotional distress than women with 
insecure attachment.56 
Suzanne Wood, Jacquelyn Scarville and Katharine S. Gravino write: 57  
For all (the spouses whose husbands are in deployment), there were 
changes in household routines, roles, and responsibilities.  Some women 
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experienced severe problems: overwhelming depression and loneliness, 
loss of a job, financial crises, falling out by nearby relatives or neighbors, 
or illness.  (Two of the 11 pregnant wives in the sample miscarried during 
the weeks around departure.)  For most of the women in the sample, life 
began to stabilize as they determined their new roles as “waiting wives.”58  
Members who seemed to adjust more quickly were those who stayed busy and 
involved in a variety of ways: such as work, community activities, the family, church, 
family support groups, and a combination of these.  
According to Wood et al.,  the problems within military families do not end when 
the husband (member) returns.  After the first days of physical c loseness, when there was 
an initial tendency to do everything together,  
…differences became apparent.  Many men had unrealistically expected 
that things would remain the same at home.  Some women were hurt by 
their husbands’ seeming indifference to their accomplishments and 
changes of the past six months.  Men, eager to resume roles in the family, 
were surprised and often overwhelmed by their wives’ ability to get along 
without them.59 
According to Mady Wechsler Segal, family members informally carry the ran k of 
the service member60.  In times of deployments, the officers’ wives are expected to 
organize some family support activities such as gatherings, telephone trees to relay 
information, which add more duties and responsibilities for them.  In most of the c ases, 
the stress and the problems caused by the deployments diminish with each subsequent 
deployment, but they never disappear entirely for the families.  
Johnson emphasizes another problem for the spouses caused by deployments.  
She studies the advantages  and disadvantages of civilian spouses for female officers in 
her master’s thesis61.  She points out that, in 1997, 46.7 percent of female officers were 
single, 18.4 percent of female officers were married to military service members, and 
34.8 percent of female officers were married to civilians.  According to her, a civilian 
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spouse, in addition to other problems that all spouses encounter, “may also suffer some 
degree of jealousy or mistrust of either his military wife, or her male coworkers, during 
periods of separation or deployment, depending on his maturity and level of mutual trust 
in the marriage.”62 
The findings of a study by Firestone and Harris in 1994 support the civilian 
husbands’ concerns. In their study, out of the 9,497 female military service members 
(from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Coast Guard), 64.4 percent of female 
officers and 74.8 percent of female enlisted personnel stated that they were exposed to 
sexual harassment at least once. 63  
The negative effects of deployments are not only limited to the single deployment 
cycle.  Some important events occurred during deployment, such as births, deaths, the 
first steps of a child, and many others.  When the deployed officers cannot share in these 
events, permanent problems may occur with family bonds.  The long-term effects of 
deployments are as important as the short-term effects. 
The problems caused by deployments are added to the other job-related problems 
that all officers face and increase the possibility of divorce.  In addition, mos t of the 
spouses who do not have enough courage to initiate divorce can test themselves during 
the deployments about whether they can manage to live on their own or not, and this may 
make the decision concerning divorce a little easier for them than for th eir civilian 
counterparts.  
2. Officers Who Marry in the Early Years of Military Service Are More 
Likely to Divorce  
In a study by Becker, two reasons are identified for early marriages.64  First, a 
person is so very lucky to find the best spouse and they mar ry immediately; or, second, a 
person is very pessimistic and believes that it will be impossible to find a better spouse in 
the future.  In the second case, long-term deployments and consecutive assignments may 
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make officers feel pessimistic and cause them to marry without being sure if this is the 
“right” person.  
Wallace and Rose offer another opinion about why an early marriage may occur 
in the military.65  In their thesis, they basically studied the marriage and divorce patterns 
of junior enlisted personnel and analyzed family support services.  According to the 
authors, marriages also bring some extra benefits for the couples.  They state: 
…perhaps the sub-population entering the military is strongly influenced 
by the immediate benefits gained from the marriage.  Individuals with a 
present-oriented attitude may be less likely to put forth much time in the 
search for the best spouse and may generally make more wrong choices. 66  
Wallace and Rose also point out “early marriages and parenthood rates lead to 
unstable marriages and divorces, which inhibit readiness.  It is a counterproductive 
system.”67  For all cases, besides all the benefits, it is obvious that officers who marry in 
the early years of military service may encounter additional work -related problems 
affecting their marriage that other officers do not encounter.  
The working environment is generally harder for young officers due to being 
relatively inexperienced in solving routine problems, having personal difficulties with 
other officers caused by being a junior officer, having additional administrative duties, 
mostly assigned by the executive officer, and heavier assignment in lower -level, routine 
duties.  According to regulations, young officers have to fulfill required training in the 
early years of service and, as mentioned in section B, 2, b, they also fulfill the sea -duty 
requirements due to their branch of service, which makes it virtually impossible for them 
to have control over their assignments.  For this reason, when compared to an officer who 
gets married in the higher ranks (O-3 or O-4), an officer who gets married in the junior 
ranks likely encounters relatively more job-related problems. 
In the hierarchical composition of the military, the closest friends of officers and 
their wives are naturally their workmates and their wives, or other officers who are close 
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to them in rank.  Since officers marry over a long career period, in the early years of 
military service, the percentage of married officers from the same group is often very 
low.  This will cause early-married officer families to have fewer friends than the 
families who married later.  This will cause loneliness for these families, which is very 
important, especially when the officers are deployed.  Another issue is that, when offic ers 
get married, they have to share less time even with their best “single” friends.  Their 
friendships will surely not end, but it is obvious that two best friends cannot spend as 
much time together as they spent before one of them gets married.  For the so-called 
“trailing spouse,” friendship is a greater problem because their marriage causes them to 
leave their family, relatives, and friends, and start a new life in a new location, which puts 
them, and their marriages, in a very vulnerable position.  
In addition to having fewer friends, research shows that a number of these 
families are not aware of support available in hard times through the military’s family 
support programs.  For example, according to a RAND research paper:  
Inequities exist both in [family support] program use and in location.  The 
use of the programs varies widely.  Some, such as the housing office, get 
heavy use with a third of the military members visiting it within the first 
two years at a location.  Others, such as stress management and effective 
parenting, serve less than 4 percent of the population during the first two 
years.68 
Another RAND report observes the following: 
The well-being data indicate that most military members are satisfied with 
their service life, but satisfaction varies according to demographics, 
service, and rank.  For example, married service members accompanied by 
their spouses are the most satisfied, and older members show slightly more 
satisfaction than do younger ones.69 
The combination of these findings means that, although younger military service 
members are less satisfied with their jobs, they do not use the quality of life programs 
provided for them effectively.  This is yet another reason why “early -married” families 
may be more likely to divorce.  
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For early-married dual military couples, the job-related problems again make life 
harder.  As mentioned in section B, the Navy’s assignment policy supports the 
collocation of Navy members married to other military members, and it is noted that 
every reasonable effort would be made to allow military couples to move together and/or 
serve together whenever possible.  However, most of the relocating programs do not 
include officers who are in pay grades O-1 or O-2.  As Johnson writes:  
As of September 1997, only 47 percent of junior (female) officers (pay 
grade O-1 to O-3) are married; however, 40 percent have a civilian spouse, 
while 7 percent are married to military personnel.  This large disparity 
probably reflects the difficulty of assigning both a husband and a w ife, at 
least one of which is a junior officer, to the same location during the early 
stage of their career.70 
From the spouses’ point of view, early marriages, whether or not with an officer, 
also cause some additional problems.  Assuming that the typical spouse is the same age 
as or younger than the officer (at the pay grade of O-1 or O-2), he or she may not be able 
to finish college or may not have much job experience in a job area.  This situation 
affects the spouse very much, because consecutive assignments will cause the couple to 
move to different locations, and reduce the possibility that the spouse will find a good job 
and accrue seniority or experience.  This not only affects the family financially, but also 
prevents the spouse from staying busy and being less stressed when the officer deploys. 
Other problems are related to the age of the spouse and his or her experience.  
Kelley refers to Holland’s findings (1997) that “older wives with deployed husbands who 
had been married and in the military syst em for over 10 years tended to exhibit lower 
levels of separation anxiety”.71  Wallace and Rose also mention that the family’s 
experience with deployments, exercises and recent conflicts can actually be important in 
maintaining family stability.  Although all families are very sensitive to such difficulties 
and stress, the ones who have more life experiences may be more likely to solve them.  
Obviously, early marriages do not always end in divorce.  The choice of an 
appropriate spouse is the key factor for healthy, early marriages.  On the other hand, job-
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related problems caused by the rank and experiences of the officer and the problems 
caused by the age and the life-experience of spouses, make early marriages more 
susceptible to dissolution.         
3. Sea Duty in the Early Years of Military Service Cause Later Marriage 
Among Single Officers  
Since most of the officer candidates are not allowed to marry before being 
commissioned (see eligibility requirements for U.S. Naval Academy72), most officers get 
married only after being commissioned.  Assignment to a new location after being 
commissioned makes it difficult for an officer to continue previous friendships and also 
make new friends.  The officer’s success in continuing friendships or making new friends 
is directly proportional to the time he or she can spare for “leisure.”  Sea duties, and 
especially five- or six-month long deployments, can reduce this personal time.  
According to Johnson, in fiscal year 1997, 53.3 percent of female Navy officers 
were married, and 65 percent of these officers had a civilian husband.73  One of the 
important findings of the study is that the marital status of female Navy officers is very 
dependent on their branch.  For example, in 1997, 28.7 percent of female surface warfare 
offic ers and 33.5 percent of the female aviators were married.  At the same time, 63.6 
percent of the female public information officers were married.  According to Johnson:  
Two reasons women aviators and surface warfare officers are more likely 
to be single are the frequency of the deployments and arduous work 
schedule in these specific communities, which exact a high toll by limiting 
the available time for interpersonal relationships.  It is also likely that a 
civilian spouse would understand the need for the frequent training 
assignments, pre-deployment work-ups and deployments that inevitably 
take the service member away from the spouse and/or family for many 
months at a time.  This environment may explain why the number of 
military spouses outnumbers civilian spouses in these specific 
communities.  Twenty-one percent of aviators and nearly 16 percent of 
surface warriors are married to military husbands, as compared with 12.5 
percent who are married to civilian husbands.74 
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Although Johnson’s findings were limited to female officers, this study offers a 
very good example of how difficult it is for officers who deploy to marry.  
4. Riskier and More Arduous Duty Has a Negative Effect on Officers 
and Causes a Higher Rate of Divorce Than Do Other Types of Duty  
In a recent article, published in Armed Forces & Society, the authors state, 
“…employees who experience a moderate degree of job stress perform their jobs most 
efficiently, while those who experience either low or high work -related stress show 
reduced work effic iency.”75  The high job-related stress that military combat personnel 
encounter not only affects their work efficiency, but also their family lives, because, as 
Wallace and Rose mention, “when service members marry, their families are also 
affected by some of the unique characteristics of military life, geographic mobility 
(including overseas residency), the risk of injury or death of the service member, periodic 
separations, and normative pressures regarding their roles in the military community.”76 
Muchinsky mentions three different models that researchers use to explain the 
relationship between work and family in his book, Psychology Applied to Work:  
Spillover model asserts that there is similarity between what occurs in the 
work environment and what occur s in the family environment.  It also 
proposes that a person’s work experiences influence what he or she does 
away from work.  It is assumed that attitudes at work become ingrained 
and carried over into home life, affecting a basic orientation toward the 
self and family members.  In general, spillover is a notion of positive 
relationships between work and family variables such that an individual’s 
satisfaction with work enhances family life.  The compensation model is 
most often contrasted with the spillover model.  It proposes an inverse 
relationship between work and family…deprivations experienced in work 
are made up or compensated for in nonwork activities.  The segmentation 
model proposes that the work and nonwork spheres are distinct so that an 
individual can be successful in one without any influence on the other.77 
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As Muchinsky states, “A common finding is that aspects of work, such as job 
stress and work schedules, have negative effects on families.”78  According to 
Muchinsky, social support reduces the relationship between various job stressors and 
indicators of mental and physical health, such as anxiety, depression and irritation.  
Muchinsky, citing Sutton and Kahn (1987), mentions that, besides social support, there 
are three other situational variab les that serve as potential buffers against stress: “(1) the 
extent to which the onset of a stressor is predictable, (2) the extent to which it is 
understandable, and (3) the extent to which aspects of the stressor are controllable by the 
person who must experience it.”79  However, in the case of military combat personnel, 
the precautions these personnel can take against job-related stress are very limited. 
The risk of injury or death is incomparably higher in wartime for military 
personnel, but exercises and training increase injury and the risk of death for military 
personnel in combat groups even in peacetime, as the training and exercise are always 
tied to simulating real wars.  The various syndromes combat groups may encounter in 
wartime are listed as follows by a Military Psychiatry source: “organic mental 
syndromes, mood and anxiety disorders (major depression, bipolar disease, phobic 
disorders, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder), adjustment disorder, dissociative 
disorders.”80  Aspects of these syndromes are also possible for military personnel in 
combat groups and their dependents during peacetime.  
Mady Wechsler Segal shares the same view concerning the risk of injury for 
military personnel.  According to Segal, the family and the military are two “greedy” 
institutions.81  As Segal writes:  
The risk that military personnel will be wounded or killed in the course of 
their duties is an obvious aspect of the institution’s demands.  The 
legitimacy for the institution to place its members at such physical risk is 
perhaps the greediest aspect of all.  While this risk is, of course, greatest in 
wartime, even peacetime military training maneuvers entail some risk of 
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injury, and military personnel can be sent any moment to areas of armed 
conflict.82 
The permanent, and occasionally increasing, stress in the work environment 
surely affects the social lives of the military personnel.  In a 1999 RAND report, Van 
Laar observes:  
…military personnel in combat units face the possibility of involvement in 
dangerous activities, often at short notice.  These stressors are likely to 
increase the difficulty of maintaining close social connections with 
others.83  
Although this stress is directly related to the level of risk encountered, and the 
ability of the individual to overcome the stress, it is fair to assume that officers who work 
in riskier and more arduous duties are likely to have more interpersonal problems then 
these who do not.  These interpersonal problems are also more likely to service in the 
officers’ marriages  
Research suggests that job-related stress affects female and male military 
personnel differently.  Muchinsky, citing Frankenhaeuser (1988), writes that “the 
characteristic elevation of catecholamine levels as the stresses of the workday accumulate 
are sharply reduced at the end of the workday for men, but for married, employed 
women, the elevation persists until the household responsibilities are also fulfilled.”84  
In another study, Bray et al. administered a survey to 16,193 military members, 
3,662 of them officers, to analyze the effects of work-related stress, family-related stress, 
financial stress, and health-related stress on job functioning.  The correlations between 
each factor were measured as .84, .65, .50 and .20, respectively, for work -related stress, 
health-related stress, family-related stress, and financial-related stress.  According to their 
findings,  
About 40 percent of both women and men perceived a great deal or a 
fairly large amount of work-related stress. In contrast, women perceived 
more family stress than did men.  About 29 percent of women perceived a 
great deal or a fairly large amount of family stress versus about 22 percent 
                                          
82 Ibid, p. 16. 
83 Van Laar, Colette, Increasing a Sense of Community in the Military: The Role of Personnel Support 
Programs, RAND Corporation, 1999, pp. 1 -2. 
84 Muchinsky, Paul M., Psychology Applied to Work, 2000, p .312.  
75 
for men.  An estimated 33 percent of the women reported a great deal or a 
fairly large amount of stress due to a being a woman in the military….  
Descriptive analyses indicated that from 22 percent to 40 percent of 
military men and women experienced high levels of stress in their work or 
family and personnel relationships.  Overall, both military men and 
women were nearly twice as likely to report feeling high levels of stress in 
their military work (39 percent) then in their family life (22 percent).  For 
both men and women, nearly 4 out of 10 perceived a great deal or a fairly 
large amount of work-related stress.  In contrast, women perceived more 
family-related stress than did men.85 
Another important finding by Bray et al. is that the drug and alcohol usage in 
groups exposed to stress increases remarkably, statistically significant for men, but not 
significant for women, which is very dangerous for family relationships.  
Although the report by Bray et al. does not directly study the effects of job -related 
stress on family relations, some conclusions can be derived from its findings.  Since the 
study does not differentiate the occupations in the military, military personnel are 
analyzed as a whole.  The finding that only some of the personnel feel work -related stress 
is consistent with the idea that some occupations are riskier, more arduous, and more 
stressful than others.  Another finding, that the ratios of work-related and family-related 
stresses are different, can be interpreted to mean that not all work -related stresses affect 
family life.  In addition, it may also mean that family support programs are s uccessful to 
some extent.  Another reason for this difference can be that the participants in the survey 
may simply not want to admit their family problems.  
In sum, certain occupations, especially combat duties, in the military are riskier 
and more arduous than others both during wartime and peacetime. Stress caused by the 
risk of serious injury or death likely affects the family relationships of military members 
negatively and increases the possibility of divorce.  
5. Duty Overseas Will Tend to Delay Marriage for a Single Officer and 
Increase the Likelihood of Divorce for a Married Officer 
In part B, the subject of overseas duty for military service members is described 
in detail.  Both single and married military service members may have overseas duty if 
they satisfy the eligibility requirements.  Overseas duty affects single military service 
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members similarly when deployed, as mentioned in part C, section 3.  Overseas duty 
significantly impedes service members from continuing their previous friendships an d 
making new friends.  The effects of overseas duty are more severe than regular 
deployments, because deployments typically last five or six months.  On the other hand, 
most foreign duty assignments for single members last 24 months.  
Although consecutive assignments to different locations are very natural in 
military life, and both the military members and their dependents are carefully screened 
for overseas duty, the problems caused by overseas duty for military families are 
relatively greater than a regular relocation in CONUS.  As Muchinsky, citing Arthur and 
Bennett (1995) writes:  
Family support is the most critical factor in accounting for successful 
international assignments.  The results suggest the advisability of 
including one’s spouse and other family members in cross-cultural 
training and, if feasible, sending them overseas to preview their new 
environment.86 
Ronen identified four abilities considered critical for successful overseas 
assignments: tolerance for ambiguity, behavioral flexibility, non-judgmentalism, and 
cultural empathy, which indicates that foreign duties cause problems even for civilians.  
As Ronen adds, intensive support is often needed to overcome related problems.  
According to Segal:  
Periodic foreign assignments bring to the military family both benefits and 
hardships.  All the relocation adjustments are experienced in extreme 
form.  While they vary according to how different the host culture is from 
American society, even in those to the most similar to the United States 
(industrialized Western democracies) the initial reaction is often one of 
“culture shock.”.  Behavioral norms differ on matters both serious and 
mundane, and language barriers can lead to feelings of isolation and even 
fear.  While most families eventually cope with living abroad, and many 
thoroughly enjoy the experience, some encounter severe difficulties.87 
As mentioned previously, according to Wallace and Rose, “when service 
members marry, their families are also affected by some of the unique characteristics of 
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military life: geographic mobility (including overseas residency), the risk of injury or 
death of the service member, periodic separations, and normative pressures regarding 
their roles in the military community.”88  For them, 
The increased geographic mobility of military families relative to civilians 
may indicate a higher propensity for divorce among military families for 
several reasons.  While some in the military consider the opportunity to 
travel a benefit, most experience it as hardship.  The hardship s of frequent 
moves include the general adjustments made by any family; establishment 
of a new social support system, finding one’s way around a new town (or 
country), and adjustment to regional dialects or cultural differences.  The 
difficulties children experience in adjusting to a new location can vary, 
depending upon their ages.  School-age children and teenagers are 
particularly vulnerable; lack of standardized curricula across the nation 
may cause gaps or repetition in education, and the disruption of peer 
relationships may be particularly stressful during adolescence. 89 
Although Wallace and Rose focus on regular relocation assignments, the 
problems they mention also cover some of the problems of foreign duty.  However, 
families, and especially the spouses during foreign duties, need more support. 
Van Laar explains the additional support requirements in her study.  According to 
Van Laar: 
The concerns for military service members living abroad closely resemble 
those for individuals living in isolated communities.  Because the civilian 
community is likely to differ somewhat from the community with which 
most of the service members are familiar, the personnel support programs 
will have more responsibility for creating a community than the programs 
would have in a comparable location in the CONUS.  Again, this means 
that personnel support programs should develop different kinds of 
programs to satisfy the heterogeneity of service members and their 
families.  At the same time, the unique position of bases on for eign 
territory leads to a concern with the attitudes individuals on-base form 
towards nationals of the host country and of the attitudes that the host 
nation forms of U.S. citizens through its contact with service members and 
their families.  Thus, an important role for the personnel support programs 
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will involve the maintenance of partnerships between the military and 
local citizens.90  
Another important issue, according to Van Laar, is that,  
Spouses low in community identity are four times as likely to return to the 
United States from their station abroad than spouses who are high in 
community identity.  In turn, spouse and family problems have been 
related to problems of the military service member.91 
This suggests that family members, and especially spous es, should be trained and 
counseled before the foreign duty.  
The unacquainted life-style, cultural differences, language and communication 
problems, loneliness due to isolation from friends and relatives, school adaptation 
problems by children, spouse career problems, and so forth, likely cause increased stress 
among military members and their families who are on foreign duty.  This stress, in turn, 
can create an increased risk of divorce.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter consists of four parts.  In the first part, the reasons behind the 
marriage and divorce decisions of individuals are examined using theories of various 
researchers.  The second part looks at the marital status trends of both the U.S. population 
and military personnel.  The third section reviews previous studies regarding the 
marriage-related decisions of military personnel and the relationship between marital 
status and individual behavior or performance.  In the last part, five hypotheses are 
offered, based on the literature review about the effects of military duties and 
assignments on marital status.  These five hypotheses form the central focus of the study.   
 
                                          
90 Van Laar, Colette, Increasing a Sense of Communit y in the Military: The Role of Personnel Support 
Programs, RAND Corporation, 1999, p. 38.  
91 Ibid, p. 11. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The data for this study contain information about U.S. Navy officers wh o were 
commissioned in 1990.  The data were obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC).  Although the DMDC data included different officer cohorts from 1981 to 
1999, only those in the 1990 cohort were selected for this study.  The reason for foc using 
on 1990 is twofold: this year is the most recent point at which career milestones can be 
studied, generally at least ten or twelve years after commissioning.  The 1990 cohort data 
are also useful because they reflect marital status trends in the 1990 s. In addition, the 
1990 Navy officer cohort data allow an analysis of officer performance and marital status 
using promotion to O-4.  
Based on the literature review, many variables have been generated to test the 
effects of Navy duties and assignments on the marital status of Navy officers.  Table IV.1 
shows the variables that are used in the regression models in this study.  
 
Table IV.1. Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
MARRIED = 1 if officer remained married during the military service 
DIVORCED = 1 if officer has divorced during the military service 
SEA =  Number of years at sea duty 
SEAGONE = 1 if officer has ever had a sea duty 
FOREIGN = 1 if officer had a duty in a foreign country  
FEMALE = 1 if officer is female 
BLACK = 1 if officer is black 
OTHER = 1 if officer is neither black nor white 
AGE1 = 1 if entry age is less than 22 
PRIOR = 1 if officer is prior enlisted 
PG 
= 1 if highest education year is higher than education at year of 
commissioning 
MILSPOUSE = 1 if offic er has a has a spouse in military service 
TOPSECRET  = 1 if officer has a security classification of topsecret  
SWO = 1 if officer is a surface warfare officer  
SEAL = 1 if officer is a seal 
SUB = 1 if officer is a submariner  
DIVER = 1 if officer is a diver 
PILOT  = 1 if officer is a pilot 
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Variable Name Variable Description 
SURGEON = 1 if officer is a surgeon 
EMERGENCY = 1 if officer is a nurse who is in charge with emergency care 
LEGISLATIVE = 1 if officer has a legislative duty 
INTELLIGENCE  = 1 if officer has an intelligence duty  
PERSONNEL = 1 if officer is a recruiter or a distribution officer  
NUCLEARENG = 1 if officer is in charge with the nuclear reactors onboard 
NROTCSCHOLAR = 1 if officer is nrotc graduate with scholarship  
NROTCNONSCHOLAR  = 1 if officer is nrotc graduate with no scholarship 
OCS = 1 if officer is ocs graduate 
DIRAPP = 1 if officer became an officer via direct appointment 
AVIPROG = 1 if officer had aviation training program 
EARLYPRO 
= 1 if officer who was O1 at commissioning becomes O4 in 10 
YOS or earlier 
O1 = 1 if officer has married at rank of O1 
O2 = 1 if officer has married at rank of O2 
O3 = 1 if officer has married at rank of O3 
O4 = 1 if officer has married at rank of O4 
O5 = 1 if officer has married at rank of O5 
O6 = 1 if officer has married at rank of O6 
DIVDEPEND = 1 if officer has more than one dependent  
Note: Variables are generated based on the literature review and the availability of data.  
  
The U.S. Navy officer cohort data originally consisted of 6,818 observations.  
However, some of these observations are excluded due to erroneous or missing/unknown 
data.  Out of the 6,818 observations, 455 are warrant officers.  Since warrant officers do 
not have the same characteristics as commissioned officers (because of differences in 
age, year of service, duty types, and, most importantly, marital status at entry), warrant 
officers were excluded from the analysis.  Another restriction resulted from the missing 
data on race.  Since race is an important demographic attribute, 109 observations with  
“unknown” information on race were excluded from the sample.  Further, 126 officers 
were excluded because of missing data for an entire year within their careers.  Finally, 
although DMDC data consisted of yearly information for only single and married 
officers, in all years except 1991 and 1992, marital status information was coded 
differently.  Consequently, 285 officers with unidentified marital status were excluded 
from the data.  Since some of these excluded officers had more than one of these data 
problems (72 in all), the total number of excluded observations is 903.  The remaining 
observations used in the study totaled 5,915.  
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DMDC data used in this thesis contain yearly marital status information on Navy 
officers from 1990 to 2001.  This yearly information allows the tracking of the changes in 
marital status during each person’s career.  Since DMDC data do not include information 
on cohabitation, separation, or being widowed, only three basic categories of marital 
status were used: married, single, and divorced.  It should be emphasized that must be 
underlined is that the officers are only tracked and analyzed during their military career.  
Changes in marital status changes after the completion of military service are not 
analyzed.  For example, although a divorce may occur just one year after leaving the 
military, and be influenced by the officer’s military service, such cases are beyond the 
scope of the thesis. 
One of the important issues about marital status is the effect of time.  It is very 
likely that, in the first years of service, the percentage of single officers is relatively 
higher than the percentage later in one’s career.  This factor is examined by looking at the 
marital status of officers at different career points.  
Table IV.2 shows marital status information on Navy officers at different points.  
Since all of the officers did not stay in the Navy throughout the years 1990 and 2001, the 
number of officers (observations) who were on duty at each point is indicated in the table.   
The first column shows the marital status of officers between the entire 1990-2001 
period.  Within this period, 63.6 percent of officers were married and did not divorce 
during their career, 5.5 percent of them divorced at least once, and 30.9 percent never 
married.  The second column shows marital status for the first five years.  The third 
column covers the same period, but, in this column, officers who left the Navy within the 
first five years of military service are excluded.  The fourth column contains informatio n 

















1990-1994 b 1990-1994 c 1995-2001 d  
STATUS 
# % # % # % # % 
SINGLE 1,826 30.9 2,474 41.8 1,665 37.5 780 20.0 
MARRIED 3,764 63.6 3,290e 55.5 2,644f 59.5 2,940 75.4 
DIVORCED 325 5.5 151 2.6 134 3.0 179 4.6 
TOTAL 5,915 100.0 5,915 100.0 4,446 100.0 3,899 100.0 
Notes: a: All officers are included, no period separation.  
b: All officers are included, only marital status and duties in the first five years are included.  
c: Officers who attritted within the first years of service are excluded.  
d: Officers who were still in the military at the end of 5 years of service are includ ed.  
e: Both officers who were married at entry and officers who married within first five years of service are 
included.   
f:  Only officers who married within first five years of service are included.   
Source: Derived from DMDC, 1990 Navy Officer Cohort Data File. 
 
Table IV.3 shows descriptive statistics about the variables at different points for 
both male and female officers.  Only the variable “sea” is measured in years, and the rest 
of the variables are displayed in percentages.  Table IV.3 shows that almost 75 percent of 
officers have never experienced sea duty, and 80 percent have never had foreign duty.  In 
terms of demographics, 88 percent of the officers are white.  Officers are from different 
commissioning sources, and only 15 percent of them are Naval Academy graduates.  
Approximately 65 percent of officers have duties listed in the table, and the rest have 
relatively less risky and arduous duties.  Half of all officers are submariners, surface 
warfare officers, or pilots. 
 





1990-1994 b 1990-1994 c 1995-2001 d 
5,915  5,915  4,446  3,899  TOTAL OBS. 
# % # % # % # % 
MARRIED 3,764 63.6 3,290 e 55.7 2,647 f 59.5 2,940 75.4 
DIVORCED 325 5.5 151 2.6 134 3.0 179 4.6 
SEA (IN YEARS) 0.7 - 0.5 - 1.1 - 0.3 - 
SEAGONE 1,635 27.6 1,405 23.8 1,121 25.2 654 16.8 




1990-1994 b 1990-1994 c 1995-2001 d 
5,915  5,915  4,446  3,899  TOTAL OBS. 
# % # % # % # % 
FEMALE 921 15.6 921 15.6 630 14.2 545 14.0 
BLACK 404 6.8 404 6.8 293 6.6 264 6.8 
OTHER 302 5.1 302 5.1 215 4.8 198 5.1 
AGE1 1,975 33.4 1,975 33.4 1,571 35.3 1,378 35.3 
PRIOR 1,252 21.2 1,252 21.2 984 22.1 882 22.6 
PG 1,060 17.9 401 6.8 192 4.3 834 21.4 
MILSPOUSE 456 7.7 357 6.3 289 6.5 347 8.9 
TOPSECRET  70 1.2 70 1.2 64 1.4 61 1.6 
SWO 785 13.3 744 12.6 577 13.0 478 12.3 
SEAL 55 0.9 54 0.9 48 1.1 44 1.1 
SUB 481 8.1 467 7.9 460 10.4 339 8.7 
DIVER 35 0.6 30 0.5 22 0.5 22 0.6 
PILOT 1,658 28.0 1,628 28.0 1,410 31.7 1,254 32.2 
SURGEON 121 2.1 76 1.3 36 0.8 71 1.8 
EMERGENCY 120 2.0 90 1.5 57 1.3 57 1.5 
LEGISLATIVE 250 4.2 218 3.7 159 3.6 85 2.2 
INTELLIGENCE 136 2.3 122 2.1 98 2.2 102 2.6 
PERSONNEL 130 2.2 48 0.8 45 1.0 116 3.0 
NUCLEARENG 231 3.9 178 3.0 165 3.2 92 2.4 
NROTCSCHOLAR  1,397 23.6 1,397 23.6 1,076 24.2 940 24.1 
NROTCNONSCHOLAR 192 3.3 192 3.3 121 2.7 111 2.9 
OCS 1,211 20.5 1,211 20.5 897 20.2 762 19.5 
DIRAPP 2,137 36.1 2,137 36.1 1,501 33.8 1,346 34.5 
AVIPROG 78 1.3 78 1.3 53 1.2 46 1.2 
EARLYPRO 259 4.4 N.A. N.A.  N.A.  N.A 259 6.6 
O1 1,659 28.1 1,659 28.1 1,407 31.7 1,268 32.5 
O2 904 15.3 934 15.3 743 16.7 650 16.7 
O3 1,307 22.1 735 12.4 555 12.5 1,063 27.3 
O4 174 2.9 101 1.7 49 1.1 111 2.9 
O5 30 0.5 27 0.5 18 0.4 19 0.5 
O6 15 0.3 15 0.3 9 0.2 8 0.2 
NOTE: N.A.: Not available 
a: All officers are include d, no period separation.  
b: All officers, and only marital status and duties in the first five years are included.  
c: Officers who attritted within the first years of service are excluded.  
d: Officers who were still in duty at the end of fifth year of se rvice are included.  
e: 1634 of the officers were married at entry/got married in 1990.  
f: 1270 of the officers were married at entry/got married in 1990.  
Source: Derived from DMDC, 1990 Navy Officer Cohort Data File.  
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Tables IV.4 and IV.5 show gender differences in marital status.  These tables are 
basically the same as the previous table, but Table IV.4 shows descriptive statistics for 
only male officers, and Table IV.5 shows the same descriptive statistics for women. 
Comparing these two tables, the differ ences in duties (no female officers as submariner, 
diver, SEAL, or nuclear engineer) and marital status (higher divorce rates for female 
officers) can be easily seen.  As seen here, the number of female pilots and SWOs are 
significantly lower than the totals for males.  Female officers also have less sea duty, but 
more foreign duty than do their male counterparts.  The commissioning sources of both 
genders are also very different.  More than 60 percent of female officers were 
commissioned by direct appointment, but only 30 percent of male officers are from this 
source.  The proportion of black female officers is noticeably higher than the proportion 
of black male officers, whereas the proportions of male and female officers in the other 
races are similar. 
 
Table IV.4. Descriptive Statistics For Navy Officers Commissioned in 1990 (Men 




1990-1994 b 1990-1994 c 1995-2001 d 
4,994  4,994  3,816  3,354  TOTAL OBS. 
# % # % # % # % 
MARRIED 3,285 65.8 2,873 e 57.5 2,349 f 61.6 2,600 77.5 
DIVORCED 251 5.0 112 2.2 101 2.7 143 4.3 
SEA (IN YEARS) 0.7 - 0.6 - 0.6 - 0.8 - 
SEAGONE 1,560 31.2 1,346 27.0 1,076 28.2 629 18.8 
FOREIGN 1,006 20.1 615 12.1 509 13.3 620 18.5 
FEMALE None None None None None None None None 
BLACK 297 6.0 297 6.0 218 5.7 197 5.9 
OTHER 256 5.1 256 5.1 179 4.7 163 4.9 
AGE1 1,742 34.9 1,742 34.9 1,408 36.9 1,233 36.8 
PRIOR 983 19.7 983 19.7 803 21.0 716 21.4 
PG 857 17.2 313 6.3 136 3.6 668 19.9 
MILSPOUSE 195 3.9 148 3.0 126 3.3 161 4.8 
TOPSECRET  63 1.3 63 1.3 57 1.5 55 1.6 
SWO 755 15.1 715 14.3 554 14.5 464 13.8 
SEAL 55 1.1 54 1.1 48 1.3 44 1.3 
SUB 481 9.6 467 9.4 460 12.1 339 10.1 




1990-1994 b 1990-1994 c 1995-2001 d 
4,994  4,994  3,816  3,354  TOTAL OBS. 
# % # % # % # % 
PILOT 1,596 32.0 1,594 31.9 1,359 35.6 1,210 36.1 
SURGEON 113 2.3 74 1.5 35 0.9 64 1.9 
EMERGENCY 32 0.6 19 0.4 11 0.3 18 0.5 
LEGISLATIVE 200 4.0 170 3.4 125 3.3 69 2.1 
INTELLIGENCE 110 2.2 102 2.0 81 2.1 81 2.4 
PERSONNEL 93 1.9 28 0.6 25 0.7 85 2.5 
NUCLEARENG 231 4.6 178 3.6 165 4.3 92 2.7 
NROTCSCHOLAR  1,290 25.8 1,290 25.8 993 26.0 865 25.8 
NROTCNONSCHOLAR 183 3.7 183 3.7 115 3.0 106 3.2 
OCS 1,076 21.6 1,076 21.6 803 21.0 677 20.2 
DIRAPP 1,568 31.4 1,568 31.4 1,140 29.9 1,032 30.8 
AVIPROG 68 1.4 68 1.4 49 1.3 45 1.3 
EARLYPRO 236 4.7 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 236 7.0 
O1 1,498 30.0 1,498 30.0 1,284 33.7 1,168 34.8 
O2 748 15.0 748 15.0 639 16.8 564 16.8 
O3 1,104 22.1 610 12.2 457 12.0 898 26.8 
O4 144 2.9 89 1.8 45 1.2 89 2.7 
O5 27 0.5 25 0.5 16 0.4 16 0.5 
O6 15 0.3 15 0.3 9 0.2 8 0.2 
NOTE: N.A.: Not available 
a = All officers are included, no period separation.  
b = All officers are included, only marital status and duties in the first five years are included.  
c = Officers who attritted within the first years of service are excluded.  
d = Officers who were still in duty at the end of fifth year of service are included.  
e = 1447 of the officers were married at entry/got married in 1990.  
f = 1136 of the officers were married at entry/got married in 1990.  
Source: Derived from DMDC, 1990 Navy Officer Cohort Data File.  
 
Table IV.5. Descriptive Statistics For Navy Officers Commissioned in 1990 (Women 




1990-1994 b 1990-1994 c 1995-2001 d 
921 921 630 545 TOTAL OBS. 
# % # % # % # % 
MARRIED 479 52.0 417 e 45.3 298  f 47.3 340 62.4 
DIVORCED 74 8.0 39 4.2 33 5.2 36 6.6 
SEA (IN YEARS) 0.2 - 0.1 - 0.2 - 0.1 - 
SEAGONE 75 8.1 59 6.5 45 7.1 25 4.6 




1990-1994 b 1990-1994 c 1995-2001 d 
921 921 630 545 TOTAL OBS. 
# % # % # % # % 
FEMALE 921 100.0 921 100.0 630 100.0 545 100.0 
BLACK 107 11.6 107 11.6 75 11.9 67 12.3 
OTHER 46 5.0 46 5.0 36 5.7 35 6.4 
AGE1 233 25.3 233 25.3 163 25.9 145 26.6 
PRIOR 269 29.2 269 29.2 181 28.7 166 30.5 
PG 203 22.0 88 9.6 56 8.1 166 30.5 
MILSPOUSE 261 28.3 209 22.7 163 25.9 186 34.1 
TOPSECRET  7 0.8 7 0.8 7 1.1 6 1.1 
SWO 30 3.3 29 3.2 23 3.7 14 2.6 
SEAL None None None None None None none none 
SUB None None None None None None none none 
DIVER None None None None None None none none 
PILOT 62 6.7 62 6.7 51 8.1 44 8.1 
SURGEON 8 0.9 2 0.2 1 0.2 7 1.3 
EMERGENCY 88 9.6 71 7.7 46 7.3 39 7.2 
LEGISLATIVE 50 5.4 48 5.2 34 5.4 16 2.9 
INTELLIGENCE 26 2.8 20 2.2 17 2.7 21 3.9 
PERSONNEL 37 4.0 20 2. 20 3.2 31 5.7 
NUCLEARENG None None none none None None None None 
NROTCSCHOLAR  107 11.6 107 11.6 83 13.2 75 13.8 
NROTCNONSCHOLAR 9 1.0 9 1.0 6 1.0 5 0.9 
OCS 135 14.7 135 14.7 94 14.9 85 15.6 
DIRAPP 569 61.8 569 61.8 361 57.3 314 57.6 
AVIPROG 10 1.1 10 1.1 4 0.6 1 0.2 
EARLYPRO 23 2.5 N.A. 2.5 N.A. N.A.  23 4.2 
O1 161 17.5 161 17.5 123 19.5 100 18.4 
O2 156 16.9 156 16.9 104 16.5 86 15.8 
O3 203 22.0 125 13.6 98 15.6 165 30.3 
O4 30 3.3 12 1.3 4 0.6 22 4.0 
O5 3 0.3 2 0.3 2 0.3 3 0.6 
O6 none none none none none none none none 
a = All officers are included, no period separation  
b = All officers are included, only marital status and duties in the first five years are included  
c = Officers who attritted within the first years of service are excluded 
d = Officers who were still in duty at the end of fifth year of service are included 
e = 187 of the officers were married at entry/got marr ied in 1990 
f = 134 of the officers were married at entry/got married in 1990  
Source: Derived from DMDC, 1990 Navy Officer Cohort Data File.  
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Table IV.6 shows the distribution of marriages and divorces for the Navy officers 
between 1990-2001.  The number of marriages constantly decreases after 1990, but the 
number of divorces fluctuates.  As seen here, almost 30 percent of officers were married 
before or during their first year of commissioned service.  However, since DMDC data do 
not contain information on whether the officers were married at entry, it is assumed that 
those who were married in 1990 were married at the time they were commissioned.  
Regardless of the exact point of marriage, little difference likely exists between the 
effects of duties on the marital status of officers who were married a few months before 
entry or a few months after entry.   
 
Table IV.6. Navy Officers Commissioned in 1990: Distribution of Marriages and 
Divorces by Year, 1990-2001 
 
MARRIAGES DIVORCES  
YEARS # % (OF ALL OBS.) # % (OF ALL OBS.) 
1990 1,742 29.5 N.A. N.A. 
1991 550 9.3 31 0.5 
1992 496 8.4 36 0.6 
1993 398 6.7 41 0.7 
1994 287 4.9 43 0.7 
1995 231 3.9 30 0.5 
1996 177 3.0 41 0.7 
1997 151 2.6 44 0.7 
1998 98 1.7 25 0.4 
1999 49 0.8 16 0.3 
2000 41 0.7 18 0.3 
2001 37 0.6 6 0.1 
TOTAL 4,257 72.0 331 5.6 
Source: Derived from DMDC, 1990 Navy Officer Cohort Data File  
N.A.= Not available 
 
When total numbers and percentages in Table IV.6 are compared with those in 
Table IV.3, certain discrepancies emerge.  The discrepancies stem from the differences in 
the units of the tables.  Table IV.3 shows the total number of officers who married and 
stayed married during military service, or who divorced at least once.  However, Table 
IV.6 shows the total number of marriages and divorces.  If, for example, an officer 
divorces twice, it is counted once in Table IV.3, but twice in Table IV.6.  In addition, the 
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number of the marriages of divorced officers is included in Table IV.6, but is excluded 
from the married category and is included in the divorced category in Table IV.3.  Table 
IV.7 shows the multiple marriages and divorces.  With a simple calculation,  the numbers 
in three tables can be matched as follows:  
For marriages: 4,257 marriages (total number of marriages shown in Table  IV.6) 
minus 168 multiple marriages (160 officers who married twice plus 4 officers who 
married three times, as shown in Table IV.7) minus 325 divorced officers (from Table 
IV.3.) equals 3,764 married officers (same as the number in Table IV.3)  
For divorces: 331 divorces (total number of divorces shown in Table IV.6) minus 
6 divorces (multiple divorces shown in Table IV.7) equals 325 divorced officers (same as 
the number in Table IV.3) 
According to Table IV.7, 160 officers married twice and 4 officers married three 
times; on the other hand, 6 officers divorced twice and none of them divorced more than 
twice. These numbers show that half of the divorced officers did not get married again.  
 
Table IV.7. Officers Commissioned in 1990: Multiple Marriages and Div orces, 1990-
2001 
 
FREQUENCY MARRIED DIVORCED 
NEVER 1,826 5,590 
ONCE 3,925 319 
TWICE 160 6 
THREE TIMES 4 0 
Source: Derived from DMDC, 1990 Navy Officer Cohort  
Data File. 
 
1. Selection of Variables 
This study uses all of the relevant variables in the DMDC data files that might 
help to explain the marriage and divorce decisions of Navy officers.  Most of the 
variables that are needed to test the study’s hypotheses could be derived from the data; 
however, some of the variables that could help explain marr iage and divorce decisions 
could not be used because of unavailability.  One of the missing variables is the number 
of dependents.  This variable would help in analyzing the effects of having children on 
the divorce decisions of the officers.  Problems in the data caused by the definition of 
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dependents (some officers themselves were counted as dependents and some were not) 
did not allow using this important variable.  
In addition, some assumptions needed to be made about the variables.  One 
assumption is that all officers who were married in 1990 are assumed to be married at 
entry, which was mentioned previously. Another assumption concerns deployments.  
DMDC data do not contain actual deployment information.  Although DMDC data have 
the unit identification codes (UICs) of the ships to which officers are assigned, it was not 
possible to include the exact deploying units and the length of deployments.  Instead, the 
code for sea duties was used to proxy for deployments, assuming that ships have 
deployments for 5-6 months in every one- or two-year period.   
The reasons for selecting explanatory variables are listed below.  
Foreign: This variable was created to test the hypothesis that “Duty overseas will 
tend to delay marriage for a single officer while increasing  the likelihood of divorce for 
those who are married.”  It is created by using the duty location codes in the data.  
Sea/Seagone: These variables were created to test the hypothesis that “married 
officers who are on sea duty are more likely to divorce,” and  “sea duty in the early years 
of military service causes later marriage among single officers.”  The difference between 
these two variables is their units.  Variable “seagone” is binary and indicates if the officer 
has ever had a sea duty, and variable “sea” measures the years of sea duty.  Within the 
DMDC 1990 Navy officer cohort data, 72.4 percent of the officers never had sea duty in 
their total service years. On the other hand, other officers had assignments for sea duty up 
to 8 years within the 1990-2001 period.  
Milspouse: As mentioned in Chapter III, having a military spouse may cause 
additional family problems for officers.  This variable was created to test if officers who 
have military spouses are more likely to divorce.  
Rank Variables: These variables show the ranks when officers got married.  It 
was created to test the hypothesis that “officers who marry in early years of military 
service are more likely to divorce.”  In fact, the effects of early marriage might also be 
tested by only the year of marriage (and it will be tested in different time frames), but 
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using the ranks will specifically reflect the effects of hierarchical difficulties/advantages 
caused by rank on marital status.  If officers who marry in a certain rank tend to divorce 
signific antly more or less than officers who marry in other ranks, then this rank is worth 
analyzing in terms of its effects on marital status.   
Prior: This variable identifies persons who have previous military service 
experience before being commissioned as an officer.  Since this thesis analyzes the 
effects of duties and assignments on marital status, using this variable will be helpful to 
test if prior military experiences cause any changes in the marital status of officers.  
Pg: This variable explains  if graduate education after becoming an officer affects 
the marriage or divorce decisions of the officers.  Although the name of the variable is 
given as pg, this variable includes any education that is at least one year long.  
Early Promotion: As mentioned in Chapter III, previous studies suggest that 
married male officers are more likely than those who are unmarried to have better 
supervisor evaluations and better promotion rates.  This variable is included to test the 
relationship between marital status and performance.  In these data, most of officers were 
promoted to O-4 in the year 2000.  If officers who were O-1 at entry became O-4 before 
the year 2000, they are considered as “early promoted.”   
The following duty codes are created to test the hypothesis that  “riskier and more 
arduous duty has a negative effect on officers and causes a higher rate of divorce than do 
other types of duty.”  Most of these duties have monetary incentives to compensate for 
the difficulties caused by the nature of the duty.   
Topsecret: DMDC data contain information about the security codes of officers 
and “Top Secret” is the highest code given.  It is obvious that the reason an officer is 
given this security code is the nature of the officer’s duty, which is probably a risky and 
secret one that requires more devotion from the officer than do other duties.    
SWO: As seen previously  in Table II.5, surface warfare officers have 
approximately seven sea rotations during their career.  In addition to deployments, being 
a SWO is much more arduous and risky than are most other duties.  
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SEAL: Being a Navy SEAL requires both physical and mental fitness, and the 
nature of the duty is extremely risky, even during exercises or regular training.    
Sub: Submariners tend to have long-term deployments as well as very risky and 
arduous duty.  Possible differences in the effects of being a submariner and being a SWO 
on the marital status can be attributed to reasons other than the deployment, such as 
working conditions.  Although these two duties are similar, important differences exist in 
working conditions.  For example, during deployments submariners are less likely to 
communicate with their families than are SWOs due to physical and tactical constraints.  
Pilot: Pilots are another group of officers who work in risky and arduous 
conditions.  Although this variable was created to include all types of pilots, a significant 
percentage of this group also must deploy.  
Surgeon: Being a surgeon is different from the duties mentioned above, but it is 
still risky and arduous, not necessarily in the form of a personal life risk, but a life risk for 
the surgeon’s patients, which makes it very tiring and stressful.  
Emergency: Being an emergency care nurse is also a stressful duty.  These are 
the officers who mostly conduct first aid procedures and who have to deal with injuries 
and wounds.  In addition, their working hours are not limited to regular office hours, 
which also affects personal or family lives. 
Legislative: Although officers in legislative duties have relatively more regular 
working conditions, it is assumed that they have considerable responsibility, which may 
cause additional stress and separate these officers from the others.  
Diver: Being a diver, like being a Navy SEAL,  requires both physical and mental 
fitness.  The nature of the duty is also extremely risky.  
Intelligence: Intelligence duties can be in various working conditions, but 
basically they require officers to separate their family lives from their work lives.  
Generally they are prohibited from discussing their work at home. This separation of 
work and personal lives makes it interesting to analyze the effects of their duties on 
marital status. 
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Nuclear Engineer: This variable contains information on officers who have 
engineering duties in nuclear-powered ships.  The officers not only work onboard ships 
and have deployments, but also have the risk of exposure to radioactivity.  
Personnel: At first glance, officers who are recruiters and detailers seem to have 
relatively regular office works.   However, these officers’ duties have extremely high 
impact on their family lives.  
These selected duties are used to detect if riskier and more arduous assignments 
have a significant effect on the marital status of officers.  One of the constraints that 
affected the selection of “arduous and risky jobs” for this study was the insufficient years 
of service of the officers for some duties.  For example, only eight commanding officers 
were identified out of 5,915 officers in the 1990 cohort.  Thus it was not  possible to 
analyze the effects of being a commanding officer in this thesis.  
B. METHODOLOGY   
The dependent variables in the models are binary and indicate whether a person is 
married or not, single or not, or divorced or not.  Logit multivariate regres sion models are 
used to estimate the effects of military assignments and duties on the marital status of 
Navy officers.  DMDC data used in this thesis do not indicate cohabitation, separation, or 
being widowed, thus we only analyze the effects of being mar ried, divorced, and single.  
The models will explain the decision to marry and to divorce.  The models will also be 
divided into different career stages.  Each career stage will include a different number of 
officers due to attrition.  Two models are estim ated: one that consists of the basic 
explanatory variables (gender, race, sea duty, foreign duty, entry age, and being prior 
enlisted), and one that includes all relevant explanatory variables.  
Another important issue is the inclusion of female officers in the sample. 
Descriptive statistics in Tables IV.3-IV.5 emphasize the differences between male and 
female officers.  One of the important differences is the restriction of assigning female 
officers to certain duties.  For example it should be noted that, among the selected duty 
variables in this thesis, no female officers are submariners, SEALS, divers, or nuclear 
engineers.  As a result, many other important differences can be found between men and 
women.  For example, the percentage of female officers who had sea duty is significantly 
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lower than that of male officers: 8 percent for female officers and 31 percent for their 
male counterparts.  These differences will affect some variables, such as the impact of 
being a submariner on the marital status of officers, when both male and female officers 
are included in the models.  However, the cost of excluding female officers from the 
models may be high, since 15 percent of all officers are women.  Also female officers 
appear to be strongly affected by duty and assignment policies. For example, the divorce 
rate of female officers is 8 percent, compared with 5 percent for male officers.  Thus, 
exclusion of female officers from the samples may reduce the credibility of the study.  To 
study the effects on female officers and prevent possible biases, all models are estimated 
both with and without female officers.  
1. Theoretical Models 
As mentioned in Chapter III, previous studies have looked at the effects of marital 
status on military-related issues, such as promotion and retention.  Since this study will 
be the first to analyze the effects of different military duties and assignments on marital 
status, it is not possible to derive hypotheses directly from previous studies.  Instead, five 
basic hypotheses were developed based on a review of literature relating generally to 
marriage and divorce.  These five hypotheses are: (1) married officers who serve on sea 
duty are more likely to divorce; (2) officers who marry early in their military career are 
more likely to divorce; (3) sea duty in the early years of military service causes 
individuals to marry later; (4) riskier and more arduous duty has a negative effect on 
officers, which causes a higher rate of divorce than do other types of duty; and (5) duty 
overseas tends to delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. 
These hypotheses require construction of variables for deployment (to test 
hypotheses 1 and 3), marriage time (to test hypotheses 2 and 3), various  risky and 
arduous duties (to test hypothesis 4), and foreign duties (to test hypothesis 5).  In addition 
to these variables, other relevant variables that could be derived from the data are also 
used in the models to control for other factors that may affect the marriage and divorce 





a. Marriage Models 
The basic model (equation 1) used to explain the marriage decision of 
Navy officers is specified as follows:  
 
 
Married = ß0 + ß1*foreign + (ß2*female) + ß3*black + ß4*other + ß5*age +
 ß6*priorenlisted + ß7*sea + u
 
 
Equation (1) does not permit a test of hypothesis 4 about the negative 
effects of risky and arduous duties.  The reason duties are excluded from equation (1) is 
related to the variable, female.  Including the variable, female, is important because, as 
mentioned in Chapter III, 7,736 active-duty female officers served in the Navy in year 
2000 (15 percent of all Navy commissioned officers).  On the other hand, since female 
officers are not eligible for some risky and arduous duties, using both the female variable 
and duty variables in the same model can bias the estimated effects of these duties.   
The full model (equation 2) generated to explain the marriage decisions of 
Navy officers is as follows:  
 
Married = ß0 + ß1*foreign + (ß2*female) + ß3*black + ß4*other + ß5*age + 
 ß6*priorenlisted + ß7*sea + ß8*pg + ß9*topsecret + ß10*nrotcscholarship +
 ß11*nrotcnonscholarship + ß12*ocs + ß13*dirapp + ß14*aviationprogram + ß15*swo + 
ß16*seal + ß17*submariner + ß18*pilot + ß19*surgeon + ß20*emergency + ß21*legisl ative + 
ß22*diver + ß23*intelligence + ß24*nuclearengineer + ß25*personnel + ß26*earlypro + u
 
Based on the literature review, the expected effects of the explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable are as follows: 
Foreign Duty:  According to hypothesis 5, foreign duties will delay the 
marriage decision because being away from home reduces the opportunity to find a 
spouse.  On the other hand, in some cases, pes simism regarding the opportunity or ability 
to find a spouse in the future may create an incentive to marry early, if foreign duty is 
scheduled.  These two different factors may affect the timing of marriage, but it is hard to 
assess if they increase or decrease the probability of marriage.  
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Female: Marriage rates of men and women are 61.7 and 57.9 percent, 
respectively, in the U.S. population, and 67.1 and 45.7 percent, respectively, in the Navy.  
Male officers are more likely, and female officers are less  likely, to marry than are their 
civilian counterparts.  
Black: Marriage rates of black officers are significantly lower than those 
of white officers (41.8 percent versus 62.1 percent).  
Other:  Marriage rates of Hispanic officers are 58.9 percent.  Although the 
variable “other” contains all races except white and black, the marriage rate of Hispanic 
officers suggest that the marriage rate of “other” officers is close to the rate of white 
officers (62.1 percent).  
Age: Marriage rates increase with age until 55-64 years old, and then start 
to fall.  The binary age variable created for this study indicates if entry age is below 22.  
This variable tests if being younger at entry affects the marriage decision of Navy 
officers.   
Prior Enlisted:  Prior enlisted officers are more likely to be married at 
entry, probably because they have a stable job earlier than do other officers.  In addition, 
officers commissioned through the US Naval Academy were not allowed to marry while 
they were midshipmen.  At the same time sinc e persons with prior enlisted source are 
more likely to be married when commissioned, they are less likely to get married after 
commissioning.  It is difficult to determine whether having prior enlisted sources affects 
the overall marriage rates.   
Sea Duty: According to hypothesis 3, sea duty in the early years of 
military service delays marriage among single officers.  Based on this hypothesis, it is 
expected that officers who have deployments are more likely to marry later than others, 
possibly because of waiting for their shore duty cycle.  It is difficult to determine whether 
deployments increase or decrease the total number of marriages.  
Pg: Long-term periods for education provide opportunities for officers to 
get away from deployments and reduce the uncertainties about their future plans.  Single 
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officers may benefit from this relatively stable period, which may encourage them to seek 
even more personal stability through marriage.  
Early Promotion: As mentioned in Chapter III, previous studies proved 
that a strong relationship exists between marital status and on-the-job performance.  
Based on the literature review, it is expected that officers who get earlier promotions are 
also more likely to get married.  
Duty Variables:  The selected duties for this thesis are riskier or more 
arduous than other duties, and the possibility of job-related stress is high.  Although it is 
easier to say that stressful jobs may adversely affect family life, it is not so easy to make 
any assessment about the effects of stressful jobs on the decision to marry.  However, 
duties that require deployment, such as being a SWO or a submariner, may be a common 
effect of sea duty.  
Commissioning Source Variables: For this group of variables, the base 
commissioning source is the US Naval Academy. Since midshipmen are not allowed to 
get married before graduation, officers from the US Naval Academy will marry after 
commissioning.  However, officers from other sources may marry before becoming 
officers. Because of this difference, it is expected that officers who are not Academy 
graduates are less likely to get married after becoming officers than are Academy 
graduates.   
b. Divorce Models 
The basic model (equation 3) generated to explain the divorce decisions of 
Navy officers is as follows:  
 
 
Divorced = ß0 + ß1*foreign + (ß2*female)  + ß3*black + ß4*other + ß5*age + 
ß6*priorenlisted + ß7*sea +ß8*militaryspouse + u
 
 
This model tests the first and fifth hypotheses: “married officers who are 
on sea duty are more likely to divorce” and “duty overseas will tend to delay marriage for 
a single officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are married.”  
Since the effects of being female on divorce needs to be tested, duty variables were not 
added to this model to avoid the bias caused by female officers being restricted from 
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some duties.  The only difference between the bas ics models of divorce and marriage is 
the military spouse variable.  By adding this variable, it becomes possible to test the 
effect of having a military spouse on divorce.  
The full model (equation 4) generated to explain the divorce decisions of 
Navy officers is as follows:  
 
Divorced = ß0 + ß1*foreign + (ß2*female)  + ß3*black + ß4*other + ß5*age +
ß6*priorenlisted + ß7*sea + ß8*pg + ß9*topsecret + ß10*nrotcscholarship + 
ß11*nrotcnonscholarship + ß12*ocs + ß13* dirapp + ß14*aviationprogram + ß15*swo + 
ß16*seal + ß17*submariner + ß18*pilot + ß19*surgeon + ß20*emergency + ß21*legislative +
ß22*diver + ß23*intelligence + ß24*nuclearengineer +ß25*personnel + ß26*milspouse + 
ß27*ranks +ß28*earlypro + u
 
The rank variables are included to the full divorce model to test the second 
hypothesis; “officers who marry in the early years of military service are more likely to 
divorce.”  In addition, as with the bas ic models, another difference between the full 
marriage model and the full divorce model is the inclusion of the military spouse 
variable.  
Based on the literature review, expected effects of the explanatory 
variables on the probability of divorce are as follows: 
Foreign Duty: As mentioned in Chapter II, dependents of an officer are 
screened before the approval of the officer’s overseas duty assignment.  This screening 
may prevent families that already have problems to be assigned to foreign duty.  
However, problems such as culture shock, being away from relatives and friends, and 
child-related issues might increase the likelihood of getting divorced for the families that 
are in overseas duty.   
Female: The divorce rates of men and women are 10.8 percent and  8.8 
percent, respectively, in the U.S. population, and 40.8 percent and 25.3 percent, 
respectively, in all military services.  These values indicate that female officers are more 
likely to divorce than are their male counterparts.  
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Black: The divorce rate of black officers is higher than that of white 
officers (11.7 percent versus 9.8 percent).  Thus, it is expected that being a black officer 
increases the likelihood of getting divorced. 
Other:  The divorce rate of Hispanic officers is 7.7 percent.  Although  the 
variable “other” contains all races except white and black, the divorce rate of Hispanic 
officers suggests that marriage rate of “other” officers may be lower than divorce rate of 
white officers (9.8 percent).  
Age: As discussed in Chapter III, divorce rates increase with age until 45-
54 years old, and then start to fall.  The binary age variable created for this thesis 
indicates if entry age is below 22.  It is difficult to make assessment about the effects of 
lower entry age on the divorces.  
Prior Enlisted:  It is difficult to make any assessment about the 
relationship between having prior enlisted source and getting divorced.  If officers with 
prior enlisted source use their relatively longer military experiences when they marry and 
choose their spous es due to the expectations of military life, then being prior enlisted may 
reduce the divorce rate to some extent.   
Sea Duty:  According to the first hypothesis, married officers who are on 
sea duty are more likely to divorce.  Based on the literature review, deployments have a 
significant adverse effect on families, especially for female officers.  These negative 
effects are more likely to increase the possibility of a divorce for the officers who have 
sea duty.  
Pg: Officers may tend to get divorced durin g long-term education periods 
because this period is probably the first time that many families come together for a long 
period.  During this time, spouses have unprecedented opportunity to recognize and 
evaluate each other.  This may work to strengthen a relationship.  It may also lead to a 
reevaluation of the marriage and divorce.  
Early Promotion: As mentioned in Chapter III, previous studies suggest 
that there is a strong relationship between marital status and on-the-job performance.  
However, it is not easy to make an assessment about the relationship between early 
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promotion and divorces.  The positive effect of being married on supervisor evaluations 
may keep ambitious officers from divorcing before getting an expected promotion.  On 
the other hand, working extremely hard to get early promotion may cause serious 
problems within a family that may result in divorce.  
Duty Variables:  The selected duties for this thesis are riskier or more 
arduous than other duties and the possibility of job-related stress is high.  Due to the 
degree of the intensity of job-related stress, serious problems may surface within families 
that may cause a divorce.  On the other hand, most of these duties have monetary 
incentives, and together with other nonmonetary incentives, these negative effects can be 
ameliorated. 
Commissioning Source Variables: It is not easy to make any assessment 
about the relationship between the commissioning source and getting divorced.   
2. Models That Are Used in the Thesis 
The statistical models used in the thesis are described below.  Sixteen models are 
developed, and each is slightly unique. As mentioned before, these 16 models are 
estimated twice, one with and one without female officers, yielding 32 total regressions.  
In terms of time separation, three models are used.  The first analyzes the first five 
years of an officer’s career (1990 -1994); the second analyzes the rest of the career period 
(1995-2001); and the third analyzes the entire period.  The first period (1990 -1994) 
indicates “early marriages and divorces,” and the second period indicates “late marriages 
and divorces.”  The first period is named the minimum service requirement (MSR) period 
for easier understanding.  Although some of the officers in the sample have an obligation 
to serve within an MSR period, most of the officers do not.  Thus, a noticeable 
percentage of officers who do not have an obligation leave the Navy within this period.  
Tables IV.8-IV.23 describe the 16 models used in the study.  For each model, 
explanations are presented for the dependent variable, the period covered, the sample size 
(both with and without female officers), and the hypotheses and additional variables it 
tested.  The numbers in Italics used in the sample and dependent variable sections of the 
models show only male officers (when female officers were excluded from the data).   
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a. Marriage Models 
(1) Basic Model (1) – Period After MSR (1995 and later)  
Table IV.8. Model 1 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR (before 1995) are excluded and 
officers who were on duty in 1995 are included. (N=3,899; 3,354). 
In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) 
after MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = Officers who got married after MSR (1995 and 
later) are the focus group (721 officers; 608), and officers who are 
married at entry, or got married within MSR (before 1995), or 
single, or divorced form the comparison group. (3,178 officers; 
2,746)      
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign) 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, and entry age.  
Benefit This model tests the effects of variables on late marriages.  
 
(2) Basic Model (2) – Period After MSR (1995 and later)  
Table IV.9. Model 2 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR (before 1995) are excluded and 
officers who were on duty in 1995 are included. (N=3,899; 3,354). 
In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) 
after MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = All married officers who didn’t attrite within 
MSR are the focus group (2,940 officers; 2,600), and officers who 
are single or divorced form the comparison group. (959 officers; 
754)       
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign) 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are  gender, race, being prior enlisted, and entry age.  
Benefit By comparing models one and two, the difference between officers 
who got married any time during their careers and officers who got 










(3) Basic Model (3) – Period Within MSR (Before 1995)  
Table IV.10. Model 3 Description 
 
Sample All officers in the sample are included. (N=5,915; 4,994). In this 
model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) within 
MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = Officers who got married within MSR are the 
focus group (1,656 officers; 1,426), and officers who are married at 
entry, or got married after MSR (1995 and later), single or divorced 
form the comparison group. (4,259 officers; 3,568)       
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign) 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, and entry age.  
Benefit Using this model, the effects of variables on early marriages are 
tested. 
 
(4) Basic Model (4) – Period Within MSR (Before 1995) 
Table IV.11. Model 4 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR are excluded and the sample 
consists of officers who stayed in the Navy until 1995. (N=4,446; 
3,816). In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, 
deployments) within MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = Officers who got married within MSR are the 
focus group (1,377 officers; 1,213), and officers who are married at 
entry, or got married after MSR (1995 and later), single or divorced 
form the other group. (3,069 officers; 2,603)       
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign) 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, and entry age.  
Benefit Comparing this model with Model 3, the early marriage and 













(5) Full Model (5) – Period After MSR (1995 and later) 
Table IV.12. Model 5 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR (before 1995) are excluded and 
officers who were on duty in 1995 are included. (N=3,899; 3,354). 
In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) 
after MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = Officers who got married after MSR (1995 and 
later) are the focus group (721 officers; 608), and officers who are 
married at entry, or got married within MSR (before 1995), or 
single, or divorced form the comparison group. (3,178 officers; 
2,746)      
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign); Riskier 
and more arduous duty has a negative effect on officers and causes 
a higher rate of divorces than do other types of duty (by duty 
variables). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, 
commissioning source, early promotion, and having additional 
education  
Benefit This model is basically the same as Model 1. This model tests the 
effects of additional variables on late marriages. 
 
(6) Full Model (6) – Period After MSR (1995 and later) 
Table IV.13. Model 6 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR (before 1995) are excluded and 
officers who were in duty in 1995 are included. (N=3,899; 3,354). 
In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) 
after MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = All married officers who didn’t attrite within 
MSR are the focus group (2,940 officers; 2,600), and officers who 
are single or divorced form the comparison group. (959 officers; 
754)       
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by  variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign); Riskier 
and more arduous duty has a negative effect on officers and causes 
a higher rate of divorces than do other types of duty (by duty 
variables). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, 
commissioning source, early promotion, and having additional 
education 
Benefit This model is basically the same as Model 2. By comparing models 
6 and 5, the difference between officers who got married any time 
during their careers and officers who got married late can be tested 
by additional variables. 
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(7) Full Model (7) – Period Within MSR (Before 1995) 
Table IV.14. Model 7 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR are excluded and the sample only 
consists of officers who stayed in the Navy until 1995. (N=4,446; 
3,816). In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, 
deployments) within MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = Officers who got married within MSR are the 
focus group (1,377 officers; 1,213), and officers who are married at 
entry, or got married after MSR (1995 and later), or single, or 
divorced form the comparison group. (3,069 officers; 2,603)       
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while  increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign); Riskier 
and more arduous duty has a negative effect on officers and causes 
a higher rate of divorces than do other types of duty (by duty 
variables). 
Other Variables Tested The effects of gender, race, prior enlisted, entry age, commissioning 
source, and having additional education are also tested. (since this 
model covers only MSR, the variable early promotion is not tested) 
Benefit This model is basically the same as  Model 4. Using this model, the 
effects of additional variables on early marriages are tested. 
 
(8) Full Model (8) – Period Within MSR (Before 1995) 
Table IV.15. Model 8 Description 
 
Sample All officers in the sample are included. (N=5,915; 4,994). In this 
model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) within 
MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = Officers who got married within MSR are the 
focus group (1,656 officers; 1,426), and officers who are married at 
entry, or got married after MSR (1995 and later), or single, or 
divorced form the other group. (4,259 officers; 3,568)       
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by variable sea); Duty ove rseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign); Riskier 
and more arduous duty has a negative effect on officers and causes 
a higher rate of divorces than do  other types of duty (by duty 
variables). 
Other Variables Tested The effects of gender, race, prior enlisted, entry age, commissioning 
source, and having additional education are also tested. (since this 
model covers only MSR, the variable early promotion is not tested) 
Benefit This model is basically the same as Model 3. By comparing models 
8 and 7, the early marriage and attrition relationship is being tested 
by additional variables. 
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b. Divorce Models 
(1) Basic Model (9) – Period After MSR (1995 and later) 
Table IV.16. Model 9 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR (before 1995) are excluded and 
officers who were in duty in 1995 are included. (N=3,899; 3,354). 
In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) 
after MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Divorced = Officers who divorced after MSR (1995 and 
later) are the focus group (179 officers; 143), and officers who got 
divorced within MSR (before 1995), or single, or married form the 
comparison group. (3,720 officers; 3,211)      
Hypotheses Tested Married officers who are on sea duty are more likely to divorce (by 
variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to delay marriage for a single 
officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are 
married (by variable foreign). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, and 
having a military spouse. 
Benefit Using this model, the effects of variables on late divorces are tested. 
 
(2) Basic Model (10) – Period Within MSR (Before 1995) 
Table IV.17. Model 10 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR are excluded and the sample only 
consists of officers who stayed in the Navy until 1995. (N=4,446; 
3,816). In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, 
deployments) within MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Divorced = Officers who divorced within MSR (before 
1995) are the focus group (134 officers; 101), and officers who got 
divorced after MSR (1995 and later), or single, or married form the 
comparison group. (4,312 officers; 3,715)      
Hypotheses Tested Married officers who are on sea duty are more likely to divorce (by 
variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to delay marriage for a single 
officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are 
married (by variable foreign). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, and 
having a military spouse. 










(3) Basic Model (11) – Period Within MSR (Before 1995) 
Table IV.18. Model 11 Description 
 
Sample All officers in the sample are included. (N=5,915; 4,994). In this 
model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) within 
MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Divorced = Officers who divorced within MSR (before 
1995) are the focus group (151 officers; 112), and officers who got 
divorced after MSR (1995 and later), or single, or married form the 
comparison group. (5,764 officers; 4,882)      
Hypotheses Tested Married officers who are on sea duty are more likely to divorce (by 
variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to delay marriage for a single 
officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are 
married (by variable foreign). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, and 
having a military spouse. 
Benefit Comparing this model with Model 10, the early divorce and 
attrition relationship is being tested. 
 
(4) Full Model (12) – Period Within MSR (Before 1995) 
Table IV.19. Model 12 Description 
 
Sample All officers in the sample are included. (N=5,915; 4,994). In this 
model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) within 
MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Divorced = Officers who divorced within MSR (before 
1995) are the focus group (151 officers; 112), and officers who got 
divorced after MSR (1995 and later), or single, or married form the 
comparison group. (5,764 officers; 4,882)      
Hypotheses Tested Married officers who are on sea duty are more likely to divorce (by 
variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to delay marriage for a single 
officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are 
married (by variable foreign); Riskier and more arduous duty has a 
negative effect on officers and causes a higher rate of divorces than 
do other types of duty (by duty variables); Officers who marry in 
the early years of military service are more likely to divorce (by 
rank variables). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, 
commissioning source, and having a military spouse. (since this 
model covers only MSR, the variable early promotion is not tested) 
Benefit This model is basically the same as Model 11. This model tests the 











(5) Full Model (13) – Period Within MSR (Before 1995) 
Table IV.20. Model 13 Description  
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR are excluded and the sample only 
consists of officers who stayed in the Navy until 1995. (N=4,446; 
3,816). In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, 
deployments) within MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Divorced = Officers who divorced within MSR (before 
1995) are the focus group (134 officers; 101), and officers who got 
divorced after MSR (1995 and later), or single, or married form the 
comparison group. (4,312 officers; 3,715)      
Hypotheses Tested Married officers who are on sea duty are more likely to divorce (by 
variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to delay marriage for a single 
officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are 
married (by variable foreign); Riskier and more arduous duty has a 
negative effect on officers and causes a higher rate of divorces than 
do other types of duty (by duty variables); Officers who marry in 
the early years of military service are more likely to divorce (by 
rank variables). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, 
commissioning source, and having a military spouse. (since this 
model covers only MSR, the variable early promotion is not tested) 
Benefit This model is basically the same as Model 10. By comparing 
models 13 and 12, the early divorces and attrition relationship is 
being tested by additional variables. 
 
(6) Full Model (14) – Period After MSR (1995 and later) 
Table IV.21. Model 14 Description 
 
Sample Officers who attrite within MSR (before 1995) are excluded and 
officers who were in duty in 1995 are included. (N=3,899; 3,354). 
In this model, only the duties (such as foreign duties, deployments) 
after MSR are taken into account. 
Dependent Variable Getting Divorced = Officers who divorced after MSR (1995 and 
later) are the focus group (179 officers; 143), and officers who got 
divorced within MSR (before 1995), or single, or married form the 
comparison group. (3,720 officers; 3,211)      
Hypotheses Tested Married officers who are on sea duty are more likely  to divorce (by 
variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to delay marriage for a single 
officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are 
married (by variable foreign); Riskier and more arduous duty has a 
negative effect on officers and causes a higher rate of divorces than 
do other types of duty (by duty variables); Officers who marry in 
the early years of military service are more likely to divorce (by 
rank variables). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, 
commissioning source, and having a military spouse.  
Benefit This model is basically the same as Model 9. Using this model, the 
effects of additional variables on late divorces are tested. 
107 
(7) Full Model (15) – Entire Period (1990-2001) 
Table IV.22. Model 15 Description 
 
Sample All officers in the sample are included. (N=5,915; 4,994). 
Dependent Variable Getting Divorced = Officers who divorced during the entire period 
(1990-2001) are the focus group (325 officers; 251), and officers 
who are single or married form the comparison group. (5,590 
officers; 4,743)      
Hypotheses Tested Married officers who are on sea duty are more likely to divorce (by 
variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to delay marriage for a single 
officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are 
married (by variable foreign); Riskier and more arduous duty has a 
negative effect on officers and causes a higher rate of divorces than 
do other types of duty (by duty variables); Officers who marry in 
the early years of military service are more likely to divorce (by 
rank variables). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, 
commissioning source, early promotion  and having a military 
spouse.  
Benefit This model indicates the cumulative effects of variables on divorces 
of officers for the entire period.  
  
(8) Full Model (16) – Entire Period (1990-2001) 
Table IV.23. Model 16 Description 
 
Sample All officers in the sample are included. (N=5,915; 4,994). 
Dependent Variable Getting Married = Officers who got married during the entire 
period (1990-2001) are the focus group (3,764 officers; 3,285), and 
officers who are single or divorced form the comparison group. 
(2,151 officers; 1,709)      
Hypotheses Tested Sea duty in the early years of military service causes later marriage 
among single officers (by variable sea); Duty overseas will tend to 
delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of 
divorce for those who are married. (by variable foreign); Riskier 
and more arduous duty has a negative effect on officers and causes 
a higher rate of divorces than do other types of duty (by duty 
variables). 
Other Variables Tested Other variables are gender, race, being prior enlisted, entry age, 
commissioning source, and early promotion.  
Benefit This model indicates the cumulative effects of variables on 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
109 
V. RESULTS 
The results of the models are reported in this chapter.  As mentioned in Chapter 
IV, 16 different models are analyzed in this study.  Since female officers are prohibited 
from some duties, in order to prevent a possible bias, each model is estimated twice: one 
with and one without females.  When reporting the results from the baseline models, each 
variable used in the models is discussed separately.  Then the model for those who stay 
and the model for the sample that omits females are reported.  For these two models, only 
the differenc es from the baseline models are reported.  In addition, results are discussed 
separately for the marriage and divorce models.   
Each model is reported in a column.  At the top of each column, the sample 
information is given.  At the bottom of the columns, the number of observations, the 
intercept, log-likelihood value and the predicted probability of marriage (or divorce) are 
listed.  The predicted probability is based on an officer with median or mean values of the 
explanatory variables.  For all models, the base case is an officer who is male, white, not 
prior enlisted, an Academy graduate, has less risky and arduous duty, has an entry age of 
more than 21, did not serve in foreign duty or sea duty, who did not acquire a graduate 
degree, who got married when O-1 (for divorce models) and does not have a military 
spouse (for divorce models).    
In each cell, the standard error is given in parenthesis below the coefficient, and 
the marginal effect (in percentage points) is given in brackets.  The marginal effec t 
reports the change in the probability of marriage (or divorce) when the explanatory 
variable changes by one unit, and other characteristics of the base category remain the 
same.  Since all variables, except sea duty, are binary, the change in each variab le is from 
0 to 1.  For example, the marginal effect of the variable “female” shows the difference in 
the likelihood of getting married or divorced (in percentage points) for a female as 
compared to a male. Marginal effects are reported as percentage point  differences in the 




A. MARRIAGE MODEL RESULTS 
Marriage model results are reported in three tables.  Table V.1 shows the results 
of the baseline models, Table V.2 shows the r esults of the models estimated on a sample 
of those who stay, and Table V.3 shows all model results, where females are omitted 
from the sample.  
1. Baseline Models 
a. Baseline Model Results 
Table V.1 shows the results of two basic and three full baseline models, 
where the dependent variable is “married.”  The samples contain both male and female 
officers.  The full model uses the same sample but includes additional explanatory 
variables on commissioning sources, duties, and early promotion.  The first two models 
analyze marriage during the first 5 years of the officers who entered in 1990.  The second 
two models analyze the marriages in the 7-year period after minimum service 
requirement (MSR) and include all officers who stayed in service after MSR.  The fifth 
model analyzes all marriages during the entire 12-year period (1990-2001) for all officers 
commissioned in 1990.  
 
Table V.1. Baseline Marriage Model Results – All Officers 
 
1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers commissioned in 1990 
(Marriages before MSR) 
All Officers in service in 1995 
(Marriages after MSR) 
 
Variable 
Basic Full Basic Full 
 























































































 -0.132** -0.150** -0.112 -0.086 0.046 
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1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers commissioned in 1990 
(Marriages before MSR) 
All Officers in service in 1995 
(Marriages after MSR) 
 
Variable 
Basic Full Basic Full 
 




































































































































































































































1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers commissioned in 1990 
(Marriages before MSR) 
All Officers in service in 1995 
(Marriages after MSR) 
 
Variable 
Basic Full Basic Full 
 



























































































Intercept -0.7542 -0.5388 -1.4594  -1.5179  0.4618 
N 5915 5915 3899  3899  5915 
-2 Log L 6932.753 6692.075 3665.527  3605.952  7480.973 
Dep. Mean 0.3255 0.3678 0.1974 0.1843 0.6283 
Notes: Each cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parenthesis, and marginal effect in 
brackets 
* Indicates significance at .10 level; ** at .05 level; *** at . 01 level 
N.A. = Not Applicable 
 
b. Analysis of the Baseline Marriage Models (Columns 1 and 3, 
Table V.1) 
SEA: Table V.1 results show that sea duty: (1) does not affect the 
likelihood of marriage for the entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of late m arriages 
(marriages after MSR) by 1.5–3.5 percentage points; and (3) increases the likelihood of 
early marriages (marriages before MSR) by 1 percentage point.  Only the basic model 
supports result (3).  When additional explanatory variables are included in  the full model, 
the significance of the sea duty variable disappears.  Result (2) supports the hypothesis 
that “sea duty in early years of service cause later marriages among single officers.”  
FOREIGN: The results show that foreign duty: (1) does not affect the 
likelihood of marriage of officers for the entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of late 
marriages by 3.5-4 percentage points; and (3) decreases the likelihood of early marriages 
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by 6-8.5 percentage points.  Foreign duty appears to negatively  affect marriages by 
causing late marriages.  Results (2) and (3) support the hypothesis that, “duty overseas 
will tend to delay marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce 
for those who are married.”  
FEMALE: The results show that being female: (1) decreases the 
likelihood of marriage of officers by 16 percentage points for the entire period; (2) 
increases the likelihood of late marriage by 5-7 percentage points; and (3) in the full 
model, increases the likelihood of early marriage by 4.5 percentage points (in the basic 
model, this effect is insignificant).  
Since the results of the basic and full models are the same for the full 
sample and the sample of stayers, results (1) and (2) indicate that being female negatively 
affects marriage both by reducing the likelihood of marriages for the entire period, and by 
increasing late marriages.  However, the addition of new variables changes the results for 
those who stay.   
BLACK: Consistent with the literature review, the results show that 
blacks: (1) have a lower likelihood of getting married by 6 percentage points for the 
entire period; (2) have lower ratio of late marriages by 6 percentage points; and (3) have 
an insignificant effect on early marriages.  
AGE1: Being younger at entry does not affect the likelihood of getting 
married, but it affects the marriage period.  Being younger at entry: (1) decreases the 
likelihood of early marriages by 3 percentage points; and (2) has an insignificant effect 
on late marriages. These results indicate that younger entrants are more likely to be 
married at entry, or to remain single or to get divorced.   
PRIOR: Being prior enlisted: (1) increases the likelihood of marriage by 
6 percentage points for the entire period; (2) decreases the likelihood of  late marriages by 
6-8.5 percentage points; and (3) decreases the likelihood of early marriages by 4-9 
percentage points.  These results show that being prior enlisted increases the likelihood of 
getting married.  Also prior enlisted officers are more likely to be married at entry.  
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PG: Acquiring a graduate education after commissioning: (1) increases 
the likelihood of marriage by 5 percentage points for the entire period; (2) has no effect 
on late marriage; and (3) reduces the likelihood of early marriage by 14 percentage 
points.  
TOPSECRET:  Having a top secret security code: (1) increases the 
likelihood of getting married by 16 percentage points for the entire period; (2) has no 
significant effect on late marriage; and (3) decreases the likelihood of early  marriage by 
28 percentage points.  The results show that officers who have top-secret security code 
are more likely to be married at entry.  
SWO: Being a SWO: (1) does not have a significant effect for the entire 
period; (2) does not have a significant effect on late marriage; and (3) increases early 
marriage by 7.5 percentage points.  SWOs may marry early because they are pessimistic 
about finding a spouse in the future due to deployments.  
SEAL: None of the models show a significant effect of being a Navy 
SEAL on marriage.  Navy SEALs have the same marriage patterns as officers who have 
less arduous duty.  
SUB: Being a submariner: (1) increases the likelihood of marriage by 6 
percentage points for the entire period; (2) does not have a significant effect on late 
marriage; and (3) increases early marriage by 9 percentage points.  The results show that 
submariners are more likely to marry than officers who have less arduous duty, and 
marriages are more likely occur within the first five years of service.  
DIVER: Being a diver: (1) increases the likelihood of early marriages by 
16 percentage; (2) does not have a significant effect on late marriages; and (3) does not 
have an effect on total marriages.  
PILOT: Being a pilot: (1) increases the likelihood of marriage by 5.5 
percentage points for the entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of late marriage by 8 
percentage points; and (3) increases early marriage probability by 10.5 percentage points.  
The results show that pilots are more likely to marry both within  and after MSR than 
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officers who have less arduous duty.  Thus, being a pilot has a positive effect on the 
marriage decisions of officers.  
SURGEON: Being a surgeon: (1) increases the likelihood of marriage by 
21 percentage points for the entire period; and (2) has an insignificant effect on the early 
or late marriages.  
LEGISLATIVE: Having a legislative duty: (1) does not have a 
significant effect on the marriage rates of officers in general; (2) does not have a 
significant effect on late marriages; but (3)  increases the likelihood of early marriages by 
7 percentage points. 
PERSONNEL: Personnel duty (recruiter, detailer and others): (1) 
increases the likelihood of marriage by 13.5 percentage points for the entire period; and 
(2) has no significant effect on early or late marriages.  The results indicate that officers 
who have personnel duties are more likely to be married at entry.  
NROTCSCHOLAR: Having an NROTC scholarship (relative to 
Academy graduates): (1) decreases the likelihood of marriage by 5.5 percen tage points 
for the entire period; (2) does not have a significant effect on late marriage; and (3) 
decreases the likelihood of early marriage by 7 percentage points.  
NROTCNONSCHOLAR: A NROTC non-scholarship graduate: (1) 
decreases the likelihood of getting married by 10 percentage points for the entire period; 
(2) has no effect on late marriage; and (3) decreases the likelihood of early marriage by 8 
percentage points.  
OCS: OCS commissioning source has a negative effect on the likelihood 
of marriage.  The results show that OCS graduates: (1) have a 9.5 percentage points 
lower marriage probability; (2) 6 percentage points lower late marriage probability; and 
(3) 4.5 points lower likelihood of early marriage.  
DIRAPP: Direct appointment (DA) commissioning source increases the 
likelihood of marriages of both male and female officers; however, DA decreases the 
likelihood of early and late marriage, because most of the officers from this 
commissioning source are married at entry.  The results show that direct app ointees:  (1) 
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have a higher marriage probability by 5 percentage points for the entire period; (2) a 
lower late marriage probability by 6.5 percentage points; and (3) a lower early marriage 
probability by 16 percentage points.  The reason a significant por tion of officers from 
direct appointment commissioning source is married at entry can be attributed to the fact 
that they are relatively older at the time of entry and already have a profession, such as a 
physician, which provides social and financial support for them to get married.  
EARLYPRO: Consistent with the literature review about the positive 
relationship between being married and on the job performance, officers who promote to 
O-4 earlier than other officers are more likely to be married.  Accordin g to the results, 
getting an early promotion: (1) increases the likelihood of getting married by 17 
percentage points for the entire period; and (2) increases the likelihood of late marriages 
by 6 percentage points.  The results show that officers who get an early promotion are 
more likely to be married than officers who promote to O-4 on time.  The tendency for 
late marriages is an indicator of having a better-planned lifestyle, which makes these 
officers more successful.    
2. Models Analyzing Stayers  
Table V.2 shows the results of the basic and full models for a sample of stayers.  
The samples contain both male and female officers.  As in Table V.1, the only difference 
between basic and full models is the addition of the variables for commissioning sources, 
duties, and early promotion.  The first two models analyze marriage during the first five 
years (while officers are under MSR).  The second two models analyze marriage within 
the entire period and include only stayers.  The comparison of the first two m odel results 
of Table V.2 with the first two models of Table V.1 will help in explaining marriage -
related separations.  On the other hand, the comparison of the second two model results 
of Table V.2 with the fifth model of Table V.1 will help in explaining  marriage-related 









Table V.2. Marriage Model Results – Stayers Only 
 
1990-1994 1990-2001 
Officers Who Leave at MSR Excluded  
(Marriages in MSR) 
Officers Who Leave at MSR Excluded  
(All Marriages in 1990-2001) 
 
Variable 



























































































































































































Officers Who Leave at MSR Excluded  
(Marriages in MSR) 
Officers Who Leave at MSR Excluded  
(All Marriages in 1990-2001) 
 
Variable 

















































































































































Intercept -0.5232 -0.4223 1.2566 1.2651 
N 4446 4446 3899 3899 
-2 Log L 5389.556 5226.564 4256.343 4150.561 
Dep. Mean 0.3738 0.3935 0.7720 0.7736 
Notes: Each cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parenthesis, and marginal effect in 
brackets 
* Indicates significance at .10 level; ** at .05 level ; *** at .01 level 
N.A. = Not Applicable 
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The two focus variables, “foreign” and “sea” duty have the same effects on 
separation.  The results indicate that officers who marry under the effect of sea or foreign 
duty are more likely to separate, and officers who have sea or foreign duty and continue 
their service after MSR are less likely to marry than their counterparts who do not have 
sea or foreign duty.  In short, sea or foreign duty increases separation and reduces the 
likelihood of marriage for officers who stay in the Navy.  
Married officers who are minorities are less likely to separate.  Officers who 
acquire a graduate degree within the first five years of their service are less likely to 
marry during this period and more likely to separate after acquiring the education.  Of the 
401 officers with the graduate education, 209 separate within MSR.  This underlines an 
important policy issue that graduate education in the early career years increases 
separation, which means these officers prefer to use their human capital investment 
(education) in the civilian sector rather than in the military.     
In terms of risky and arduous duties, the results show that: (1) married officers 
who have top-secret security clearance are more likely to separate than their c ounterparts 
who are not married; (2) married SWOs are more likely to separate and SWOs who stay 
in the Navy after MSR are less likely to be married (than their counterparts who have less 
arduous duty); (3) married submariners are more likely to separate be fore MSR and 
submariners who stay in the Navy after MSR are less likely to be married; (4) divers are 
more likely to make early marriages, but married divers are more likely to separate at 
MSR than single divers; (5)  some of the married pilots separate be fore MSR; and (6) 
officers who have legislative duty are more likely to marry within the first five years of 
their careers, but married officers are more likely to separate before MSR than their 
single counterparts.  
In terms of commissioning sources, both NROTC scholarship and non-
scholarship graduates have lower marriage probabilities (relative to Academy graduates), 
and married officers from NROTC scholarship commissioning source are less likely to 
separate after MSR, and married officers from NROTC non-scholarship commissioning 
source are less likely to separate at MSR.  
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3. Models Analyzing Males Only 
Table V.3 shows the results of all models for samples of male officers.  The 9 
models reported in Table V.3 are the same as the previous 9 models, 5 of them  listed in 
Table V.1 and 4 listed in Table V.2.  
Table V.3. All Marriage Model Results -- Female Officers Omitted 
 
1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers  
(Marriages before 
MSR) 
Officers Who Leave at 
MSR Excluded 
















































































































































































































































































































































1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers  
(Marriages before 
MSR) 
Officers Who Leave at 
MSR Excluded 


























































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -0.7139 -0.5039 -0.4829 -0.3903 -1.4616 -1.5220 1.2298 1.0759 0.2315 
N 4994 4994 3816 3816 3354 3354 3354 3354 4994 
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1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers  
(Marriages before 
MSR) 
Officers Who Leave at 
MSR Excluded 















-2 Log L 5883.285 5647.530 4659.675 4487.416 3104.065 3050.188 3545.589 3438.858 6184.042 
Dep. 
Mean 
0.3355 0.3758 0.3834 0.4003 0.1991 0.1855 0.7675 0.7390 0.5826 
Notes: Each cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parenthesis, and marginal effect in 
brackets 
* Indicates significance at .10 level; ** at .05 level; *** at .01 level  
N.A. = Not Applicable 
   
Comparing Table V.3 with Tables V.1 and V.2 helps to explain gender -related 
differences in marriage patterns.  In terms of different races: (1) blacks have a lower 
likelihood of getting married and this negative effect appears to be stronger for females 
than for males; and (2) male minority officers are less likely to marry early.  
Among the risky and arduous duties: (1) male SWOs are more likely to marry 
than officers who have less arduous duty; and (2) intelligence duty does not have a 
significant effect on marriage of females, but increases the likelihood of late marriage for 
males. 
In terms of commissioning sources: (1) females who are NROTC non -scholarship 
graduate are less likely to have early marriages than Academy graduates, and married 
female officers from this source are less likely to separate within or at the end of MSR; 
(2) married male OCS graduates are less likely to separate within or at the end of MSR; 
and (3) male officers from aviation training program are either more likely to remain 
single or get divorced before MSR.  Finally, females who achieve early promotion to O-4 
are more likely to be married after MSR.  
B. DIVORCE MODEL RES ULTS 
Divorce model results are reported in three tables.  Table V.4 shows the baseline 
models, Table V.5 shows the results of the models for stayers, and Table V.6 shows all 
model results where female officers are omitted.  
1. Baseline Models 
Table V.4 shows the results of two basic  and three full baseline models, where the 
dependent variable is “divorced”.  The samples contain both males and females.  The first 
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two models analyze divorce during the first 5 years of the career of officers who entered 
in 1990.  The second two models analyze divorces in the 7-year period after MSR and 
include only officers who stayed in service after MSR.  The fifth model analyzes all 
divorces during the entire period for all officers commissioned in 1990.  
 
Table V.4. Baseline Divorce Model Results – All Officers 
 
1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers commissioned in 1990 
(Divorces before  MSR) 
All Officers in service in 1995  




Basic Full Basic Full 
 




































































































































































































1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers commissioned in 1990 
(Divorces before  MSR) 
All Officers in service in 1995  




Basic Full Basic Full 
 
All Officers  
(All Divorces) 



















































































































































































































    0.552** 0.444* 
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1990-1994 1995-2001 1990 -2001 
All Officers commissioned in 1990 
(Divorces before  MSR) 
All Officers in service in 1995  




Basic Full Basic Full 
 
All Officers  
(All Divorces) 















































































Intercept -4.1015 -4.5764 -3.3670 -3.7796 -3.8948 
N 5915 5915 3889 3899 5915 
-2 Log L 1376.954 1325.931 1427.301 1386.171 2391.983 
Dep. Mean 0.0171 0.0107 0.0349 0.0238 0.0189 
Notes: Each cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parenthesis, and marginal effect in 
brackets 
* Indicates significance at .10 level; ** at .05 level; *** at .01 level 
N.A. = Not Applicable 
 
SEA: Sea duty: (1) increases the likelihood of divorce by 0.2 percentage point for 
all officers for the entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of late divorce (divorce after 
five years of service) by 0.6-1.2 percentage point for all officers; and (3) does not have a 
significant effect on early divorce (within first five years of service-MSR). 
Result (1) supports the hypothesis that “married officers who are on sea duty are 
more likely to divorce.”  Result s (2) and (3) indicate that divorces mostly occur after the 
first five years of service.  This is reasonable because the negative effects of sea duties 
may cause some damages to families, which may cause spouses to separate (the last stage 
before divorce).  If spouses cannot recover from their problems, they may end up in 
divorce.  The importance of this finding comes from the fact that, since sea duty does not 
cause immediate divorces, there is enough time for family support services to help 
families before divorce happens.    
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FOREIGN: The effects of foreign duty on divorces are similar to the effects of 
sea duty.  Foreign duty: (1) increases the likelihood of divorce by 1 percentage point for 
all officers for the entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of late divorce by 1.5 
percentage point for all officers; and (3) does not have a significant effect on early 
divorce.  The results support the hypothesis that “duty overseas will tend to delay 
marriage for a single officer while increasing the likelihood of divorce for those who are 
married.”  Like sea duty, family support services have time to help officers before the 
negative effects of foreign duty on marriage cause a divorce.  
FEMALE: Full models including duty variables indicate that there is no 
significant effect of being female on divorces.  On the other hand, being female increases 
the likelihood of early divorce by 1-1.2 percentage point, but does not have a significant 
effect on late divorce in basic models.  The significant effect of being female on divorces 
is consistent with the literature review. 
BLACK/OTHER: Inconsistent with the literature review, none of the models 
show a significant effect of being black on divorce.  Black officers analyzed in this thesis 
have the same divorce pattern as white officers.  Officers who are other race/ethnicity 
have the same divorce patterns as white officers.  Since the officer data used in this thesis 
represent the characteristics of a recent group of officers (officers commissioned within 
the last decade), the results suggest that the effects of race/ethnicity on divorce are 
weakening.  
PRIOR: In full models, the effect of being prior enlisted on divorce is 
insignificant, but basic models show that being prior enlisted increases the likelihood of 
early divorces by 0.8-1.0 percentage point. 
PG: Acquiring a graduate education after commissioning, does affect divorce.  
However, this result does not completely test the assumption that “long -term education 
periods may be the first time that families come together for a long period and spouses 
can find opportunity to recognize and evaluate each other which may cause divorces,” 
because the configuration of the data does not allow testing whether divorces occur 
during the education period.  
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SWO: Being SWO does not have a significant effect on total number of divorces 
and the divorce periods.  The results does not support the hypotheses that “married 
officers who are on sea duty are more likely to divorce”; and that “riskier and more 
arduous duty has a negative effect on officers and causes a higher rate of divorces than do 
other types of duty.”  In spite of all difficulties, being SWO does not increase the 
likelihood of divorces.  
SUB: Being a submariner: (1) increases the likelihood of divorces by 2 
percentage points (this is more than twice of the likelihood of divorce of an officer who 
has a less arduous duty); (2) increases the likelihood of late divorces by 3 percentage 
points; and (3) does not have a significant effect on early divorces.  
The results show that submariners are more likely to divorce than officers who 
have less arduous duty, and that the divorces are more likely to occur after MSR.  The 
results support the hypotheses that “married officers who are on sea duty are more likely 
to divorce”, and that “riskier and more arduous duty has a negative effect on officers and 
causes a higher rate of divorces than do other types of duty.”  The results indicate that the 
effectiveness of current monetary incentives (like subpay) and family support services for 
submar iners are questionable.  
The comparison of the model results for SWOs and submariners underlines many 
important findings about the effects of riskier and more arduous duties on divorce.  
Although both SWOs and submariners have long-term deployments, have risky duties, 
have similar marriage patterns, and receive monetary incentives, only submariners have 
higher divorce rates.  This situation indicates that submariners, relative to SWOs, have 
some additional difficulties (caused by the physical and tactical constraints of 
submarines) that increase the likelihood of divorce.  
DIVER/TOPSECRET/SEAL/SURGEON/EMERGENCY/LEGISLATIVE/I
NTELLIGENCE/PERSONNEL/NUCLEARENG/NROTCSCHOLAR/NROTCNO
NSCHOLAR: None of the models show a significant effect of these attributes on 
divorces.  
PILOT: Being a pilot: (1) increases the likelihood of divorce by 1 percentage 
point for the entire period; and (2) does not have a significant effect on divorce timing.  
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OCS: OCS commissioning source increases the likelihood of divorces in all 
models.  OCS commissioning source: (1) increases the likelihood of divorce by 1.2 
percentage point for the entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of early divorces by 1.4 
percentage point; and (3) increases the likelihood of late divorces by 1.3 percentage 
point.  
DIRAPP: Direct appointment commissioning source: (1) increases the likelihood 
of divorce by 2.7 percentage points for the entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of 
early divorces by 2.9 percentage points; and (3) increases the likelihood of lat e divorces 
by 1.5 percentage point.  
EARLYPRO: An early promotion to O-4: (1) increases the likelihood of getting 
divorced by 1 percentage point for the entire period; and (2) increases the likelihood of 
late divorces by 1.7 percentage point.  The results show that officers who receive an early 
promotion are more likely to divorce than officers who promote to O-4 on time, and 
divorces are more likely to occur after MSR (when the time of promotion gets closer).  
This situation may be explained by the “greedy institutions” theory. When officers devote 
themselves completely to their work, the problems within families increase and cause a 
higher chance of divorce relative to families where an officer spends plenty of effort to 
get promoted on time.  
MILSPOUSE: Having a military spouse significantly increases the likelihood of 
divorce.  (In all models, the effect of this variable is significant at 0.01 level).  Having a 
military spouse: (1) increases the likelihood of divorce 3.5 percentage points for the 
entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of early divorces by 1.3-1.8 percentage point; 
and (3) increases the likelihood of late divorces by 3.3-4.4 percentage points.  
Having a military spouse increases the likelihood of divorce in all career points 
and all officer groups, which indicates that there may be problems with the current 
spouse collocation policy.  It also may indicate that family support services cannot 
effectively help military couples.  In addition, the regular income of both military spouses 
indicates that monetary incentives do not always resolve the problems within families. 
Instead, the regular income for both spouses, and especially for females may make it 
easier for spouses to divorce.  
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O2: Interestingly, officers who marry when O-2 are more likely to divorce than 
officers who marry when O-1.  Marrying when O-2: (1) increases the likelihood of 
divorces by 0.8 percentage point for the entire period; (2) increases the likelihood of late 
divorces by 1 percentage point; and (3) does not have a significant effect on early 
divorces.  This result does not support the hypothesis that “officers who marry in the 
early years of military service are more likely to divorce.”  
O3: Getting married when O-3 (relative to O-1): (1) decreases the likelihood of 
divorce 0.7 percentage point for the entire period; (2) decreases the likelihood of early 
divorces by 0.6 percentage point; and (3) decreases the likelihood of late divorces by 0.7 
percentage point.  This result supports the hypothesis that “officers who marry in the 
early years of military service are more likely to divorce.” 
O4: Getting married when O-4 (relative to O-1): (1) decreases the likelihood of 
divorce 1.2 percentage point for the entire period; (2) decreases the likelihood of early 
divorces by 0.9 percentage point; and (3) decreases the likelihood of late divorces by 1 
percentage point.  This result supports the hypothesis that “officers who marry in the 
early years of military service are more likely to divorce.”  
The models show that the variables  of diver, topsecret, SEAL, surgeon, 
emergency, legislative, intelligence, personnel, nucleareng, nrotcscholar, 
nrotcnonscholar, and aviprog have no significant effect on divorce.  
2. Divorce Models Using Stayers Only 
Table V.5 shows the results of one basic and one full model for a sample of 
stayers for the first five years of service.  The samples contain both male and female 
officers.  As will be noticed, there were two more models analyzing marriage -related 
separations for the entire period in Table V.2.  This difference comes from the definitions 
of the dependent variables.  The dependent variable “married” defines an officer who gets 
married once and stays married throughout his or her career.  On the other hand, the 
dependent variable “divorced” defines an officer who divorces within his or her career.  
Thus, an officer who marries second time stays in the divorced category.   
Table IV.7 shows that, out of the 325 divorced officers, 167 officers marry again.  
Since officers who get divorced before MSR are more likely to re-marry after MSR, 
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analyzing divorce-related separations for the entire career period (by using divorces that 
occur within the first career years) may not be appropriate.  Although this does not cause 
any problem for the marriage models, since officers will still be married after MSR, for 
divorce models there is a very high risk of bias in analyzing officers who re-marry, 
instead of divorced ones.  Since this risk will be considerably low for a shorter period, 
only the period before MSR is used to analyze divorce-related separations.  The 
comparison of the model results of Table V.5 with the first two models of Table V.4 will 
help explain divorce-related separations before MSR.  
 
Table V.5. Divorce Outcomes For Stayers Only  
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1990-1994 





































































































































































Intercept -3.8606 -4.2539 
N 4446 4446 
-2 Log L 1174.503 1114.206 
Dep. Mean 0.0219 0.0148 
Notes: Each cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in 
parenthesis, and marginal effect in brackets 
* Indicates significance at .10 level; ** at .05 level; *** at .01 level  
N.A. = Not Applicable 
 
The results show that divorce-related separations are more likely to happen for 
only one gender instead of affecting all officers.  For this reason,  all divorce-related 
separations (except for submariners) will be discussed in the next section, which analyzes 
gender-related differences.  Since female officers are prohibited from serving in 
submarines, it is assumed that gender does not play a role in divorce-related separations 
for submariners.  The results show that submariners are more likely to divorce after MSR, 
and if submariners divorce before MSR, they are more likely to separate within the same 
period.  
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3. Models Analyzing Males Only 
Table V.6 shows the results of all models for samples of male officers.  The 7 
models reported in Table V.6 are the same as the previous 7 divorce models, 5 of in 
Table V.4 and 2 in Table V.5.  
 
Table V.6. All Divorce Model Results -- Female Officers Omitted 
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Intercept  -4.2001 -4.9986 -3.9559 -4.44655 -3.3949 -3.6357 -3.9051 
N 4994 4994 3816 3816 3354 3354 4994 
-2 Log L 1052.332 999.109 916.495 856.847 1169.020 1131.665 1897.382 
Dep. Mean 0.0157  0.0070  0.0202  0.0123  0.0345  0.0277 0.0184  
Notes: Each cell includes estimated coefficient, standard error in parenthesis, and marginal effect in 
brackets 
* Indicates significance at .10 level; ** at .05 level; *** at .01 level  
N.A. = Not Applicable 
 
The results show that: (1) foreign duty causes divorce mostly after MSR for 
female officers, but there is no specific divorce period for male officers; (2) males who 
are younger at entry are more likely to divorce; (3) also, the ones who get divorced 
because of the effects of being younger at entry are more likely to separate within the 
same period; (4) in spite of all difficulties, being SWO does not increase the likelihood of 
divorces; (5) divorced male pilots are more likely to separate before MSR than single 
male pilots; and (6) females who marry when O-2 are more likely to divorce than females 
who marry when O-1.  
In terms of commissioning sources: (1) males who have NROTC scholarship are 
more likely to divorce than Academy graduates; (2) divorced females who have NROTC 
scholarship and divorced male officers who are NROTC non-scholarship graduate are 
less likely to separate at MSR; (3) for OCS graduates, divorce occurs both before and 
after MSR for females, but occurs more likely within MSR for males; and (4) for direct 
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appointments, divorces occur both before and after MSR for females and occur more 
likely at MSR for males.      
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This section provides an overview of the model results.  In this section, two tables 
-- one for marriage and one for divorce models -- summarize the marginal effects of the 
statistically significant variables.  After the tables, the effects of the variables are reported 
very briefly.  In the last part, the results for the samples of stayers are reported.  
1. Marriage Models 
Table V.7 summarizes the marginal effects of the statistically significant variables 
for the marriage models.  Each column represents one model and each row represents one 
variable.  The predicted probability of marriage for each model is reported at the bottom 
of each column.  In each cell, the number above shows the marginal effect of the 
variables for models including both men and women, and the number below shows the 
marginal effect of the variables for models including only men.  
 
Table V.7. Marginal Effects of the Significant Variables – Marriage Models 
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Sea duty, foreign duty, being black, an NROTC scholarship, an NROTC non -
scholarship, an OCS graduate, a submariner or surface warfare officer (stayers), reduces 
the likelihood of marrying.  Being prior enlisted, adding a graduate degree, having a top -
secret security clearance, being a pilot or surgeon, having personnel duties, having a 
direct appointment, or receiving an early promotion to O-4 increases the likelihood of 
marriage.  Besides these variables that affect both male and female officers similarly, 
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being a female officer decreases; being a male surface warfare officer, or of a race other 
than white and black (females) increases the likelihood of marriage.  
Prior enlisted, officers who hold a top-secret security clearance, and officers from 
a direct appointment commissioning source are more likely to be married when entering 
the Navy. Sea duty, foreign duty, being female or a pilot increases, and being black, 
being prior enlisted, being from OCS or a direct appointment source decreases the 
likelihood of late marriage.  On the other hand, sea duty, being a surface warfare officer, 
submariner, diver or pilot, or having legislative duties increases the likelihood of early 
marriage, and foreign duty, being less than 22 at entry, being prior enlisted, adding a 
graduate degree, having a top-secret security clearance, or having an NROTC 
scholarship, OCS, or a direct appointment commissioning source decreases the likelihood 
of early marriage.  
2. Divorce Models 
Table V.8 summarizes the marginal effects of the statistically significant variables 
in the divorce models.  Each column represents one model and each row represents one 
variable.  The predicted probability of divorce for each model is reported at the bottom of 
each column.  In each cell, the number above shows the marginal effect of the variables 
for models including both males and females, and the number below shows the  marginal 
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Sea duty, foreign duty, having a military spouse, being a pilot, entering from OCS 
or via a direct appointment, or obtaining an early promotion to O-4, marrying when an O-
2 (females only) increases, and marrying when an O-3 or O-4 decreases the likelihood of 
divorce.   
In terms of divorce timing, sea duty, having a military spouse, obtaining an early 
promotion to O-4, or being a submariner increases the likelihood of late divorce.  Being 
female or prior enlisted, having a military spouse, having an NROTC scholarship, OCS, 
or a direct appointment increases, and being a submariner or a male pilot, or marrying 
when O-3 or O-4 decreases the likelihood of early divorce.  
3. Results For Stayers  
The comparison of the models shows that the following officer groups are more 
likely to separate than their counterparts: 
· Married officers on sea duty or foreign duty 
· Single officers who have an additional graduate degree within the first five 
years of service (attrite within the same period) 
· Married officers who have top-secret security clearances  
· Married surface warfare officers (generally at the fifth year of service)  
· Married submariners (within the first five years of duty)  
· Married divers (within the first five years of service) 
· Married pilots (generally at the fifth year of service)  
· Married officers who have legislative duty (within the first five years of 
service)  
· Single officers who are from a NROTC scholarship or a non-scholarship 
commissioning sources  
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· Single or divorced males who are from OCS  
· Divorced officers who were less than 22 years old when entering the Navy 
(within the first five years of service)  
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the effects of military assignments and duties on the 
marriage and divorce decisions of Navy officers.  The data for this study contain 
information on U.S. Navy officer s who were commissioned in 1990.  The data were 
provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The year 1990 was chosen 
because of the need for more recent data due to rapidly changing marital trends.  In 
addition, the career length needed to be suff iciently long enough to analyze career 
milestones.  
Since the dependent variables are binary--married versus not married, divorced 
versus not divorced--logit multivariate models were estimated. Sixteen models were 
developed, and each differs slightly in terms of career periods and the number of 
explanatory variables.  These 16 models were estimated twice, one with and one without 
female officers, yielding 32 total regressions.  
Three types of models are used when referring to career periods.  The first 
analyzes the first five years of an officer’s career (1990-1994), and encompasses the 
initial service obligation; the second analyzes the six years after the minimum service 
requirement or MSR (1995-2001); and the third analyzes the entire period.  The first 
period (1990-1994) contains “early marriages and divorces,” and the second period 
indicates “late marriages and divorces.”  Two samples are analyzed: the first analyzes all 
officers, and the second analyzes only officers who stay post -MSR.  Two model 
specifications are used.  The first specification is the basic model, which analyzes the 
effects of sea and foreign duties, gender, race, entry age, being prior enlisted, and having 
a military spouse (for divorce models).  The second, the full model, adds the ef fects of 
riskier and more arduous duties, commissioning sources, early promotion to pay grade O-
4, and rank when getting married (for divorce models).   
According to the marriage models, the duties of a Navy SEAL, an onboard 
nuclear engineer, or an emergency care nurse do not significantly affect marriage 
decisions. Sea duty, foreign duty, being black, being female, a Navy ROTC (NROTC) 
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scholarship, an NROTC non-scholarship, being a graduate of Officer Candidate School 
(OCS), a submariner or surface warfare officer (for those who do not leave at minimum 
service requirement (MSR)) reduce the likelihood of marrying.  Being prior enlisted, 
having a graduate degree, being a pilot or surgeon, having a direct appointment, and 
receiving an early promotion to O-4 increase the likelihood of marriage.  
In terms of marriage timing, officers with prior enlisted service, officers who have 
a top-secret security clearance, and officers commissioned by a direct appointment are 
more likely to be married when entering the Navy. Sea duty, foreign duty, being female, 
and being a pilot increase the likelihood of a late marriage (i.e., after five years of 
service).  Being black, having prior enlisted service, and being commissioned through 
OCS or by direct appointment decrease the likelihood of a late marriage.  On the other 
hand, sea duty, being female, a surface warfare officer, submariner, diver, or pilot 
increase the likelihood of an early marriage (i.e., within the first five years of service).  
Foreign duty, being younger at entry, being prior enlisted, having a graduate degree, and 
being commissioned through NROTC or OCS, or by direct appointment decrease the 
likelihood of an early marriage.  
According to the divorce models, the duties of a Navy SEAL, divers, onboard 
nuclear engineers, surgeons, emergency care nurses and having a graduate degree do not 
significantly affect divorce.  Sea duty, foreign duty, having a military spouse, being a 
submariner or pilot, being commissioned through OCS or by direct appointment, and 
obtaining an early promotion to O-4 increase the likelihood of divorce. At the same time, 
marrying when an O-3 or O-4 decreases the likelihood of later divorce.  
In terms of divorce timing, sea duty, foreign duty (females only), being a 
submariner, having a military spouse, and obtaining an early promotion to O-4 increase 
the likelihood of late divorce (i.e., divorce after the first five years of service).  On the 
other hand, being female, having prior enlisted service, receiving a commission through 
NROTC or OCS or by direct appointment, and having a military spouse increase the 
likelihood of early divorce (i.e., divorce within the first five years of service).  Marrying 




The results show that some variables do not have a significant effect on marriage 
or the divorce decisions of Navy officers in general. Nevertheless, these variables may 
affect certain groups of officers at specific periods.  In addition, although the purpose of 
this study is not to analyze the reasons why officers leave the Navy, the methodology 
helped to reveal certain relationships between separation from service and the marital 
status of officers.  
A comparison of the results from the models shows that the following offic er 
groups are more likely to leave the Navy than their counterparts: 
· Married officers on sea duty or foreign duty 
· Single officers who acquire a graduate degree within the first five years of 
service (tend to leave within the same period) 
· Married officers who have top-secret security clearances  
· Married surface warfare officers (generally leave at the fifth year of 
service)  
· Married submariners (tend to leave within the first five years of duty)  
· Married divers (tend to leave within the first five years of serv ice) 
· Married pilots (generally leave at the fifth year of service)  
· Single officers who had an NROTC scholarship or an NROTC non -
scholarship  
· Single or divorced men who were commissioned through OCS  
· Divorced officers who were less than 22 years old when they entered the 
Navy (tend to leave within the first five years of service)  
· Submariners who divorced within the first five years of duty  
The results of the models highlight various important issues.  The factors that 
reduce the likelihood of marriage and those that increase the likelihood of divorce should 
be the main concerns of policy makers. At the same time, some factors that affect 
marriage and divorce also have an indirect effect on the decisions of Navy officers to 




The major findings of this study are discussed below. 
1. Comparison of Submarine and Surface Warfare Officers  
Comparing surface warfare officers (SWOs) and submariners yields some 
important findings about the effects of duties and assignments on the marital status of 
Naval officers.  Although these two duties have many common characteristics, their 
effects on divorce are different.  Being a submariner increases the likelihood of a divorce, 
and generally causes late divorces, while being a SWO does not increase the likelihood of 
a divorce, and even decreases the likelihood of late divorces for men.  Both SWOs and 
submariners are more likely to marry within the first five years of service.  Although 
SWOs and submariners both marry early, the results suggest that SWO marriages ar e 
much healthier than the marriages of submariners. This may relate to the observation that 
submariners are more pessimistic, or have fewer opportunities than surface warfare 
officers, about finding a suitable spouse.  
Since these two groups deploy frequently, the finding that submariners are more 
likely to divorce suggests that deployment itself may not be a leading cause of divorce.  
When deployment is combined with other factors the chances of divorce are increased.  
Some of the additional difficulties associated with being a submariner relative to being a 
SWO are as follows: submariners cannot communicate with their families as much as 
SWOs because of physical constraints (deep diving or tactical constraints); submariners 
cannot have as many port visits as SWOs (and they cannot relax as much during 
deployments); submariners cannot always have fresh air/fresh food, and the environment 
is hygienically disadvantageous; diving often causes personnel to confuse the day/night 
cycle and thus lose the regular rhythm of sleep and work; submariners are exposed to 
limited sunshine (D vitamin); and submariners risk their lives more often due to the 
sensitivity of the technical problems while diving.  In addition, the results suggest that t he 
current monetary incentives (accession pay, subpay, continuation pay, or annual incentive 
pay) for submariners are not likely to compensate for the difficulties caused by this duty.  
This view is also supported by other studies.  Nakada, Mackin and Mackie (1996), for 
example, studied the effects of monetary incentives on retention decisions of nuclear 
officers, and found that submariners are less affected by monetary incentives than are 
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SWOs.92 Intrinsic rewards may be far more important. This may help to explain why 
submariners are less responsive to increases in monetary retention incentives.   
2. The Timing of Divorce    
One of the important findings of this study concerns the timing of divorce.  
Instead of divorcing immediately, divorces influenced by sea duty or being a submarine r 
mostly occur after the first five years of service.  This underscores the fact that there is 
enough time and opportunity for family support services to help families by providing 
different programs to resolve problems before divorce occurs.  On the other  hand, the 
factors that influence more immediate divorce, such as being younger than others upon 
entering the Navy and marrying relatively early, should be recognized, and any 
associated problems should be treated differently and more aggressively by famil y 
support services.     
3. Making Generalizations in Analyses    
Although the occupations selected for the models are considered more risky and 
arduous than others, the results do not always come out as expected. For example, certain   
occupations, such as  pilots, surgeons, and personnel specialists, actually increase the 
likelihood of marriage. Consequently, making predictions about occupations is difficult, 
and it may be necessary to analyze each occupation separately.  
Having a military spouse increases the likelihood of divorce in all career points 
and all officer groups.  This suggests that problems may exist with the current spouse 
collocation policy.  It may also imply that family support services cannot effectively help 
military couples.  In addition, the regular income of both military spouses suggests that 
monetary incentives do not always resolve the problems within families.  Instead, the 
regular income for both spouses, and especially for women, may actually make it easier 
for spouses to divorce.  
Another important finding concerns the on-the-job performance and marital status 
of officers. Previous studies have looked at the effects of marital status on performance, 
but the present study analyzed the opposite: the effects of performance on marital s tatus.  
Consistent with previous studies, a significant relationship was found between being 
                                          
92 Nakada, Michael K., Mackin, Patrick C., Mackie, Christopher D., “Nuclear Officer Retention: MSR  
and Beyond”, Navy Personnel Research and Development  Center, 1996.      
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married and obtaining an early promotion.  However, working harder also increases the 
likelihood of divorce.  Ambitious officers either have to select a spouse who  is very 
understanding or as ambitious as themselves, or they have to make a choice between their 
career and their family.    
The results regarding prior enlisted service suggest that military experience 
reduces the likelihood of divorce.   According to the results,  officers with prior service are 
more likely to be married at commissioning.  In addition, those who are single are less 
likely to marry within the first five years of duty, but are more likely to divorce within the 
same period.  The effects of being prior enlisted on divorce are insignificant after the first 
five years.  These results show that prior enlisted officers are more likely to divorce if 
they are married at entry and less likely to divorce if they marry after becoming an 
officer .  This may suggest that either additional military experience helps these officers 
select a more suitable spouse for a military family, or maturity or life experience 
promotes greater stability in marriage.  
Another important finding relates to long-term education within the first five 
years of service.  Officers who acquire graduate degrees are more likely to stay single and 
leave the Navy within the same five-year period after obtaining the degree.  
Significant differences are found in the effects of various commis sioning sources 
on marital status.  The higher likelihood of divorce, lower likelihood of marriage, and 
higher likelihood of separation in other commissioning sources relative to Naval 
Academy graduates suggests that Academy graduates have “healthier” marr iages. The 
reasons may relate more directly be marrying relatively late (because of restrictions on 
marriage when receiving an Academy education), or better and longer preparation for 
military life. 
Many personal factors are found to affect the marital sta tus of Naval officers.  
Personality, the effect of relatives, money, environment, and “luck” are some of the 
factors that may explain why all submariners do not divorce in spite of all the difficulties 
discussed in this particular duty, or why many more of ficers who have less risky and 
arduous duty are not married.  However, the results suggest that military duties and 
assignments also affect marital status.  Instead of general policies for the well -being of 
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officers, the negative effects of these duties and assignments may be reduced only by 
specific policies that recognize the difficulties of each single duty.    
C. RECOMMENDATIONS   
1. Recommendations for Policy Makers  
Similar studies should be conducted for the other services. Examining duties and 
assignments that are unique to each military branch would help policy makers determine 
which specific group of military personnel are the most affected and what specific 
programs may alleviate the problems.  Policy makers can then concentrate financial and 
manpower resources on the personnel groups with the greatest problems and develop 
more effective policies.  
In addition, further research should be conducted on current collocation policies. 
In this study, military couples seem to have the greatest difficulty in preserving their 
marriage. Besides modifications of the collocation policy, some additional improvements, 
such as special childcare programs in times of deployments, and providing unconditional 
holiday and leave periods for both spouses at the same time,  may help alleviate the 
apparent stress on marriage experienced by military couples.  
For officers on sea duty, and especially for submariners, incentives that would 
help to reduce on-the-job stress, and make it possible to spend quality time with families , 
such as longer holidays with family members during port visits, or more relaxed and 
flexible working conditions during nondeployment periods, may help to promote stronger 
spousal and family relationships.   
Since one of the major concerns of policy makers is to increase the retention of 
military officers, the effects of marital status on separation should also be taken into 
account. Making assignments based on marital status to decrease the likelihood of 
separation may result in perceptions of inequity or other problems. However, careful 
screening of these groups, when possible, such as screening at accession or screening for 
foreign duty, may help to prevent some separations caused by family -related problems.    
A final recommendation concerns the active participation of military personnel 
from different occupations in family support programs. Although personnel working in 
family support services are considered experts in solving family -related problems, it is 
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possible that they approach the problems of each occupation in the same manner.  
According to the findings of this study, however, each occupation has unique 
characteristics, and job-related problems may be better diagnosed when personnel from 
the same occupation group, such as pilots, submariners, and so forth, are also included in 
family support services.  
2. Recommendations for Future Research 
This study is important because of its emphasis, for the first time, on the effects of 
different duties and assignments on the marital status of Navy officers.  On the other 
hand, it is limited to Navy officers only.  Statistics on the marital status of Navy enlisted 
personnel show that they tend to have lower marriage rates and higher divorce rates than 
Naval officers.  In terms of the armed forces, as shown in Table III.6, marriage rates of 
Marine Corps personnel are lower, and the divorce rates of Army and Air Force 
personnel are higher, than those of Navy personnel.  The present study suggests that 
military duties and assignments significantly affect marital status.  The effects of duties 
on the marital status of officer and enlisted personnel from each branch of the military 
should be analyzed separately.  
Another recommendation relates to the selection of personnel cohorts in future 
studies.  Since marital status trends are changing rapidly within both the U.S. civilian 
population and the U.S. Armed Forces, personnel cohorts should be selected in such a 
way that they should be recent enough to represent current marital status trends, but at the 
same time, old enough to allow for the analysis of different career points.     
Since the data for this study did not include cohabitation, marital separation, being 
widowed, and being a single parent, these important and possibly more problematic 
areas, could not be analyzed.  Analyzing these issues in future studies may help to better 
understand the transition periods between single, married, and divorced personnel.  
One limitation of this study concerns the accuracy of some data.  Due to the 
structure of the data and missing information, some assumptions had to be made.  For 
example, since the exact deploying units were not known, all officers who were assigned 
to ships were assumed to be deployed, without, in fact, knowing whether the units were 
active or in a maintenance period. In addition, because of data problems, an important 
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variable, the number of dependents, could not be used in divorce models.  Future studies 
should include the number of dependents, marriage age, the exact duty at the time 
personnel marry or divorce, and how long the spouses are acquainted before marrying.  
As previously observed, the primary purpose of this study was to analyze how 
certain military duties and assignments affect the marital status of military personnel.  
More comprehensive and more accurate studies, with the help of better -organized data, 
would help policy makers resolve family -related problems and use scarce resources more 
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